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Abstract 
Cognitive performance has previously been shown to be associated with time to 
death in a broad range of studies.  There are multiple perspectives that have been used 
to better understand this relationship, including identifying the types of cognitive 
abilities that predict mortality, investigating potential mechanisms that might explain 
the relationship, examining whether level of ability or changes in ability are responsible 
for the association, assessing evidence of terminal decline and exploring patterns of 
late-life decline.  It is also important to rule out the confounding of the relationship 
between cognition and time to death by other factors such as mental health.  Five 
research articles investigated multiple aspects of the relationship between cognition and 
mortality using the Canberra Longitudinal Study cohort, a sample of 896 community-
dwelling Australians aged 70 and older.  Findings suggested that fluid intelligence was 
a better predictor of mortality than crystallised intelligence.  While socioeconomic 
status, health behaviours and health status accounted for some of the variance in the 
relationship, certain domains of cognitive ability including processing speed and global 
ability had an independent effect on mortality.  Using unbiased estimates of cognitive 
change, it was found that initial cognitive performance was a better predictor of 
mortality, particularly cardiovascular mortality, than the rate of change in ability.  
However, there was evidence of terminal decline in the sample, with decline 
accelerating two- to four-fold, beginning 6-8 years prior to death across various 
abilities.  Although education modified the time course of terminal decline, the effects 
were not consistent with the predictions of the cognitive reserve hypothesis.  Age-
related decline in ability could not be attributed to common biological constraints, as 
little evidence was found for late-life dedifferentiation of abilities after accounting for 
dementia.  Finally, depression and anxiety had no significant association with mortality 
after accounting for physical health, indicating that the cognition-mortality relationship 
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did not result from confounding by mental health status.  Overall, late-life cognitive 
performance appears to be related to mortality partly because it reflects life-long 
outcomes from a range of health behaviours, disease states, educational experience and 
socioeconomic background.  In addition, pathological events including dementia and 
cardiovascular changes may contribute to the decline of cognitive performance that 
occurs in proximity to death.  However, beyond these influences, there is an aspect of 
cognitive ability that is independently predictive of mortality. 
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INTEGRATED INTRODUCTION 
 
Cognitive performance has previously been shown to be associated with time to 
death in a broad range of studies (Bäckman & MacDonald, 2006; Batty, Deary, & 
Gottfredson, 2007; Bosworth & Siegler, 2002; Deary, 2005; Ghisletta, McArdle, & 
Lindenberger, 2006; Pavlik et al., 2003; Portin et al., 2001; Shipley, Der, Taylor, & 
Deary, 2006; Sliwinski et al., 2006; Small & Bäckman, 1999).  A variety of 
explanations have been proposed for this association.  The theory of terminal decline 
suggests that pathological events in the few years prior to death hasten the rate of 
decline in cognitive performance (Kleemeier, 1962; Riegel & Riegel, 1972; Sliwinski et 
al., 2006; Thorvaldsson et al., 2008).  Research has implicated a range of factors in the 
association between cognition and mortality, from developmental events, childhood 
intelligence, genes and environment, through lifetime health behaviours and health 
literacy, to physical disease or vitality and mental health status, in concert with 
normative neurological decline and dementia (Bäckman & MacDonald, 2006; Deary, 
2005).  Understanding why cognitive performance is associated with mortality may 
further distinguish the mechanisms that lead to cognitive decline, dementia and death.  
In addition, understanding patterns of cognitive decline prior to death provides further 
insight into of the reasons for the decline.  As cognitive decline and mortality may both 
be driven by complex interactions between multiple factors, examining these outcomes 
using a range of methodologies that account for the diversity of the aging population is 
vital to understanding these processes. 
The relationship between cognition and mortality has been examined from a 
number of perspectives.  Many prospective studies have directly described the 
relationship between late-life cognitive performance and mortality, taking either cross-
sectional or longitudinal measures of cognitive performance.  In such studies, the 
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outcome is usually survival time, and methods such as survival analysis (primarily Cox 
proportional hazards regression) are used.  This methodology has been extended to 
examine whether changes in cognitive performance over time are associated with 
mortality, using a variety of methods of estimating change including latent growth 
models (Johansson et al., 2004) and mixed effects models (Ghisletta et al., 2006).  A 
converse perspective has investigated the effect of time-to-death on cognitive 
performance, to explain the phenomenon of terminal decline.  The hastening of 
cognitive decline in proximity to death has been proposed to result from pathological 
processes that are distinct from normative age-related cognitive decline.  Methods such 
as change point models (Sliwinski et al., 2006; Thorvaldsson et al., 2008) have been 
used to test the conditions in which terminal decline might occur.   
Explaining the nature of cognitive change close to death may also be achieved 
by examining relationships between different cognitive domains in terms of 
developmental trajectories.  Specifically, the differentiation-dedifferentiation hypothesis 
is the most prominent developmental theory of late-life cognitive decline (Baltes, 
Cornelius, Spiro, Nesselroade, & Willis, 1980; Garrett, 1946; Li & Lindenberger, 
1999).  The theory suggests that different cognitive abilities become more closely 
related in old age in response to biological constraints, much as they become 
differentiated in childhood and early adulthood due to motivation, interest and fluid 
ability (Tucker-Drob, 2009).  Understanding relationships between different cognitive 
abilities may help to reveal the underlying bases for their decline in late life. 
Finally, the investigation of a broad range of risk factors is important in 
identifying whether relationships between cognition and mortality are influenced by 
sociodemographic factors, health behaviours, physical health or mental health.  
Understanding the factors associated with individual differences in cognitive aging may 
provide greater insight into why cognitive decline occurs and how it may be related to 
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mortality.  One area of particular importance involves the associations observed 
between late-life depression and declines in cognitive performance (Christensen, 
Griffiths, Mackinnon, & Jacomb, 1997; Jorm, 2000).  Previous research has also found 
a consistent relationship between depression and mortality (Cole & Bellavance, 1997; 
Cuijpers & Schoevers, 2004; Harris & Barraclough, 1998; Saz & Dewey, 2001; Schulz, 
Drayer, & Rollman, 2002; Wulsin, Vaillant, & Wells, 1999), although only limited 
evidence for a relationship between anxiety and mortality (Dewey & Chen, 2004; Harris 
& Barraclough, 1998).  Determining the role of mental health on late-life mortality is 
important for assessing whether the cognition-mortality relationship may be 
confounded. 
This thesis examines the relationship between cognition and mortality from 
multiple perspectives using the Canberra Longitudinal Study cohort (Christensen et al., 
2004).  The study is a community-based cohort study that commenced in 1990 with a 
sample of 896 elderly participants from cities of Canberra and Queanbeyan in Australia.  
Participants in the study completed comprehensive surveys every four years for twelve 
years, assessing their cognitive performance, physical health, social interactions, 
background variables and a range of other measures.  The final wave of interviews was 
completed in 2002.  However, the study continued to collect vital status information 
beyond the interview period, finishing in mid-2007 with up to 17 years of vital status 
follow-up.  These data have provided a new opportunity for studying relationships 
between cognition and mortality.  The thesis presents five manuscripts each reporting a 
study addressing a facet of the issues above.  The manuscripts have been published in 
(or submitted to) peer-reviewed journals. The topics covered are: (i) survival as a 
function of cognitive performance (Batterham, Christensen, & Mackinnon, 2009), (ii) a 
comparison of two methods to examine cause-specific mortality as a function of 
cognitive change (Batterham, Mackinnon, & Christensen, submitted), (iii) estimation of 
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the effects of education on terminal decline using change point models (Batterham, 
Mackinnon, & Christensen, in press), (iv) a comparison of age and time-to-death as 
indicators for cognitive dedifferentiation (Batterham, Christensen, & Mackinnon, in 
press-a), and, (v) an analysis of the relationship between mental health symptoms and 
mortality (Batterham, Christensen, & Mackinnon, in press-b).  The following sections 
provide a background of research and theory for each of the studies and provide context 
for their inclusion in the thesis. 
 
Research examining the relationship between cognitive performance and mortality 
The bulk of the literature examining the relationship between cognition and 
mortality has used prospective or retrospective study designs to observe how initial 
performance on cognitive tasks might be associated with subsequent survival time or 
mortality rates.  While most prospective studies examining the relationship find 
evidence that poorer cognitive performance is associated with shorter survival time, the 
relationship is dependent of the type of test administered, the age of the cohort and the 
length of the follow-up period.  Much of the research has examined the effect using tests 
of general intelligence.  A review of nine studies on the relationship between early-life 
intelligence (between the ages of 8 and 22) and later mortality risk (Batty et al., 2007) 
reported that all studies found an association between higher intelligence and lower 
mortality.  Even long-term studies of intelligence and mortality have shown that better 
cognitive abilities predict lower all-cause mortality, even over extended periods.  
Whalley and Deary (2001) retrospectively traced the vital status of 2,230 participants of 
the Scottish Mental Survey of 1932 for 65 years until 1997 and found that the hazard of 
mortality over the 65 year follow-up period was decreased by 21% for each 15-point 
increase in scores on a test of general intelligence.  Similarly, Deeg, Hofman, & van 
Zonneveld (1990) retrospectively examined a cohort of 211 elderly Dutch residents who 
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were administered the Wechsler Memory Scale in 1957.  After 26 years of follow-up, 
both lower initial performance on the scale and decreases in performance over the first 
eight years of follow-up were significantly associated with survival time (Deeg et al., 
1990). 
Other research has examined whether specific domains of cognitive function are 
associated with mortality.  Poor executive performance tends to be associated with 
higher mortality risk, even after adjustment for health and sociodemographic measures 
(Bassuk, Wypij, & Berkman, 2000; Blazer, Sachs-Ericsson, & Hybels, 2005; Dartigues 
et al., 2007; Liang, Bennett, Sugisawa, Kobayashi, & Fukaya, 2003; Schultz-Larsen, 
Rahmanfard, Kreiner, Avlund, & Holst, 2008).  However the relationship is not always 
found to be significant (Ganguli, Dodge, & Mulsant, 2002; Ostbye et al., 2006) and may 
be attenuated over longer follow-up periods (Ganguli et al., 2002; van Gelder, Tijhuis, 
Kalmijn, Giampaoli, & Kromhout, 2007).  Verbal ability tends to be robust to the 
effects of aging and is less likely to be associated with mortality after adjusting for 
health and social status (Abas, Hotopf, & Prince, 2002; Anstey, Luszcz, Giles, & 
Andrews, 2001; Rabbitt et al., 2002).   
Poor performance on short-term memory tasks (Ghisletta et al., 2006; Portin et 
al., 2001; Shipley et al., 2006) or associative learning tasks (Abas et al., 2002; Ghisletta 
et al., 2006; Rabbitt et al., 2002; Royall, Chiodo, Mouton, & Polk, 2007) tends to be 
more strongly associated with increased mortality rates than performance on tests of 
general intelligence or tests of executive functioning.  Likewise, tests of processing 
speed such as Digit-Symbol Substitution (Anstey et al., 2001; Ghisletta et al., 2006; 
Pavlik et al., 2003; Portin et al., 2001) have strong associations with mortality.  As 
performance on such tests is often reliant on motor speed, it has been suggested that 
decline in these basic abilities may be driving the association with mortality (Deary & 
Der, 2005).  Nevertheless, the effects are often strong even after accounting for health 
18 
status, and sensory and motor abilities (Ghisletta et al., 2006; Pavlik et al., 2003).  In 
general, evidence suggests that tests with a fluid intelligence component tend to be more 
strongly predictive of mortality than crystallised intelligence tests. 
To better understand why cognitive performance may be associated with 
mortality, it is necessary to examine a range of cognitive abilities and account for 
possible mediators or moderators that may explain the mechanism of the association.  
Deary (2005) has categorised possible mechanisms to explain the childhood intelligence 
and mortality connection into three general mechanisms, which are equally relevant to 
explaining the relationship between late-life cognitive ability and death.  Firstly, socio-
economic status may mediate the relationship between intelligence and mortality.  
Disadvantages in intelligence lead to burdens in occupation, which are linked to poorer 
health outcomes (Siegrist & Marmot, 2004).  Secondly, the relationship may be 
mediated by health behaviours and knowledge.  Many positive health behaviours that 
prevent disease, including health monitoring, screening, medication adherence and 
becoming health literate, require high levels of cognitive functioning (Gottfredson & 
Deary, 2004).  Conversely, poor cognitive ability may be associated negative health 
behaviours, including substance use, poor diet, decreased physical activity and low 
healthcare utilization (Deary, 2005), leading to poorer health outcomes and greater risk 
of mortality.   
Thirdly, the relationship between intelligence and mortality may be due to a 
common association with health status.  Studies of the common cause hypothesis have 
linked sensory function, lung function, grip strength and other biological markers with 
performance on cognitive tests (Christensen, Mackinnon, Korten, & Jorm, 2001; 
Salthouse, Hancock, Meinz, & Hambrick, 1996).  To a considerable extent, intelligence 
reflects core processing mechanisms such as reaction time, which may decline in direct 
response to biological deterioration (Deary & Der, 2005).  Intelligence may therefore 
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serve as a marker of biological fitness (Deary, 2005).  In addition, development in early 
life, influenced by foetal events, birth weight and early nutrition, shapes future patterns 
of health and disease and may confound the relationship between intelligence and 
mortality (Deary, 2005). 
Few studies of the relationship between cognition and mortality have explicitly 
tested these potential mechanisms.  Systematic adjustment for measures of 
socioeconomic status, health behaviours and health status enables estimation of the 
proportion of the variance in the relationship that may be explained by each of these 
mechanisms.  Such investigation of the relationship is also necessary for furthering our 
understanding of why cognitive abilities such as processing speed are associated with 
mortality, while other abilities such as verbal performance are not.  Previous studies 
have demonstrated that socioeconomic status and health factors may attenuate this 
relationship but that core processes such as processing speed and reaction time remain 
critical in predicting mortality (Deary & Der, 2005; Pavlik et al., 2003; Shipley et al., 
2006; Shipley, Der, Taylor, & Deary, 2007).  However, with few studies directly testing 
these mechanisms of the relationship in aging cohorts, further investigation across a 
range of cognitive abilities is warranted. 
The first study in the present thesis systematically examined three potential 
mechanisms for the relationship between cognition and mortality in the Canberra 
Longitudinal Study cohort (Batterham et al., 2009).  While this relationship has been 
widely studied using survival analysis, the first study took a hierarchical modelling 
approach to assess each of the three primary mechanisms detailed by Deary (2005).  
The association between tasks tapping fluid and crystallised intelligence and all-cause 
mortality was assessed, accounting for possible moderation by sociodemographic 
factors, health behaviours and health status.  This study also examined whether fluid 
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intelligence was more strongly related to mortality than crystallised intelligence.  The 
manuscript begins on page 43. 
 
Research examining changes in cognitive performance with respect to mortality 
There has been markedly less research examining how change in cognition, as 
opposed to levels of cognitive performance, might be associated with mortality.  
Bosworth and Siegler (2002) reviewed studies that examined change in cognition as a 
predictor of mortality.  The review noted that while an established relationship exists 
between cognitive performance and risk of mortality, the relationship between rate of 
cognitive change and mortality is less clear.  Only nine studies met the selection criteria 
for the review, which covered the period from 1975-2000.  Among the included studies, 
methods used to assess cognitive change included the comparison of mean differences 
(Bosworth & Schaie, 1999; Mortensen & Kleven, 1993), categorizing participants as 
decliners or non-decliners based on the size of change scores (Anstey et al., 2001) or 
grouping the sample by time to death and comparing change in cognitive scores 
(Johansson & Berg, 1989).  These methods only account for within-person change or 
rely on arbitrary characterizations of decline.  The reviewed studies also tended not to 
adjust for the initial level of performance, which may confound the effects of change in 
performance.  Bosworth and Siegler (2002) concluded that the relationship between 
cognitive change and mortality has not been clearly established, necessitating further 
analysis of existing and future population-based studies to provide a better 
understanding of the relationship. 
More recent studies of the relationship between cognitive change and mortality 
have used more defensible and robust methods to characterise change.  Johansson et al. 
(2004) and Ghisletta et al. (2006) used two related methods to obtain unbiased estimates 
of change in cognition to predict mortality.  Johansson et al. (2004) used a latent growth 
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model, while Ghisletta et al. (2006) used a mixed model approach to obtain Best Linear 
Unbiased Predictors of linear change (BLUPs).  Both studies found some effect of 
cognitive change on all-cause mortality.  However the types of cognitive decline 
associated with mortality differed: Johansson et al. (2004) reported an association 
between declines in crystallised abilities and mortality, while Ghisletta et al. (2006) 
reported that declines in speed and fluency were significantly related to survival time.  
Given the disparate findings, a comparison of the two methods for investigating the 
effect of cognitive change on mortality would serve as an important development.  
Furthermore, these methods may also be extended to examine cause-specific mortality 
within a survival analysis framework, which has not previously been done using latent 
growth models.  Specifically, Johansson et al. (2004) used time-to-death as a predictor 
of cognitive change within the latent growth model, rather than using time-to-death as 
an outcome and accounting for censored (surviving) observations.  Given these 
omissions from past research and the divergence of findings, further examination of the 
relationship between cognitive change and both all-cause and cause-specific mortality 
using these two emerging methods would provide an important and innovative 
extension to the literature. 
Recognising these deficits, the second study (Batterham et al., submitted) 
examined whether longitudinal within-person changes in cognitive performance were 
associated with mortality.  As very little research has used defensible methods for 
assessing within-person cognitive change with respect to mortality, the study compared 
two unbiased methods for estimating cognitive change.  Latent growth models 
(Johansson et al., 2004) and best linear unbiased predictors (Ghisletta et al., 2006) were 
used to generate within-person level and slope estimates of cognitive performance over 
time.  The study extended previous research by examining whether these estimates of 
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change were associated with mortality from specific causes, including cardiovascular 
disease, respiratory disease and cancer.  This manuscript is presented on page 73. 
 
Research on changes in the rate of cognitive decline: the terminal decline theory 
An alternative approach that directly tests the theory of terminal decline is to 
examine how the rate of cognitive decline changes in proximity to death.  Change in 
cognition may not be strongly predictive of time-to-death because changes in cognitive 
performance may not accelerate continuously as death approaches (Sliwinski et al., 
2006).  The terminal decline theory originally proposed by Kleemeier (1962) and 
developed by Riegel and Riegel (1972) suggests that cognitive decline is initially 
gradual, resulting from normative age-related changes in cognition, then accelerates due 
to pathological events closer to death.  This conceptualization of terminal decline 
suggests that instead of examining linear or quadratic changes in cognitive performance, 
decline in proximity to death might be better characterised as having two distinct phases 
– preterminal decline and terminal decline.  The preterminal phase is proposed to 
represent normative changes, while the terminal phase occurs close to death when 
biological constraints increase resulting in more rapid decline in cognitive performance 
(Laukka, MacDonald, & Bäckman, 2008; Sliwinski et al., 2006). This hypothesis can be 
explicitly tested by partitioning longitudinal data to estimate the change point at which 
the terminal phase begins, and estimating the two rates of change before and after the 
change point.  Only recently have researchers developed methods to formally model the 
time course of terminal decline.  Hall, Lipton, Sliwinski and Stewart (2000) were the 
first to use the change point method for identifying the onset of cognitive decline prior 
to the diagnosis of Alzheimer‟s Disease.  Wilson et al. (2003), Sliwinski et al. (2006), 
Wilson et al. (2007) and Thorvaldsson et al. (2008) have used the method to distinguish 
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terminal cognitive decline from preterminal cognitive decline with respect to time-to-
death. 
Change point models allow for two rates of change, with the time from a 
specified base point to death partitioned on the basis of a hypothesised change point.  
To account for within-person change, fixed and random effects of the two slopes are 
included in the models.  A range of change points are tested, starting, for example, 20 
years prior to death, then incrementing this point by monthly intervals.  The fit of 
models using each of the potential change points across the range can then be compared 
using a fit statistic (usually -2 log likelihood) with the optimal change point being 
selected using this criterion.  Using a likelihood function as the criterion also allows for 
a confidence interval to be calculated around the change point.  Once a specific change 
point is selected, rates of terminal decline may be compared to rates of preterminal 
decline.  Using the change point method, Wilson and colleagues (2003; 2007) identified 
change points around 3.5 years, while Sliwinski et al. (2006) and Thorvaldsson et al. 
(2008) generally identified change points between 5-9 years prior to death.  The rate of 
terminal decline was generally 2-5 times greater than the rate of decline in the 
preterminal phase.  Some of the variation in findings may be explained by 
methodological differences, such as Wilson et al. (2003; 2007) including survivors in 
their models using a slight variation of Hall et al.‟s (2000) change point model.  
However, much of the variation appears likely to be due to the types of cognitive 
measures used to characterise decline.  The four studies generally reported findings for 
single cognitive tests or global composite scores, with the exception of Thorvaldsson et 
al. (2008) who found marked differences across different domains of ability.  
Consequently, it is important to examine a range of cognitive abilities to determine the 
specificity of the terminal decline phenomenon. 
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The change point method may also be extended to examine the effects of 
specific risk factors on terminal decline.  One specific risk factor of interest is poor 
education, as the theory of cognitive reserve suggests that education may increase the 
brain‟s ability to compensate for pathology (Stern, 2002).  Education may be associated 
with a greater number of healthy synapses or neurons, more efficient circuits of synaptic 
connectivity or more efficient use of alternative brain networks (Scarmeas, Albert, 
Manly, & Stern, 2006).  The functional effects of this reserve may be seen in research 
suggesting that increased education delays the onset of Alzheimer‟s disease, although, 
ultimately, rate of decline is more rapid among more highly educated individuals (Stern, 
Albert, Tang, & Tsai, 1999).  Thus it may be expected that terminal decline may be 
altered similarly, with increased education hypothesised to delay the onset but be 
associated with an accelerated rate of terminal decline.  Wilson et al. (2007) examined 
the effects of multiple risk factors on terminal decline, including education.  While they 
found no effect of education on the rate of decline, they did not examine whether 
cognitive reserve may influence specific domains of cognitive decline, as they only 
examined a global cognition composite score.   
Further examination of the effect of education on terminal decline is therefore 
warranted. Accordingly, the third study (Batterham, Mackinnon et al., in press) 
examined evidence for terminal decline in the Canberra Longitudinal Study cohort.  The 
change point methodology (Hall et al., 2000) was used to describe the time course of 
terminal decline by estimating the point of onset of terminal decline and comparing 
rates of decline before and after this point.  To test whether cognitive reserve impacted 
the onset or rate of terminal decline, the effect of education on terminal decline was 
assessed across three domains of cognitive performance: processing speed, global 
cognition and episodic memory.  Analyses also accounted for dementia and other 
potential confounders.  This manuscript begins on page 105. 
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Research examining the nature of late-life cognitive change: the differentiation-
dedifferentiation hypothesis 
While it is clear that some cognitive abilities decline earlier and more rapidly 
than others, the mechanisms driving these differences are not fully understood.  The 
differentiation-dedifferentiation hypothesis proposes that different abilities become 
more strongly correlated in late life as a result of increasing biological constraints (Li & 
Lindenberger, 1999).  These increasing correlations are proposed to be the reverse of 
the differentiation of abilities in early life (Lienert & Crott, 1964), which may be 
attributed to childhood intelligence and genetics interacting with environmental factors 
and motivation (Cattell, 1987).  The theory is referred to as the differentiation-
dedifferentiation hypothesis due to this rise and fall in the differentiation of abilities.  
However, evidence for dedifferentiation as a function of advanced age is mixed.  
Several studies have reported late-life increases in the correlation between cognitive 
abilities (Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997; Ghisletta & Lindenberger, 2003; Li et al., 2004) 
while other studies have found no systematic relationship (Anstey, Hofer, & Luszcz, 
2003; Juan-Espinosa et al., 2002; Sims, Allaire, Gamaldo, Edwards, & Whitfield, 2009; 
Tucker-Drob & Salthouse, 2008; Zelinski & Lewis, 2003).  Some of the differences in 
findings may be attributable to the broad array of methods used to examine the 
hypothesis. 
In assessing the dedifferentiation hypothesis, there are three methodological 
issues that have rarely been addressed by previous research.  Firstly, differentiation-
dedifferentiation as a function of age occurs in a non-linear pattern by definition.  
According to the theory, the amount of variance accounted for by a general ability 
factor over the lifetime should be curvilinear, approximating an inverted-U.  However, 
much of the research on dedifferentiation defines the general ability factor using linear 
factor analysis.  Secondly, differentiation of cognitive abilities can also occur as a 
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function of ability, as the proportion of abilities accounted for by a general factor 
increases at lower ability levels (Deary, Egan, Gibson, Austin, & et al., 1996; Der & 
Deary, 2003; Tucker-Drob, 2009).  In estimating the degree to which dedifferentiation 
occurs as a function of age, adjustment must be made for ability differentiation, 
otherwise the observed effects may simply be the result of poorer overall performance 
among older individuals.  Again, not all dedifferentiation research accounts for potential 
ability differentiation effects.  Recent analytical developments have enabled 
investigators to account for both the nonlinear nature of the hypothesis and the effects 
of level of ability.  The statistical model used by Tucker-Drob (2009) allows assessment 
of the effects of age dedifferentiation using a structural equation model to 
simultaneously combine a nonlinear factor analysis to estimate a general ability factor 
with a regression that tests the effects of age dedifferentiation and ability differentiation.  
This methodology has only been used in one previous analysis, which found little 
support for the dedifferentiation of cognitive abilities as a function of age (Tucker-Drob, 
2009). 
Thirdly, there is limited research adequately assessing whether age 
dedifferentiation occurs in response to age-related biological constraints as proposed by 
the theory.  In assessing this element of the theory, it is important to separate the effects 
of dementia from normative age-related neurological decline.  Furthermore, a metric 
that better reflects biological deterioration could be used as a comparator for age.  
Chronological age may only be weakly associated with biological damage, as lifetime 
accumulation of biological damage and resulting cognitive health may vary widely 
(Lovden, Bergman, Adolfsson, Lindenberger, & Nilsson, 2005; Sliwinski, Hofer, & 
Hall, 2003).  Instead, time-to-death is a stronger indicator of declines in both physical 
health and cognitive performance (Hassing et al., 2002; Small & Bäckman, 1999).  
Comparing age dedifferentiation to time-to-death dedifferentiation is an approach that 
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has not previously been used to assess this aspect of the dedifferentiation hypothesis.  In 
addition, such an approach may further explain the changes in cognitive abilities that are 
observed in proximity to death. 
To address these limitations of previous research, the fourth study (Batterham, 
Christensen et al., in press-a) investigated the differentiation-dedifferentiation 
hypothesis using the aforementioned methodology that accounts for non-linear 
relationships between cognitive measures and factors and adjusts for the effects of 
ability differentiation (Tucker-Drob, 2009).  The study also contrasted age with time-to-
death as the metric for dedifferentiation, to examine evidence that dedifferentiation 
could be attributed to biological constraints in late life.  Such an analysis has not 
previously been presented.  The evidence for dedifferentiation was further evaluated in 
a subgroup analysis that excluded participants with possible pre-clinical dementia.  This 
manuscript is presented on page 139. 
 
The role of mental health in the cognition-mortality relationship 
There is extensive evidence for a relationship between late-life depression and 
reduced cognitive performance (Christensen et al., 1997; Jorm, 2000; Willner, 1984).  
People with depression perform more poorly than controls on every cognitive ability 
that has been examined, including intelligence, verbal ability, memory, attention, 
executive ability, conceptual ability and orientation (Christensen et al., 1997).  
Furthermore, there is evidence that depression may be a risk factor for subsequent 
dementia (Jorm, 2000).  There is also some evidence suggesting that late-life depression 
is a risk factor for death.  Evidence for this relationship has been summarised in six 
reviews, each of which has concluded that depression is associated with an increased 
all-cause mortality rate (Cole & Bellavance, 1997; Cuijpers & Schoevers, 2004; Harris 
& Barraclough, 1998; Saz & Dewey, 2001; Schulz et al., 2002; Wulsin et al., 1999).  A 
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review of 57 studies published between 1966 and 1996 (Wulsin et al., 1999) found that 
29 (51%) reported a positive relationship between depression and mortality.  A later 
review of 61 articles subsequently published between 1996 and 2001 (Schulz et al., 
2002) reported that 72% found a significant relationship between depression and 
mortality.  A meta-analysis (Saz & Dewey, 2001) reported a combined odds ratio for 
mortality with depression of 1.73 (95% CI 1.53-1.95), while another recent review 
(Cuijpers & Schoevers, 2004) reported a relative risk for mortality in depressed subjects 
of 1.81 (95% CI 1.58-2.07) compared to non-depressed subjects.  Given the 
relationships of depression with both cognition and mortality that have been previously 
observed, it is possible that some proportion of the relationship between cognition and 
mortality could be explained by depression. 
However, before examining how depression may moderate the cognition-
mortality relationship, there are some limitations to the depression-mortality 
relationship that require further investigation. Wulsin et al. (1999) cautioned against 
drawing strong conclusions about the nature of the relationship between depression and 
mortality due to a lack of adequate controlling for confounders, the potential of 
publication bias in favour of positive studies and the heterogeneity of samples and 
methods used in the studies.  In particular, very few studies of this relationship have 
adequately controlled for the effect of physical health status.  Physical health status was 
not controlled for in 25 of the 57 studies reported by Wulsin et al. (1999), 20 of the 61 
studies reported by Schulz et al. (2002), and 31 of the 38 studies reported by Saz and 
Dewey (2001).  Moreover, very few studies used objective measures of health status, 
with most using self-report measures such as presence/absence of chronic disease.  
Furthermore, the effect of depression on mortality is greatly attenuated over long 
follow-up periods (Saz & Dewey, 2001) and tends to be weak or non-existent in 
population samples (Wulsin et al., 1999).  Given the methodological inadequacies of 
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some previous studies and the limited generalisability of the relationship, the 
association between depression and mortality may have been overstated and requires 
more refined evaluation. 
Comparatively few studies have examined the effect of anxiety on mortality.  In 
a review of six studies of the effect of anxiety disorders on mortality, Harris and 
Barraclough (1998) reported that the risk of all-cause mortality was significantly greater 
for neurosis or panic disorder but not for anxiety neurosis.  However, Dewey and Chen 
(2004) reviewed seven studies of the effect of anxiety disorders on mortality in elderly 
cohorts and found that there was no significant relationship between either anxiety 
diagnosis or anxiety symptoms and mortality.  While there is little evidence for an effect 
of anxiety on mortality, it is still worthwhile examining the relationship, as anxiety may 
also have effects on cognitive performance.  Gallacher et al. (2009) found that anxiety 
was associated with significant declines in learning memory and increased risk of 
cognitive impairment and dementia.  Bierman, Comijs, Jonker and Beekman (2005) 
reported a curvilinear association between anxiety and cognition, with severe anxiety 
symptoms associated with significantly poorer cognitive performance.  Sinoff and 
Werner (2003) also found that anxiety was a significant predictor of cognitive decline, 
particularly memory loss.  Consequently, this study sought to assess potential 
confounding of the relationship between cognition and mortality that might be 
attributable to anxiety. 
The final study (Batterham, Christensen et al., in press-b) investigated the 
effects of depression and anxiety on mortality, as mental health may be closely related 
to cognitive performance.  While other studies in this thesis adjusted for the effects of 
depression and anxiety (Batterham et al., 2009; Batterham, Mackinnon et al., in press; 
Batterham et al., submitted), previous research on interactions between mental health 
and cognition indicated a need to examine how mental health might influence mortality.  
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The mediating effect of physical health on the association between mental health 
symptoms and mortality was assessed using a novel methodology that incorporated a 
Cox Proportional Hazards regression into a structural equation model (Asparouhov, 
Masyn, & Muthen, 2006).  This manuscript begins on page 163. 
 
While published separately, the studies below represent an integrated attempt to 
carefully apply innovative methods to clarify and extend what is known about 
mechanisms associating cognition at the very latest phase of life and transition to the 
non-cognitive state. 
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Abstract 
The long-term relationship between lower intelligence and mortality risk in later 
life is well established, even when controlling for a range of health and 
sociodemographic measures.  However, there is some evidence for differential effects in 
various domains of cognitive performance. Specifically, tests of fluid intelligence may 
have a stronger association with mortality than do tests of crystallized intelligence.  The 
present study examines the relationship between intelligence and mortality in a sample 
of 896 Australian community-dwelling males and females, aged 70-97 at recruitment 
and followed for up to 17 years.  There were 687 deaths during the follow-up period.  
Cox proportional hazard regression models examined whether the relationship between 
intelligence and mortality might be  mediated by socioeconomic status, by health 
behaviors, by health status, or a combination of these.  Higher fluid intelligence – as 
measured by the Symbol-Letters Modalities Test – was strongly associated with lower 
mortality rates (Hazard ratio = 0.80; 95% confidence interval = 0.72–0.88), even after 
accounting for any combination of potential mediators and confounders.  A significant 
association between crystallized intelligence, as measured by the National Adult 
Reading Test, and mortality (HR = 0.89; 95% CI = 0.80–0.99) was attenuated by the 
inclusion of socioeconomic, health status measures, and health behavior measures and 
when deaths from the first four years of the study were excluded.  The findings show 
little support for the hypothesized mechanisms of the intelligence-mortality relationship. 
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Long-term studies of intelligence and mortality demonstrate that higher 
intelligence is associated with lower all-cause mortality.  A recent review (Batty, Deary, 
& Gottfredson, 2007) examined nine studies investigating the relationship between 
early-life intelligence and later mortality risk.  The studies followed cohorts for between 
17 and 69 years. All found that higher IQ was associated with lower mortality.  For 
example, one of the reviewed studies retrospectively traced the vital status of 2,230 
participants in the 1932 Scottish Mental Survey after 65 years (Whalley & Deary, 
2001).  The hazard of mortality over the 65 year follow-up period was decreased by 
21% for each 15-point increase in intelligence as measured by the Moray House test.  
Studies reporting follow-up into old age have also reported consistent findings (Deeg, 
Hofman, & van Zonneveld, 1990; Rabbitt, Lunn, & Wong, 2006; Shipley, Der, Taylor, 
& Deary, 2006).  However, the intelligence-mortality relationship may be dependent of 
the type of test administered, the age of the cohort and the length of the follow-up 
period. 
Poor performance on executive tests such as the Mini-Mental State Exam 
(Bassuk, Wypij, & Berkman, 2000; Dartigues et al., 2007) or the Short Portable Mental 
Status Questionnaire (Blazer, Sachs-Ericsson, & Hybels, 2005; Liang, Bennett, 
Sugisawa, Kobayashi, & Fukaya, 2003) tends to be associated with higher mortality 
risk, however the relationship has not always been found to be significant (Ganguli, 
Dodge, & Mulsant, 2002; Ostbye et al., 2006) and may be dependent on the length of 
the follow-up period (Ganguli et al., 2002; van Gelder, Tijhuis, Kalmijn, Giampaoli, & 
Kromhout, 2007).  Performance on tests of crystallized intelligence, such as the 
National Adult Reading Test (Abas, Hotopf, & Prince, 2002; Anstey, Luszcz, Giles, & 
Andrews, 2001) or Raven‟s Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (Rabbitt et al., 2002) tends to be 
robust to the effects of aging and is less likely to exhibit an association with mortality 
after health and social status are taken into account. 
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Tests of fluid intelligence, such as Digit-Symbol Substitution (Anstey et al., 
2001; Ghisletta, McArdle, & Lindenberger, 2006; Pavlik et al., 2003; Portin et al., 
2001) or various learning tasks (Abas et al., 2002; Ghisletta et al., 2006; Rabbitt et al., 
2002; Royall, Chiodo, Mouton, & Polk, 2007) tend to decline more with age and are 
more strongly associated with mortality than performance on tests of general 
intelligence or tests of executive functioning.  However, the effect size may be greater 
for long-term (e.g., Ghisletta et al., 2006) rather than short-term (e.g., Bosworth, Schaie, 
& Willis, 1999) studies and for older rather than younger cohorts (Lyyra, Heikkinen, 
Lyyra, & Jylha, 2006; Shipley et al., 2006).  The association between short-term 
memory performance and mortality among non-demented adults is also well 
documented (Ghisletta et al., 2006; Portin et al., 2001; Shipley et al., 2006).  In addition, 
two reviews have reported an association between dementia or mild cognitive disorders 
and mortality (Dewey & Saz, 2001; Guehne et al., 2006; Guehne, Riedel-Heller, & 
Angermeyer, 2005).  Indeed, it has been contended that the relationship between 
intelligence and mortality is largely mediated by dementia (Backman & MacDonald, 
2006). 
Given the evidence for the relationship between intelligence and mortality, 
potential mechanisms driving this association warrant further examination.  In early 
research on the relationship between cognitive decline and mortality, Riegel and Riegel 
(1972) described the effect in terms of “terminal drop”.  While the relationship between 
childhood intelligence and mortality cannot be explained by terminal decline alone, two 
theories posited by Riegel and Riegel (1972) form the basis of contemporary 
understanding of the intelligence-mortality relationship.  Firstly, a biological theory 
suggested that physiological mechanisms related to cell aging were responsible for the 
decline and also for death.  Secondly, a sociological theory suggested that performance 
and chance of survival drops earlier in life for those who cope less well with their 
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environment due to disadvantages in, for example, education, income, nutrition and 
medical assistance. 
More recently, three potential mechanisms for the relationship have been 
detailed by Whalley and Deary (2001) and Deary (2005) and tested by Kuh et al. (2004) 
and Shipley et al. (2006).  First, socio-economic status (SES) may mediate the 
relationship between intelligence and mortality.  This theory, advocated by Siegrist and 
Marmot (2004), is similar to the sociological theory of Riegel and Riegel (1972), 
suggesting that disadvantages in intelligence lead to burdens in occupation, which are 
linked to poorer health outcomes.  Siegrist and Marmot (2004) elaborate on the 
relationship by taking into account the mediating effect of control on health outcomes.  
The demand-control model (Karasek, 1979) proposes that high work demands interact 
with low levels of perceived control to cause such outcomes as depression and 
exhaustion, which adversely effect health outcomes and consequent mortality.  A 
second explanation is that the relationship between intelligence and mortality is 
mediated by health behaviors and knowledge, which include substance use, diet, 
physical activity, healthcare utilization, and accident and illness prevention (Deary, 
2005).  Gottfredson and Deary (2004) argued that a high level of cognitive resources are 
required to prevent disease and ameliorate illness through behaviors such as health 
monitoring, screening, medication adherence, understanding health information and 
becoming health literate.  Failure to adequately undertake these health behaviors can 
lead to illness or more severe illness, resulting in hospitalization and health costs, and 
consequently, greater risk of mortality (Gottfredson & Deary, 2004). 
A third explanation is that the relationship between intelligence and mortality 
may be due to a common association with health status.  There are two possible 
explanations for an association between intelligence and health (Deary, 2005): (i) 
intelligence may be viewed as a marker of biological “fitness” or of system integrity, or 
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(ii) intelligence may be an indicator of developmental problems that impact on later 
health.  The former explanation aligns with the biological theory proposed by Riegel 
and Riegel (1972), with evidence from studies of the common cause hypothesis linking 
sensory function, lung function, grip strength and other biological markers with 
performance on cognitive tests (Christensen et al., 2000; Christensen, Mackinnon, 
Korten, & Jorm, 2001; Salthouse, Hancock, Meinz, & Hambrick, 1996).  The latter 
explanation suggests that development in early life, such as fetal events, birth weight 
and early nutrition, shape future patterns of health and disease, which confound the 
relationship between intelligence and mortality (Deary, 2005).  A refinement of (i) is 
that intelligence is associated with mortality because it reflects basic or core information 
processing mechanisms reflected in measures such as RT and grip strength (Deary & 
Der, 2005; Shipley et al., 2006).  These two studies demonstrated that SES and health 
factors affect the relationship but that core processes such as reaction time are critical in 
predicting mortality. 
The three proposed explanations of the link between mortality and intelligence 
are testable.  The first predicts that education, employment history and other measures 
of lifetime opportunity will be associated with both intelligence and mortality and will 
consequently reduce the effect of intelligence on mortality.  The second predicts that 
health behaviors, such as substance use history and healthcare utilization measured both 
currently and retrospectively over the lifespan, will likewise mediate the association 
between intelligence and mortality.  The third set of explanations is more complex but 
suggests that disease status and a range of health or biological markers may account for 
a large proportion of the variance in the relationship between intelligence and mortality.  
The refinement of the explanation proposed by Deary and Der (2005) is that after 
accounting for core biological processes (reflected in biological measures such as grip 
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strength, sensory processing and reaction time), the relationship between intelligence 
and mortality should be reduced or eliminated. 
Two tests that capture the construct of intelligence are used in the present study.  
The Symbol-Letters Modalities Test (SLMT), a task similar to Smith‟s (1973) Symbol-
Digit Modalities Test and Wechsler‟s (Wechsler, 1981) Digit-Symbol Substitution, is a 
perceptual speed test that provides a measure of fluid intelligence.  SLMT measures the 
efficiency of visual search and memory for the symbols presented in the task (Gilmore, 
Spinks, & Thomas, 2006) and performance on the task is correlated with measures of 
general intelligence such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Waldmann, 
Dickson, Monahan, & Kazelskis, 1992).  The National Adult Reading Test (NART; 
Nelson, 1982) is a test of vocabulary that provides a measure of crystallized 
intelligence.  NART performance is also correlated with measures of general 
intelligence and, unlike SLMT, is resistant to the effects of dementia (Bright, Jaldow, & 
Kopelman, 2002).  Having the two tests allowed us to formulate differential predictions 
of the effect of these cognitive variables on mortality.  Based on past research, SLMT 
performance was hypothesized to be a better predictor of mortality than NART.  We 
also predicted that the relationship between SLMT and mortality would be more 
strongly mediated by health status than the relationship between NART and mortality, 
since NART performance is more resistant to the effects of declining health. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
The Canberra Longitudinal Study (CLS) was a large epidemiological survey of 
mental health and cognitive functioning that began in 1990.  The study design is more 
fully detailed by Christensen et al. (2004). Eight hundred and ninety-six participants 
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(456 men and 440 women) aged 70 or older at the time of the baseline assessment were 
recruited for the baseline assessment.  All participants were initially living in the 
community in the cities of Canberra or Queanbeyan, Australia.  Participants were 
sampled from the compulsory electoral roll, with 69% responding.  Approval for the 
research was obtained from the Ethics in Human Experimentation Committee of The 
Australian National University. 
 
Survey Procedure 
Participants were interviewed up to four times over 12 years.  Interviews were 
sought from both the participant and an informant, although the present study only 
examines participant data.  Baseline interviews lasted approximately two hours, 
incorporating a survey measuring a wide range of risk factors including socio-
demographics, physical health and disease status, mental health status, cognitive 
performance and social support.  Interviews also included physical assessments of blood 
pressure, lung function, grip strength, vision and reaction time.  Trained professional 
interviewers conducted the interviews. 
Of the original sample of 896 participants, 185 (20.6%) were deceased by four 
years, 363 (40.5%) were deceased by eight years, and 544 (60.7%) were deceased by 12 
years.  At the end of vital status collection in June 2007, 687 (76.7%) of the participants 
were deceased.  Of the participants who remained in the study, 14.1% (100/711) refused 
or were unable to complete the first follow-up interview, 21.1% (100/474) for the 
second follow-up and 21.1% (57/270) for the third follow-up.  
 
Assessment of mortality 
Mortality status and date of death were established by contacting relatives, 
searching the National Death Index, and from death notices in the local newspaper.  The 
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National Death Index, a register of all deaths in Australia, was searched by name and 
date of birth.  Missing death identifications from the National Death Index would most 
likely have been a rare occurrence, as the index provides nationwide coverage.  The 
additional methods used for death reporting (contacting relatives, newspaper searches) 
provide further confidence in the mortality status data.  Mortality status was followed 
for up to 17 years, from the start of baseline interviews in September, 1990 until June 
30, 2007.  Survival was calculated as the time from the baseline interview to death for 
deceased participants, or from baseline until June 30, 2007 for surviving (right-
censored) participants.  For six participants with unknown day of death, the day was set 
to the 15
th
 of the month.  For two participants with an unknown month of death, the 
month was set to June.  Taking deaths into account, the mean follow-up time was 9.7 
years – 16.4 years for surviving participants and 7.6 years for deceased participants. 
 
Assessment of intelligence 
Two tasks were used to assess different domains of intelligence.  The Symbol 
Letter Modalities Test is a test of perceptual speed that has been  used as a measure of 
fluid intelligence. This test is based on earlier tests of fluid intelligence such as Digit 
Symbol Substitution (Wechsler, 1981) and the Symbol Digit Modalities Test (Smith, 
1973).  Participants were provided with a key which linked 10 symbols with letters of 
the alphabet (A to I). They were given 90 seconds to call out to the examiner the letters 
of the alphabet that corresponded to symbols printed in rows on the page. The key to the 
symbol-letter pairings was printed above the array. The test measures both fluid 
intelligence and cognitive speed. However, it allows an oral response to be made by the 
participants, thereby limiting possible contamination from impaired psychomotor 
functioning. The number of correct symbol-letter pairs made in 90 seconds was summed 
and the scores were standardized to produce an IQ-type score (SLMT IQ). 
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The National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982) assessed crystallized 
intelligence by testing the vocabulary of participants. The NART is a list of 50 words 
that are not pronounceable phonetically. Participants read the words aloud and testing is 
discontinued whenever there were 14 failures out of 15 items. The number of correct 
pronunciations made was summed and the scores were standardized to produce an IQ-
type score (NART IQ). 
 
Control variables 
All of the control variables were measured in the baseline interview, with the 
exception of subsequent dementia diagnosis which was made on each wave of 
measurement. 
Socio-economic status:  Educational status was based on responses to two questions 
regarding the number of years in school and the highest qualification obtained.  These 
two questions were combined into a single measure representing the number of years it 
took participants to attain their highest educational qualification.  Work history was 
asked as an open-ended question that was then given a standard job classification 
coding.  From these codings, participants were classified into one of six categories:  
unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, white collar, lower professional, 
managerial/professional.  However, given the advanced age of the sample (the 
categorizations are based on a contemporary coding system) and a lack of predictive 
power provided by these categories, they were collapsed into a binary measure 
reflecting manual or non-manual employment.  Participants who were involved in home 
duties were classified based on their spouse‟s occupational status. 
Locus of control:  A 14-item locus of control scale was administered, with participants 
rating items such as “I am confident of being able to deal successfully with future 
problems” on a six-point Likert scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.  
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The scale was based on the 17-item Locus of Control of Behavior scale (Craig, 
Franklin, & Andrews, 1984) with three symptom-related items removed.  Eight items 
were negatively-worded and were reverse scored.  The score was a mean of the ratings 
(range 1-6), with higher scores indicating that the participant saw themselves as the 
locus of control. 
Health behaviors:  Participants reported whether they were current smokers, past 
smokers who had quit, or had never smoked.  Level of activity was based on a six-item 
scale asking participants how often they engaged in activities “these days”, with 
possible scores ranging from 0-18.  The activities were reading, some sort of physical 
activity, active involvement in interests or hobbies, sitting at home (inactivity, 
negatively scored), and planned activities such as household tasks and visiting people. 
(Christensen et al., 1996)  While there is a relationship between the activity scale and 
the level of physical disability (r = -.44), participation in social and intellectual pursuits 
are not captured by measures of physical disability. 
Physical health:  A brief self-reported medical history for each participant was taken 
during the survey.  Heart attack history, stroke history (combining strokes, mini-strokes 
and transient ischemic attacks) and hypertension history were measured as dichotomous 
variables.  A disease count covering 14 other diseases (including diabetes and cancer) 
and a symptom count for 21 symptoms (including falls, dizziness and chest pain) were 
generated.  To measure functional ability, eight Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) were 
rated for difficulty on a four-point scale (no difficulty, some difficulty but no help 
needed, need help, bedridden) and five Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs) 
were rated on a three-point scale (no help needed, need help, cannot do).  Two scales of 
functional ability were generated from these items, with ADL scores ranging from 0 to 
24 and IADL scores ranging from 0 to 8.  Higher scores on these scales indicate greater 
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functional disability.  Self-rated health was measured by asking participants to rate their 
general health on a four-point scale from “Excellent” (1) to “Poor” (4). 
Sensory indicators of physical health included reaction time, grip strength, 
visual and auditory function.  To measure choice reaction time, participants were asked 
to press a button with their left or right hand depending on which of two stimulus lights 
were illuminated (interstimulus intervals ranged from 0.5 to 2.0 seconds) (Christensen 
et al., 2000). The trials were performed mid-way through the survey, and choice 
reaction time was measured as the mean response time over 20 trials.  Grip strength was 
taken using a Smedley hand dynamometer which measures the force exerted in 
kilograms (Christensen et al., 2000). Visual impairment was self-rated, with participants 
reporting “poor” eyesight or blindness classified as visually impaired.  Hearing 
impairment was also self-rated, with participants who used a hearing aid or reported 
poor hearing classified as hearing impaired. 
Mental health:  Mental health ratings were included in the analysis as supplementary 
measures of health status.  The Goldberg Depression Scale and Goldberg Anxiety Scale 
each consist of nine yes/no items measuring symptoms of depression and anxiety 
(Goldberg, Bridges, Duncan-Jones, & Grayson, 1988).  Scores on these tests reflect a 
symptom count ranging from 0 to 9. 
Dementia:  To control for potential confounding by dementia, participants who were 
given an ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1993) diagnosis of dementia or severe 
dementia later in the study (at waves 2-4, 4-12 years after baseline) were identified.  
Diagnoses were made using the Canberra Interview for the Elderly (CIE) (Social 
Psychiatry Research Unit, 1992), which provides information from which a diagnosis of 
dementia can be made according to ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1993) and 
DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) by means of a computer 
algorithm. 
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Analyses 
Descriptive analyses compared living participants to deceased participants to 
investigate which predictors were associated with death during the follow-up time.  
Survival time was graphed using Kaplan Meier curves and modeled using Cox 
proportional hazards regression analyses.  A series of six regression analyses included 
the intelligence measures with a combination of potential mediators or confounders, 
corresponding to the hypothesized mechanisms of the intelligence-mortality 
relationship.  To facilitate interpretation of the Cox regression analyses, continuous 
variables (excluding age, years of education and disease and symptom counts) were 
standardized by subtracting the mean for the entire sample and dividing by the standard 
deviation.  To account for potential confounding by end-of-life illness, specifically, sub-
clinical disease states not captured by the health status measures, the analyses were 
repeated with the exclusion of participants who died in the first four years of the study.  
The analyses were also repeated separately by gender to investigate whether the 
intelligence-mortality relationship differed for males and females. 
Incomplete data for the survival analyses were imputed using the ICE procedure 
in Stata.  Ten imputed data sets were generated by simultaneously modeling all of the 
independent variables from the baseline survey that were used in the analyses.  The 
imputation procedure used linear regression to impute continuous variables, logistic 
regression to impute dichotomous variables and multinomial logistic regression to 
impute the two categorical variables (smoking status and self-rated health).  Survival 
was not imputed, as complete data were available.  Among the variables used in the 
analysis, 13% of the sample had one missing value and a further 10% of the sample had 
two or more missing values.  The imputed data sets were combined using the 
micombine procedure in Stata, in conjunction with the stcox procedure that was used for 
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the Cox proportional hazards regression models.  SPSS version 15 was used for the 
descriptive analysis.  Stata version 9 was used for the imputation and survival analyses. 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.  These are based on the raw data, 
with p-values taken from Wald tests from univariate Cox regressions combined from 
analyses of the ten imputed data sets.  Overall, the mean age was 76.6 years, with 11.4 
years of education.  With the exceptions of education, hypertension history, hearing 
impairment and Goldberg Anxiety score, all variables were significantly associated with 
mortality (p < 0.05). 
 The effects of SLMT (Figure 1a) and NART (Figure 1b) on survival time 
were plotted using Kaplan Meier curves.  A median split was chosen to separate high 
and low performance on the two tasks.  The figures show that the effect of SLMT on 
survival is much more pronounced than that of NART.  There is a 20% difference in 
cumulative survival between high and low SLMT groups after approximately five years, 
and this difference is maintained until the end of the period of observation.  The 
difference between high and low NART groups, however, is only apparent between 
approximately four and thirteen years after baseline. 
Six models of mortality risk were tested using Cox proportional hazards 
regression models (Table 2).  The univariate effect of SLMT was tested in Model 1, 
then age and gender were added to create Model 2.  Model 3 built on Model 2, 
simultaneously testing the effect of SES (education and employment background) in 
conjunction with locus of control, a potential mediator of the effect of SES on mortality 
(Siegrist & Marmot, 2004).  Health behaviors (smoking status and activity level) were 
entered into a separate model with SLMT, age and gender (Model 4).  Health status, 
including physical health and mental health measures and dementia, was included  
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for predictor variables by vital status after 17 years (n = 
896) 
      Survivors   Decedents   
   (n = 191-209)  (n = 566-687)  
  N   Mean (SD) or freq (%)   Mean (SD) or freq (%) p value 
         
SLMT IQ score 853  103.80 ( 14.10 )  93.91 ( 16.97 ) <0.001 
NART IQ score 835  113.16 ( 8.35 )  111.32 ( 10.08 ) 0.001 
         
Age 896  74.09 ( 3.38 )  77.30 ( 5.09 ) <0.001 
Gender: male 896  83 ( 39.7% )  373 ( 54.3% ) <0.001 
         
Socio-economic status         
Years of education 894  11.17 ( 2.29 )  11.41 ( 2.66 ) 0.275 
Work history: manual work 896  141 ( 67.5% )  551 ( 59.7% ) 0.039 
Self as locus of control 759  4.36 ( 0.61 )  4.21 ( 0.60 ) <0.001 
         
Health behaviors         
Smoking status 877       0.004 
Never smoked   110 ( 52.9% )  391 ( 42.0% )  
Previously smoked   78 ( 37.5% )  383 ( 45.6% )  
Currently smoke   20 ( 9.6% )  103 ( 12.4% )  
Activity score 875  12.72 ( 2.43 )  11.51 ( 3.17 ) <0.001 
         
Physical health         
Self-rated health 874       <0.001 
Excellent   59 ( 28.5% )  160 ( 15.1% )  
Good   120 ( 58.0% )  478 ( 53.7% )  
Fair   27 ( 13.0% )  192 ( 24.7% )  
Poor   1 ( 0.5% )  44 ( 6.4% )  
Heart attack history 885  23 ( 11.1% )  157 ( 19.8% ) <0.001 
Hypertension history 887  80 ( 38.5% )  371 ( 42.9% ) 0.553 
Stroke history 887  45 ( 78.4% )  269 ( 67.0% ) 0.002 
Disease count 896  1.69 ( 1.35 )  2.12 ( 1.47 ) <0.001 
Symptom count 896  2.93 ( 2.74 )  3.58 ( 2.87 ) <0.001 
ADL score 877  0.98 ( 1.31 )  2.14 ( 2.78 ) <0.001 
IADL score 877  0.28 ( 0.67 )  0.86 ( 1.61 ) <0.001 
Choice RT (sec) 798  0.46 ( 0.12 )  0.48 ( 0.15 ) <0.001 
Grip strength (kg) 877  25.95 ( 9.91 )  24.29 ( 9.44 ) 0.012 
Visual impairment 887  163 ( 78.4% )  455 ( 67.0% ) <0.001 
Hearing impairment 887  156 ( 75.0% )  475 ( 70.0% ) 0.069 
         
Subsequent dementia 
diagnosis 
896  3 ( 1.4% )  41 ( 6.0% ) 0.013 
         
Mental health         
Goldberg depression score 865  1.71 ( 1.79 )  2.13 ( 2.00 ) <0.001 
Goldberg anxiety score 870  2.49 ( 2.35 )  2.46 ( 2.25 ) 0.761 
                  
 
Notes: p values are from Z tests (binary and continuous variables) and 
2
 tests (categorical variables) from 
univariate Cox regressions using imputed data; SLMT IQ: Symbol-Letters Modalities Test IQ score; NART 
IQ: National Adult Reading Test IQ score; ADL: Activities of Daily Living; IADL: Instrumental Activities of 
Daily Living; RT: reaction time 
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simultaneously with SLMT, age and gender in Model 5.  Finally, the significant 
predictors (at p < .05) from Models 2-5 were combined into a single model (Model 6).  
The six models were also fitted to the NART (Table 3). 
SLMT IQ was significantly and substantially associated with mortality 
irrespective of which other variables were in the model.  The effect of fluid intelligence 
on mortality was reduced but not fully accounted for when adjusting for age and gender, 
and including the „competing‟ predictors measuring SES, health behavior, health status 
and sensory processing.  A 15-point (one SD) disadvantage in SLMT IQ score was 
associated with between 23-45% increase in the risk of mortality (25% for the combined 
model), depending on which variables were included in the model.  When age and 
gender were excluded from the models, attenuation of the SLMT hazard ratios from the 
inclusion of predictors representing the three proposed mechanisms ranged from 0-7%.  
In contrast, the effect of NART IQ on mortality was reduced when accounting for SES 
or health status and no longer significant after adjusting for health behaviors.  A 15-
point (one SD) disadvantage in NART IQ score was associated with between 8-14% 
increase in the risk of mortality, depending on the model.  Attenuation for the NART 
hazard ratios ranged from 0-4%, after excluding the effects of age and gender.  
Subsequent dementia onset was not responsible for the association between intelligence 
and mortality. 
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a)  Fluid  intelligence:  Symbol-letters Modalities Test 
 
 
b)  Crystallized intelligence:  National Adult Reading Test 
 
Figure 1:  Kaplan-Meier curves of cumulative survival over 17 years plotted separately 
for participants with IQ above and below the sample median (n = 896) 
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Additional analyses were conducted to further account for potential confounding 
by baseline health status.  Participants who died in the first four years of the study, prior 
to the first follow-up interview (n = 190 decedents), were excluded from the analysis.  
The effect of SLMT on mortality remained stable, as estimated by the six models 
presented in Tables 2 and 3.  Hazard ratios remained between 0.72 and 0.84 with p < 
.001 for all models.  However, the effect of NART was further attenuated, with only the 
univariate effect of NART significantly associated with mortality status (HR = 0.89, p = 
.015).  When age and gender (HR = 0.91, p = .055), socioeconomic status (HR = 0.90, p 
= .087), health behaviors (HR = 0.94, p = .223) and health status (HR = 0.93, p = .146) 
were entered, the effect of NART became non-significant.  A second supplemental 
analysis investigated whether the intelligence-mortality relationship was different for 
men and women.  The effect of SLMT on mortality was consistent across males and 
females, with p < .01 for all six models across both genders and hazard ratios ranging 
from 0.64 to 0.84.  However, the effect of NART tended to be weaker among men than 
women when adjusting for age (HRfemale =  0.86, p = .014; HRmale =  0.91, p = .078) and 
when adjusting for health behaviors (HRfemale =  0.88, p = .039; HRmale =  0.95, p = 
.349).  The univariate effect of NART was significant for both genders, but after 
adjusting for socioeconomic variables or health status, the effect of NART did not reach 
significance for either males or females (HRs ranging from 0.88 to 0.90). 
 
Discussion 
The present study examined the intelligence-mortality relationship using data 
collected from the Canberra Longitudinal Study (CLS) over 17 years in an older cohort 
of community dwellers.  Better SLMT performance was found to be significantly 
associated with lower mortality risk.  This effect persisted for 17 years of follow-up, 
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extending the findings of Korten et al. (1999) that examined the same cohort after four 
years.  The relationship between SLMT and mortality remained when participants who 
died early in the study were omitted and was similar for men and women.  NART 
performance was also significantly associated with mortality, although the effect was 
mitigated by controlling for health behaviors such as smoking status and activity level.  
Excluding participants who died in the first four years of the study diminished the effect 
of NART to non-significance.  In addition, the effect of NART was stronger for women 
than men.   
A set of six models tested three major proposed mechanisms for the relationship 
between intelligence and mortality.  We tested for the effect of SES, as measured by 
education and type of employment.  The effect of health behavior was tested using 
measures of smoking history and physical, mental and social activity.  We tested for the 
effect of health status using measures of self-rated health, disease history, functional 
disability, grip strength and mental health status.  In response to the findings of Deary 
and Der (2005), we controlled for sensory processing ability using measures of choice 
reaction time, visual impairment and hearing impairment.  We also controlled for 
dementia diagnosis in response to the theory of Backman & MacDonald (2006) that the 
intelligence-mortality relationship is due largely to dementia-related deficits.  The 
present study did not find strong support for any of the three explanations.  Moreover, 
evidence for a particular explanation was contingent on the type of intelligence test 
used.  For SLMT, although there was slight attenuation of the effect when controlling 
for SES, health behaviors or health status, the effect of SLMT remained significant, 
providing limited support for the three major mechanisms.  The effect of intelligence on 
mortality when measured by the NART was also slightly attenuated by the effects of 
SES and health status.  However, after adjusting for smoking status and activity level, 
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the attenuation was sufficient that NART was no longer significantly associated with 
mortality. 
The divergence in findings suggests the mediation of the relationship between 
intelligence and mortality by SES, health behaviors and health status is marginally 
stronger for fluid intelligence performance than for tests of crystallized intelligence.  
Fluid intelligence tasks such as the SLMT may reflect any initial and early adulthood 
effects of intelligence on mortality, combined with the effects of physical health decline 
and ageing processes not due to physical health.  NART performance, on the other 
hand, is likely to reflect initial intelligence, education across the lifespan and consistent 
implementation of health behaviors, but is less susceptible to effects of independent or 
systemic disease and biological ageing processes. 
Choice reaction time was associated with mortality, however, there was no 
effect of reaction time when models also included SLMT or NART score.  Grip strength 
was associated with mortality but accounted for little of the variance in the intelligence-
mortality relationship.  Sensory impairments were not associated with mortality.  
Manual occupation was also not associated with mortality after controlling for 
intelligence.  This finding is not due to the collapsing of occupational categories into a 
binary measure, as a six-category version of the measure also had no association with 
mortality.  Smoking status was not associated with mortality, a finding divergent from 
past research (Tessier et al., 2000) which may be explained by the advanced age and 
low smoking prevalence of this sample.  In the final model, which included measures of 
SES, health behavior and health status, a one standard deviation decrement in SLMT 
performance was associated with a 25% increase in mortality, while a one standard 
deviation decrement in NART performance was associated with an 12% increase in 
mortality 
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In this cohort, the intelligence-mortality relationship appears to be based on 
more than lower-level processing efficiency.  There was a strong independent effect of 
SLMT even after adjusting for the hypothesized mechanisms of the relationship 
together with reaction time and sensory impairment.  In addition to mental speed, 
SLMT measures the efficiency of visual search and memory for the symbols presented 
in the task (Gilmore et al., 2006).  Since reaction time was controlled for, the aspects of 
SLMT that are associated with mortality would appear to be a combination of 
processing speed with memory and attention performance.  Further research into which 
constituents of the SLMT task best predict mortality could adapt the frameworks used 
by Gilmore et al. (2006) and Salthouse and Kersten (1993) to modify the SLMT task 
into components that separately measure the processing speed, memory and attentional 
aspects of the task. 
While the present findings were often in accordance with previous research, 
there were some important differences.  Previous research of the relationship between 
poor SLMT performance and mortality risk was supported (Anstey et al., 2001; 
Ghisletta et al., 2006; Pavlik et al., 2003; Portin et al., 2001).  Previous investigations 
have found little evidence for a relationship between NART performance and mortality 
(Abas et al., 2002; Anstey et al., 2001).  While NART performance was significantly 
associated with mortality risk in the present study, the effect was tenuous after 
controlling for measures of SES, health behavior and health status.  However, contrary 
to previous findings (Deary & Der, 2005), reaction time did not explain the effect of 
either of the intelligence tasks.  The differences in findings may be attributable to the 
age of the cohort in the present study.  All of the participants were 70 or older at 
baseline, averaging over 75 years of age, and were followed until they were in their late-
80s or beyond.  Previous research has shown that the effect of intelligence on mortality 
is most pronounced in older age groups (Lyyra et al., 2006; Shipley et al., 2006).  
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Limitations of the findings and directions for future research 
The present study examined vital status over 17 years using baseline 
measurements as predictors.  However, intelligence was assessed at the start of the 
study, when participants were already advanced in age and potentially in poor health.  
Participants who were close to death at the time of the baseline may have been in a state 
of terminal decline, leading to an overestimation of the effect of poor cognitive 
performance on mortality.  While the follow-up analysis omitted participants who died 
in the early stages of the study, the baseline intelligence measurement may still have 
been influenced by sub-clinical health problems.  Additional research into temporal 
variations in the intelligence-mortality relationship would further delineate the influence 
of time-to-death on cognitive performance, as would modeling cognitive performance 
as an outcome, using time-to-death as a predictor.  Another problem for the survival 
models is that there may have been cases where death occurred but was not recorded.  
Despite a thorough search protocol, the extent of missing death records could not be 
assessed in the present study, so all cases were treated as living if there was no evidence 
to the contrary.  Having noted this, however, treating potential decedents as survivors 
would result in a more conservative estimate of the association between intelligence and 
mortality. 
The models that were tested were operationalized using available measures from 
the baseline survey.  Although it is difficult to articulate the models sufficiently well to 
test then more than in a general way, testing them is important, as it forces a theoretical 
articulation and reveals the difficulties of testing complex relationships among 
processes over long periods.  Nevertheless, some of the measures that were used in this 
study could be further refined for the purposes of future research.  Only a self-reported 
measure of vision impairment was included in the baseline interview, which may not 
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accurately reflect visual functioning.  Sensory function, particularly visual acuity, can 
influence performance on tasks like SLMT (Gilmore et al., 2006).  Self-report measures 
of health status (disease history, functional ability) may also have been inaccurate, 
although objective health measures (grip strength, reaction time) were also included as 
predictors in the models.  Additional measures of health behaviors would also have 
strengthened the analysis – the baseline interview did not include measures of alcohol 
and other substance use, diet, healthcare utilization or medication adherence.  Reflecting 
the constraints of a large in-home epidemiological survey, the tests available to measure 
intelligence assessed only specific domains of cognitive performance.  General 
intelligence tests, such as the WAIS and AH4, cover a broader array of abilities.  
However, simply examining the construct of general intelligence is not sufficient in 
investigating what aspects of intelligence are most strongly associated with mortality.  
Further research on the intelligence-mortality relationship should continue to examine a 
broad range of cognitive abilities, including memory, attention, reasoning, knowledge 
and executive function, in a variety of domains, including episodic, verbal and 
visuospatial. 
Finally, examining all-cause mortality is a starting point for investigating the 
relationship between intelligence and mortality.  There is strong evidence for a 
relationship between intelligence and cardiovascular mortality but less for the 
relationship between intelligence and cancer mortality (Hart et al., 2003; Shipley, Der, 
Taylor, & Deary, 2007).  Examining modifiable mediators of both mortality and 
cognitive performance has the potential to guide future health interventions.  Continuing 
to research the associations between various domains of cognitive performance and 
mortality will advance our understanding into the nature of the intelligence-mortality 
relationship. 
 
68 
 
Acknowledgements 
The Canberra Longitudinal Study was supported by NHMRC Unit Grants 973301 and 
933301 and NHMRC Program Grant 179805.  HC is supported by NHMRC Principal 
Research Fellowship 366781. 
 
 
References 
Abas, M., Hotopf, M., & Prince, M. (2002). Depression and mortality in a high-risk 
population. 11-Year follow-up of the Medical Research Council Elderly 
Hypertension Trial. British Journal of Psychiatry, 181, 123-128. 
American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders 3rd ed., revised. DSM-III-R. Washington DC: American Psychiatric 
Association. 
Anstey, K. J., Luszcz, M. A., Giles, L. C., & Andrews, G. R. (2001). Demographic, 
health, cognitive, and sensory variables as predictors of mortality in very old 
adults. Psychology & Aging, 16(1), 3-11. 
Backman, L., & MacDonald, S. W. (2006). Death and Cognition: Synthesis and 
Outlook. European Psychologist, 11(3), 224-235. 
Bassuk, S. S., Wypij, D., & Berkman, L. F. (2000). Cognitive impairment and mortality 
in the community-dwelling elderly. American Journal of Epidemiology, 151(7), 
676-688. 
Batty, G. D., Deary, I. J., & Gottfredson, L. S. (2007). Premorbid (early life) IQ and 
later mortality risk: systematic review. Annals of Epidemiology, 17(4), 278-288. 
Blazer, D. G., Sachs-Ericsson, N., & Hybels, C. F. (2005). Perception of unmet basic 
needs as a predictor of mortality among community-dwelling older adults. 
American Journal of Public Health, 95(2), 299-304. 
Bosworth, H. B., Schaie, K., & Willis, S. L. (1999). Cognitive and sociodemographic 
risk factors for mortality in the Seattle Longitudinal Study. Journals of 
Gerontology: Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 54B(5), 
P273-P282. 
Bright, P., Jaldow, E., & Kopelman, M. D. (2002). The National Adult Reading Test as 
a measure of premorbid intelligence: a comparison with estimates derived from 
demographic variables. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 
8(6), 847-854. 
69 
Christensen, H., Korten, A., Jorm, A. F., Henderson, A. S., Scott, R., & Mackinnon, A. 
J. (1996). Activity levels and cognitive functioning in an elderly community 
sample. Age and Ageing, 25(1), 72-80. 
Christensen, H., Korten, A. E., Mackinnon, A. J., Jorm, A. F., Henderson, A. S., & 
Rodgers, B. (2000). Are changes in sensory disability, reaction time, and grip 
strength associated with changes in memory and crystallized Intelligence? A 
longitudinal analysis in an elderly community sample. Gerontology, 46(5), 276-
292. 
Christensen, H., Mackinnon, A., Jorm, A. F., Korten, A., Jacomb, P., Hofer, S. M., et al. 
(2004). The Canberra longitudinal study: Design, aims, methodology, outcomes 
and recent empirical investigations. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 
11(2-3), 169-195. 
Christensen, H., Mackinnon, A. J., Korten, A., & Jorm, A. F. (2001). The "common 
cause hypothesis" of cognitive aging: evidence for not only a common factor but 
also specific associations of age with vision and grip strength in a cross-
sectional analysis. Psychology and Aging, 16(4), 588-599. 
Craig, A. R., Franklin, J. A., & Andrews, G. (1984). A scale to measure locus of control 
of behaviour. The British Journal of Medical Psychology, 57 ( Pt 2), 173-180. 
Dartigues, J.-F., Carcaillon, L., Helmer, C., Lechevallier, N., Lafuma, A., & 
Khoshnood, B. (2007). Vasodilators and nootropics as predictors of dementia 
and mortality in the PAQUID cohort. Journal of the American Geriatrics 
Society, 55(3), 395-399. 
Deary, I. J. (2005). Intelligence, health and death. The Psychologist, 18(10), 610-613. 
Deary, I. J., & Der, G. (2005). Reaction Time Explains IQ's Association With Death. 
Psychological Science, 16(1), 64-69. 
Deeg, D. J., Hofman, A., & van Zonneveld, R. J. (1990). The association between 
change in cognitive function and longevity in Dutch elderly. American Journal 
of Epidemiology, 132(5), 973-982. 
Dewey, M. E., & Saz, P. (2001). Dementia, cognitive impairment and mortality in 
persons aged 65 and over living in the community: a systematic review of the 
literature. International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 16(8), 751-761. 
Ganguli, M., Dodge, H. H., & Mulsant, B. H. (2002). Rates and predictors of mortality 
in an aging, rural, community-based cohort: the role of depression. Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 59(11), 1046-1052. 
Ghisletta, P., McArdle, J. J., & Lindenberger, U. (2006). Longitudinal Cognition-
Survival Relations in Old and Very Old Age: 13-Year Data from the Berlin 
Aging Study. European Psychologist, 11(3), 204-223. 
Gilmore, G. C., Spinks, R. A., & Thomas, C. W. (2006). Age effects in coding tasks: 
componential analysis and test of the sensory deficit hypothesis. Psychology and 
Aging, 21(1), 7-18. 
70 
Goldberg, D., Bridges, K., Duncan-Jones, P., & Grayson, D. (1988). Detecting anxiety 
and depression in general medical settings. British Medical Journal, 297(6653), 
897-899. 
Gottfredson, L. S., & Deary, I. J. (2004). Intelligence Predicts Health and Longevity, 
but Why? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13(1), 1-4. 
Guehne, U., Angermeyer, M. C., Riedel-Heller, S., Guehne, U., Angermeyer, M. C., & 
Riedel-Heller, S. (2006). Is mortality increased in mildly cognitively impaired 
individuals? A systematic literature review. Dementia & Geriatric Cognitive 
Disorders, 21(5-6), 403-410. 
Guehne, U., Riedel-Heller, S., & Angermeyer, M. C. (2005). Mortality in dementia. 
Neuroepidemiology, 25(3), 153-162. 
Hart, C. L., Taylor, M. D., Smith, G. D., Whalley, L. J., Starr, J. M., Hole, D. J., et al. 
(2003). Childhood IQ, Social Class, Deprivation, and Their Relationships with 
Mortality and Morbidity Risk in Later Life: Prospective Observational Study 
Linking the Scottish Mental Survey 1932 and the Midspan Studies. 
Psychosomatic Medicine, 65(5), 877-883. 
Karasek, R. A., Jr. (1979). Job Demands, Job Decision Latitude, and Mental Strain: 
Implications for Job Redesign. Administrative Science Quarterly, 24(2), 285-
308. 
Korten, A. E., Jorm, A. F., Jiao, Z., Letenneur, L., Jacomb, P. A., Henderson, A. S., et 
al. (1999). Health, cognitive, and psychosocial factors as predictors of mortality 
in an elderly community sample. Journal of Epidemiology & Community 
Health, 53(2), 83-88. 
Kuh, D., Richards, M., Hardy, R., Butterworth, S., & Wadsworth, M. E. (2004). 
Childhood cognitive ability and deaths up until middle age: a post-war birth 
cohort study. International Journal of Epidemiology, 33(2), 408-413. 
Liang, J., Bennett, J. M., Sugisawa, H., Kobayashi, E., & Fukaya, T. (2003). Gender 
differences in old age mortality: roles of health behavior and baseline health 
status. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 56(6), 572-582. 
Lyyra, T.-M., Heikkinen, E., Lyyra, A.-L., & Jylha, M. (2006). Self-rated health and 
mortality: Could clinical and performance-based measures of health and 
functioning explain the association? Archives of Gerontology and Geriatrics, 
42(3), 277-288. 
Nelson, H. E. (1982). National Adult Reading Test (NART). Windsor, UK: NFER-
Nelson. 
Ostbye, T., Krause, K. M., Norton, M. C., Tschanz, J., Sanders, L., Hayden, K., et al. 
(2006). Ten dimensions of health and their relationships with overall self-
reported health and survival in a predominately religiously active elderly 
population: the cache county memory study. Journal of the American Geriatrics 
Society, 54(2), 199-209. 
Pavlik, V. N., de Moraes, S. A., Szklo, M., Knopman, D. S., Mosley, T. H., Jr., & 
Hyman, D. J. (2003). Relation between cognitive function and mortality in 
71 
middle-aged adults: the atherosclerosis risk in communities study. American 
Journal of Epidemiology, 157(4), 327-334. 
Portin, R., Muuriaisniemi, M. L., Joukamaa, M., Saarijarvi, S., Helenius, H., & 
Salokangas, R. K. (2001). Cognitive impairment and the 10-year survival 
probability of a normal 62-year-old population. Scandinavian Journal of 
Psychology, 42(4), 359-366. 
Rabbitt, P., Lunn, M., & Wong, D. (2006). Understanding Terminal Decline in 
Cognition and Risk of Death: Methodological and Theoretical Implications of 
Practice and Dropout Effects. European Psychologist, 11(3), 164-171. 
Rabbitt, P., Watson, P., Donlan, C., Mc Innes, L., Horan, M., Pendleton, N., et al. 
(2002). Effects of death within 11 years on cognitive performance in old age. 
Psychology & Aging, 17(3), 468-481. 
Riegel, K. F., & Riegel, R. M. (1972). Development, drop, and death. Developmental 
Psychology, 6(2), 306-319. 
Royall, D. R., Chiodo, L. K., Mouton, C., & Polk, M. J. (2007). Cognitive predictors of 
mortality in elderly retirees: results from the Freedom House study. American 
Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 15(3), 243-251. 
Salthouse, T. A., Hancock, H. E., Meinz, E. J., & Hambrick, D. Z. (1996). Interrelations 
of age, visual acuity, and cognitive functioning. Journals of Gerontology: Series 
B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 51(6), P317-330. 
Salthouse, T. A., & Kersten, A. W. (1993). Decomposing adult age differences in 
symbol arithmetic. Mem Cognit, 21(5), 699-710. 
Shipley, B. A., Der, G., Taylor, M. D., & Deary, I. J. (2006). Cognition and All-Cause 
Mortality Across the Entire Adult Age Range: Health and Lifestyle Survey. 
Psychosomatic Medicine, 68(1), 17-24. 
Shipley, B. A., Der, G., Taylor, M. D., & Deary, I. J. (2007). Association between 
mortality and cognitive change over 7 years in a large representative sample of 
UK residents. Psychosomatic Medicine, 69(7), 640-650. 
Siegrist, J., & Marmot, M. (2004). Health inequalities and the psychosocial 
environment-two scientific challenges. Social Science & Medicine, 58(8), 1463-
1473. 
Smith, A. (1973). The Symbol Digit Modalities Test. Los Angeles: Western 
Psychological Services. 
Social Psychiatry Research Unit. (1992). The Canberra Interview for the Elderly: a new 
field instrument for the diagnosis of dementia and depression by ICD-10 and 
DSM-III-R. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 85(2), 105-113. 
Tessier, J. F., Nejjari, C., Letenneur, L., Barberger-Gateau, P., Dartigues, J. F., & 
Salamon, R. (2000). Smoking and eight-year mortality in an elderly cohort. The 
International Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, 4, 698-704. 
van Gelder, B., Tijhuis, M., Kalmijn, S., Giampaoli, S., & Kromhout, D. (2007). 
Decline in Cognitive Functioning is Associated with a Higher Mortality Risk. 
Neuroepidemiology, 28(2), 93-100. 
72 
Waldmann, B. W., Dickson, A. L., Monahan, M. C., & Kazelskis, R. (1992). The 
relationship between intellectual ability and adult performance on the Trail 
Making Test and the Symbol Digit Modalities Test. Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 48(3), 360-363. 
Wechsler, D. (1981). Manual for the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - revised. New 
York: The Psychological Corporation. 
Whalley, L. J., & Deary, I. J. (2001). Longitudinal cohort study of childhood IQ and 
survival up to age 76. British Medical Journal, 322(7290), 819. 
World Health Organization. (1993). The ICD-10 classification of mental and 
behavioural disorders. Diagnostic criteria for research. Geneva: World Health 
Organization. 
 
73 
 
Measuring longitudinal change in cognitive abilities to predict cause-specific 
mortality in an elderly community sample 
 
Philip J. Batterham 
1
, Andrew J. Mackinnon 
2
 and Helen Christensen 
1
 
 
1
 Centre for Mental Health Research, The Australian National University 
2
 Orygen Research Centre, The University of Melbourne 
 
Psychology and Aging, in press (revised version), accepted 19/4/2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
Abstract 
 
While there is consistent evidence that initial levels of cognitive ability predict 
mortality, there is mixed evidence for a relationship between changes in cognition and 
mortality.  There have been few studies that have examined whether the level and slope 
of cognitive performance is predictive of subsequent mortality from all causes or from 
cardiovascular disease, stroke, heart disease, respiratory disease or cancer.  Moreover, 
the statistical methods used to assess change in mortality research are not always 
definitive and require greater scrutiny.  This study aimed to assess whether the level and 
slope of cognitive ability were associated with all-cause or cause-specific mortality, 
using unbiased statistical estimates.  A cohort of 896 community-based elderly people 
in Australia were interviewed four times over twelve years, with vital status followed 
for up to 17 years.  Of these, 592 participants completed two or more interviews and 
were included in survival models of six mortality outcomes.  Cognitive change in five 
domains of ability was estimated using both Best Linear Unbiased Predictors and latent 
growth models.  Poorer initial processing speed, verbal fluency and global ability were 
significantly associated with greater all-cause and/or cardiovascular mortality.  In 
addition, declines in global ability were associated greater all-cause, cardiovascular and 
heart disease mortality.  Vocabulary and episodic memory were not associated with 
mortality and none of the cognitive tests predicted respiratory or cancer mortality.  The 
two methods of estimating change showed strong agreement.  Initial levels of cognitive 
ability tend to be better predictors of subsequent mortality than changes in ability.  The 
results suggest that vascular events may be responsible for the overall relationship 
between cognition and mortality. 
 
 
75 
While prospective research has consistently shown that cognitive ability predicts 
mortality, there is mixed evidence for a relationship between changes in cognition and 
mortality.  Few studies have definitively examined whether the level and slope of 
cognitive performance is associated with all-cause mortality and whether specific causes 
of mortality might explain the overall relationship.  Furthermore, the use of appropriate 
methodologies for assessing change in cognition is critical for providing definitive 
evidence about relationships between cognitive change and mortality.  The present 
study compared two methods of obtaining unbiased estimates of level and slope of 
cognitive ability, with the aim of assessing whether initial cognitive ability or changes 
in cognitive performance were associated with mortality from all causes, cardiovascular 
disease, cancer, respiratory disease, heart disease or stroke. 
A review by Bosworth and Siegler (2002) reported that while there was 
consistent evidence that initial levels of cognitive performance were predictive of 
mortality, there was mixed evidence for a relationship between cognitive change and 
mortality.  Declines in crystallized abilities were more consistently associated with 
increased mortality than declines in memory and fluid abilities.  Bosworth & Siegler 
(2002) attributed this differential effect to the robustness of crystallized abilities to 
normal aging, suggesting that changes in these abilities may reflect the types of 
biological deterioration associated with mortality.  Relationships between cognitive 
change and mortality may be partly explained by common associations of both 
cognition and mortality with psychomotor or sensory abilities, health behaviors, 
physical health or genetic factors (Bosworth & Siegler, 2002; Shipley, Der, Taylor, & 
Deary, 2008).  However, studies of the cognition-mortality relationship often report 
little attenuation of the effect even after adjusting for such factors (Batterham, 
Christensen, & Mackinnon, 2009; Shipley et al., 2008).  Bosworth and Siegler (2002) 
concluded that further population-based longitudinal research on the association 
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between cognitive change and cause-specific mortality was necessary to better 
characterize this relationship. 
One of the primary problems in examining the effect of cognitive change on 
mortality is that there has been little consistency in the way that cognitive change has 
been assessed.  Previous research has measured cognitive change by comparing mean 
differences (Bosworth & Schaie, 1999; Mortensen & Kleven, 1993), categorizing 
participants as decliners or non-decliners based on the size of change scores (Anstey et 
al., 2001) or grouping the sample by time to death and comparing change in cognitive 
scores (Johansson & Berg, 1989).  These methods only account for within-person 
change, rely on arbitrary characterizations of decline or may confound the initial level 
of performance with the rate of change in performance.  A more sophisticated method 
involves conducting individual linear regressions of cognitive test scores over time for 
each subject to obtain individual intercept and slope least squares estimates that can 
then be used to predict mortality (Deeg, Hofman, & van Zonneveld, 1990).  However 
this method does not appropriately account for missing data, as a participant with few 
measurements is given the same weighting as one with many measurements, despite the 
increased variance of the estimate (Verbeke & Molenberghs, 2000).  Consequently, a 
defensible method that takes into account group effects in estimating individual change 
might be considered to be more appropriate for estimating change. 
Two methods of achieving unbiased estimates of within-person change are 
mixed effects models and latent growth models, both of which can accommodate 
incomplete data and unbalanced data structures (Lindenberger & Ghisletta, 2004).  
While these types of analytical methods have been available for several decades, their 
application to the longitudinal study of terminal decline processes has been somewhat 
limited (Bäckman & MacDonald, 2006).  It is important to use analytical approaches 
such as these to accommodate missing data, adjust for unequal numbers of individual 
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observations, to account for dependencies among observations both between and within 
individuals and to account for individual differences in the rates of cognitive decline 
(Bäckman & MacDonald, 2006).  A goal of the present study was to demonstrate 
whether a mixed model approach, which is widely available in statistical software, can 
provide comparable estimates of cognitive change on survival compared to a latent 
growth approach.  The paucity of mortality research that has utilized these methods may 
be related to the complexity of implementing latent growth models or Bayesian single-
stage joint mixed-survival models (Guo & Carlin, 2004) and their need for special 
software.  We aimed to assess whether a simple two-stage mixed model and survival 
method could provide comparable results to a single-stage joint growth-survival model.  
Mixed effects models can be used to create unbiased estimates of intercept and 
slope for each individual across repeated cognitive measures.  When the mixed model 
estimates are used as independent predictors of an outcome, they are called the Best 
Linear Unbiased Predictors (BLUPs) (Robinson, 1991), as the mixed model minimizes 
the mean squared error across the entire sample although the estimate may not be 
optimal for a specific individual (Gould, Abramson, Galasko, & Salmon, 2001). Gould, 
et al. (2001) compared the use of BLUPs to change scores and least squares estimators, 
finding that change score and least squares estimates were unreliable when few 
observations were made, and BLUPs provides both an appropriate adjustment for 
limited observations and greater power for detecting differences.  Likewise, Reynolds, 
Gatz, & Pedersen (2002) compared change scores, criterion-based methods, least 
squares and random effects (BLUPs) for assessing cognitive change.  They concluded 
that the random effects method was an improvement over the other three methods as it 
showed the strongest relationships across domains of cognitive performance and 
stronger associations with demographic, health, and psychosocial predictors (Reynolds 
et al., 2002).  In the present context, the BLUP estimates of intercept and slope 
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parameters provided by the mixed effects model were incorporated into a Cox 
Proportional Hazards model to assess the effects of cognitive performance and change 
on mortality. 
Latent growth models are a class of structural equation models that represent 
individual level data in terms of an initial level of performance latent variable or factor 
(level), a rate of change factor (slope), and error (residual) parameters (Hofer et al., 
2002).  These structures are analogous to random intercept and slope terms in mixed 
models.  While it is rare to do so, individual estimates of level and slope can be 
estimated as factor scores on these latent variables.  Recent developments in SEM allow 
the incorporation of latent growth models into a survival model (or other type of 
regression model) (Asparouhov, Masyn, & Muthén, 2006).  Such models are similar to 
mixed effects models, although latent growth-survival models are implemented in a 
single step that does not require the estimation of intercept and slope terms.  No 
previous study of cognition and mortality has sought to demonstrate the implementation 
of both BLUP and LGM approaches to assess the comparability of these methods. 
Latent growth models and BLUPs have each been used only once to examine the 
relationship between cognitive change and mortality.  Johansson et al. (2004) used a 
latent growth model and found that declines in crystallized knowledge and verbal 
abilities were associated with increased risk of mortality.  However, the latent growth 
model used by Johansson et al. (2004) did not incorporate survival analysis, warranting 
the extension of the latent growth methodology in the present analysis.  Ghisletta, 
McArdle, & Lindenberger (2006) used a mixed model approach and reported significant 
associations of changes in both speed and fluency on survival.  While there were 
commonalities among the findings of these two studies, the types of abilities that were 
predictive of mortality were divergent.  Fluid and speed-based cognitive tasks decline 
more rapidly than crystallized intelligence as a consequence of normative aging 
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(Anstey, Stankov, & Lord, 1993; Compton, Bachman, Brand, & Avet, 2000), so 
declines in crystallized abilities may be more strongly associated with biological 
deterioration that leads to mortality, consistent with the findings of Johansson et al. 
(2004).  However, among cohorts that are cognitively intact with dementia excluded at 
baseline or controlled for, rates of normative aging, as represented by declines in fluid 
abilities, may be a more dominant characteristic in predicting mortality, consistent with 
the findings of Ghisletta et al. (2006).  Indeed, Ghisletta et al. (2006) concluded that the 
relationship between cognitive decline and mortality was not specific to any domain of 
functioning.   
Nevertheless, both studies reported the common finding that the initial level of 
cognitive performance was more strongly and consistently associated with mortality 
than change in performance.  Sliwinski et al. (2006) suggested that cognitive change 
may only weakly predict mortality because the change does not accelerate continuously.  
Instead, normative cognitive change begins at a gradual pace in the preterminal phase, 
then when biological constraints increase in proximity to death, cognitive decline 
increases more rapidly in the terminal phase (Sliwinski et al., 2006).  Researchers have 
modeled the time course of terminal decline using change point models to distinguish 
two phases of decline (Batterham, Mackinnon et al., in press; Sliwinski et al., 2006; 
Thorvaldsson et al., 2008).  However, this methodology does not directly assess 
whether declines in cognition are associated with increased risk of death.  Since there 
have been so few studies of cognition and mortality that have used estimates of change, 
it is important to further explore this relationship directly using latent growth and mixed 
models approaches and compare the findings of the two methods. 
An additional gap in the research on cognitive change and mortality is the 
examination of cause-specific mortality.  Small, Fratiglioni, von Strauss, & Bäckman 
(2003) separated cardiovascular and non-cardiovascular causes of death, and found no 
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differences in the strength of the cognition-mortality associations for the two groups.  
However, Shipley, Der, Taylor, & Deary (2007; Shipley et al., 2008) reported that 
associations between cognition and mortality were strongest for cardiovascular 
mortality, slightly less consistent for respiratory mortality and non-significant for cancer 
mortality.  These associations remained after adjusting for a range of sociodemographic, 
health behavior and health status measures and excluding participants who died in the 
first five years of follow-up (Shipley et al., 2008).  The difference in findings may be 
due to the more specific types of mortality defined in the Shipley et al. (2007; 2008) 
studies, in contrast to the Small et al. (2003) study that combined cancer, respiratory and 
other causes of death due to small cell sizes.  A review of studies examining the 
relationship between cognition and mortality in diseased populations found strong 
evidence for the association in patients with stroke and cancer, although the relationship 
was less clear for heart disease patients (Anstey, Mack, & von Sanden, 2006).  Few of 
these studies, however, identified the cause of death.  Identification of the circumstances 
in which mortality is best predicted by poor cognitive performance may lead to a better 
understanding of this association.  Likewise, identifying the causes of death predicted 
by changes in cognitive abilities may further pinpoint the mechanisms behind such 
associations.  To date, there has been no direct examination of the relationship between 
cognitive change and multiple causes of death. 
The present study aimed to assess the relationship between level and slope of 
cognitive performance on cause-specific mortality in a cohort of 896 community-based 
Australian participants aged 70 and older.  They were assessed over a 12-year period 
with up to four comprehensive interviews, and vital status information including cause 
of death was collected for up to 17 years.  Consequently, it was possible to assess 
change in cognitive performance using both mixed model and latent growth approaches 
to examine associations with cause-specific mortality.  Models were adjusted for 
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measures of physical and mental health to account for the roles of physical function 
(Prince et al., 2010; Rosano et al., 2005; Wang, Larson, Bowen, & van Belle, 2006), 
depression (Christensen et al., 1997) and anxiety (Beaudreau & O'Hara, 2008) on late-
life cognitive ability. Such adjustment provides a stronger test of the hypothesized 
relationships between cognition and mortality.  The second aim of the study was to 
assess whether latent growth models and BLUPs from mixed models yielded similar 
results.  While very similar, the latent growth approach implemented in Mplus does not 
involve the estimation of individual estimates of level and slope.  Based on previous 
findings (Ghisletta et al., 2006; Johansson et al., 2004), it was predicted that changes in 
cognitive performance would be less strongly associated with mortality than initial 
levels of performance.   
Furthermore, in comparing the five cognitive domains that were assessed, it was 
hypothesized that there would be no clear patterns in the strengths of association 
between changes in these abilities and mortality, consistent with the findings of 
Ghisletta et al. (2006).  It is difficult to disentangle normative age-graded effects from 
nonnormative or pathological effects, as most older adults without preclinical dementia 
have likely experienced some form of vascular pathology across the lifespan (M. J. 
Sliwinski, S. M. Hofer, C. Hall, H. Buschke, & R. B. Lipton, 2003a).  However, 
examining the effects of changes in multiple cognitive domains on death from specific 
causes allows testing of the hypothesis proposed by White and Cunningham (1988).  
They suggested that declines in tasks which are resistant to the effects of pathology are 
more strongly predictive of impending death.  Recent evidence from the Ghisletta et al. 
(2006) study and others (Batterham, Mackinnon et al., in press; Thorvaldsson et al., 
2008) appears to refute the White and Cunningham (1988) hypothesis, with terminal 
decline in fluid abilities shown to be greater than in tasks of crystallized ability such as 
vocabulary tests.  Consequently, performance in all cognitive domains except 
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vocabulary were expected to be associated with mortality.  In examining cause-specific 
mortality, stronger relationships were hypothesized between cognitive performance and 
cardiovascular mortality than cancer or respiratory mortality, as reported by Shipley et 
al. (2007; 2008).  Such findings would also be predicted by the strong links reported 
between cardiovascular disease and cognitive function (Laukka, Fratiglioni, & 
Bäckman, 2010; Spiro & Brady, 2008) and would suggest that vascular pathology may 
be a critical predictor of terminal decline.  Finally, the results from the latent growth 
models were predicted to be comparable to the results from the BLUP models.   
 
Method 
 
Participants 
The Canberra Longitudinal Study is an epidemiological survey of mental health 
and cognitive functioning in older people.  The study design has previously been 
detailed by Christensen et al. (2004).  Eight hundred and ninety-six participants (456 
men and 440 women) aged 70-97 were recruited for the baseline assessment in 1990.  
All participants were initially living in the community in the cities of Canberra or 
Queanbeyan, Australia.  Participants were sampled from the compulsory electoral roll, 
with 69% responding, and the sample was stratified by age and gender.  Approval for 
the research was obtained from the Ethics in Human Experimentation Committee of 
The Australian National University. 
Of the original sample of 896 participants, 185 (20.6%) were deceased by four 
years, 363 (40.5%) were deceased by eight years, and 544 (60.7%) were deceased by 12 
years.  At the end of vital status collection in June 2007, 687 (76.7%) of the participants 
were deceased.  Of the surviving participants at each measurement occasion, 14.1% 
(100/711) refused or were unable to complete the first follow-up interview, 21.1% 
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(100/474) for the second follow-up and 21.1% (57/270) for the third follow-up.  Only 
participants who had one or more follow-up interviews were included in the analyses, 
so that measures of cognitive change could be obtained.  Nineteen participants were 
excluded on the basis of missing baseline data, resulting in a sample size of 592 for the 
analyses. 
 
Survey Procedure 
Participants were interviewed up to four times over 12 years by trained 
professional interviewers.  Baseline interviews lasted approximately two hours, which 
included a survey that covered background characteristics, physical health and disease 
status, mental health status, cognitive performance and social support.  Interviews also 
included physical assessments of blood pressure, lung function, grip strength, vision and 
reaction time. 
 
Measures 
A range of cognitive tests was administered at each interview.  Speed of 
processing was measured by the Symbol-Letters Modalities Test (SLMT), a task similar 
to Smith‟s (1973) Symbol-Digit Modalities Test and Wechsler‟s (1981) Digit-Symbol 
Substitution.  The number of correct symbol-letter pairs made in 90 seconds was 
summed.  Verbal ability was measured using the National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 
1982), a test of vocabulary.  The NART is a list of 50 words that are not pronounceable 
phonetically. The number of correct pronunciations made was summed.  An episodic 
memory task consisted of four brief episodic memory tasks testing word, face, name and 
address  recall and figure reproduction (Jorm, 1992).  Verbal fluency was assessed as the 
number of animals named in 30 seconds.  Global function was tested using the Mini-
Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), scored out of 30.  To 
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facilitate comparisons between tests, all of the tests were standardized to a common 
metric across the full sample, with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 10 for the 
full sample at baseline. 
Mortality status and date of death were established by contacting relatives, 
searching the National Death Index, and from death notices in the local newspaper.  The 
National Death Index is a register of all deaths in Australia maintained by a Government 
instrumentality, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and based on data 
collected by the Registrars of Births, Deaths and Marriages in each State and Territory 
in Australia, so failure to identify deaths occurring in Australia would be an unusual 
occurrence.  The additional methods used for death reporting (contacting relatives, 
newspaper searches) provide further confidence in the mortality status data.  Mortality 
status was followed for up to 17 years, from the start of baseline interviews in 
September, 1990 until June 30, 2007.  For six participants with unknown day of death, 
the day was set to the 15
th
 of the month.  For two participants with an unknown month 
of death, the month was set to June.  Cause of death was based on the primary cause of 
death provided by the National Death Index, which was identified using an ICD-9 or 
ICD-10 code, depending on the date of death.  The codes for underlying cause of death 
were only available for deaths prior to 1996, so only the underlying cause was used for 
the present analyses.  The ICD codes were categorized into five binary categories: 
cardiovascular, cancer (all malignant neoplasms), respiratory, ischemic heart disease 
and stroke (cerebrovascular).  No cause of death was provided for 30 deceased 
participants (7.3%), with these participants counted as having other causes of death.  
In addition to the cognitive measures, a number of baseline risk factors for 
cognitive decline or mortality were also included in the models. Age, gender and 
number of years of education were included to account for background characteristics. 
Physical health measures included smoking status (never, previous or current), 
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Activities of Daily Living (ADL, a scale ranging from 0 to 22), disease count (self-
reported history from a list of 14 diseases), and grip strength (measured in kilograms 
using a hand dynamometer).  The ADL scale assessed the presence or extent of physical 
disability (Christensen et al., 1994).  Grip strength is a reliable and objective indicator 
of physical functioning in late life (Frederiksen et al., 2002) that is associated with both 
cognitive performance (Christensen et al., 2000) and mortality (Batterham et al., 2009a; 
Sasaki, Kasagi, Yamada, & Fujita, 2007).  Mental health was controlled for using the 
Goldberg Depression and Anxiety Scales (Goldberg, Bridges, Duncan-Jones, & 
Grayson, 1988a) to assess the number of depression and anxiety symptoms experienced 
in the two weeks prior to the interview. 
 
Analyses 
The analyses were performed using the two different methods, mixed models 
(BLUP) and latent growth models.  The mixed model approach had two stages.  In the 
first stage, linear mixed effects regression models estimated the intercept and slope of 
each cognitive test over time.  The mixed models included a fixed effect of time and 
random effects intercepts, and (linear) time which were allowed to freely correlate, with 
the latent growth models specified in the same way.  Implemented in SEM, latent 
growth models typically permit the residual variance to differ between occasions of 
measurement.  This was accommodated in the mixed model by introducing a repeated 
effect of time using a diagonal covariance matrix.  The predicted intercepts and slopes 
were extracted for the second stage of the analysis.  The second stage involved 
modeling survival time using Cox Proportional Hazards models.  Surviving participants 
were censored at the end of the follow-up period (June 2007).  Models were run 
separately for six mortality outcomes with each of the five cognitive tests, resulting in 
30 survival models.  The mortality outcomes were all-cause mortality and five 
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categories of cause-specific mortality: cardiovascular, heart disease (a subset of 
cardiovascular deaths), stroke (a subset of cardiovascular deaths), cancer and respiratory 
deaths.  All participants were included in each analysis, with participants who did not 
die from the respective cause treated as censored observations at the time of death and 
survivors treated as censored observations the end of the study period.  Both the 
intercept and slope estimates for the cognitive tests (estimated at the first stage) were 
included as predictors in each model, along with the potential confounders.  SAS v9 for 
Windows was used for this analysis. 
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Figure 1:  Latent growth model estimating the effect of level and slope of each 
longitudinal cognitive measure on survival time 
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The latent growth models assessed the same outcomes as in the BLUP approach 
and the Cox proportional hazards regression model  was incorporated into a structural 
equation model which simultaneously estimated the intercept and slope for each 
cognitive measure (see T Asparouhov et al., 2006 for further details of the model 
specification).  A representation of the model is shown in Figure 1.  The model was 
estimated for each of the five cognitive tests and for each of the six mortality outcomes.  
Mplus version 6 was used for this analysis. 
 
Results 
Sample characteristics for the 592 participants included in the analyses are 
shown in Table 1.  Participants included in the analysis tended to be younger, more 
educated, less disabled, have fewer diseases, have stronger grip strength and have fewer 
depression symptoms than those who were not included in the analysis.  Many of these 
differences may be attributable to the necessary exclusion of participants who died 
before the second interview.  Participants included in the analysis also had higher initial 
cognitive performance on all tasks, reflecting strong associations between cognitive 
performance and impending death.  There were no significant differences in anxiety 
symptoms, gender or smoking status.  Cognitive performance declined significantly 
across the trial period for all of the tests.  Accounting for both fixed and random effects 
of time, the largest decline was in SLMT (-0.27 sd per year, p < .0001), followed by 
MMSE (-0.26 sd/year, p < .0001), verbal fluency (-0.16 sd/year, p < .0001), episodic 
memory (-0.10 sd/year, p < .0001) and NART (-0.06 sd/year, p < .0001).   
At the end of the follow-up period, 410 (69.3%) of the 592 participants had died 
from all causes.  Of these 410 decedents, 192 (46.8%) died from cardiovascular causes, 
including 105 (25.6%) from coronary heart disease and 41 (10.0%) from stroke.  A 
further 64 (15.6%) died from cancer and 43 (10.5%) died from respiratory disease.  The 
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remaining 111 (27.1%) decedents were categorized for the present analyses as having 
died from other causes, including 12 (2.9%) with dementia listed as the underlying 
cause of death and 30 (7.3%) without a listed code.  The identified causes of  death were 
comparable to Australian prevalence estimates for causes of death in the 85+ age group 
in 2006: 49.4% of women and 42.4% of men (vs. 46.8% of total in the present study) 
died from cardiovascular causes, 12.3% of women and 20.6% of men (vs. 15.6%) died 
from cancer, and 8.5% of women and 11.6% (vs. 10.5%) of men died from respiratory 
disease (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2010).  Among deceased 
participants included in the analyses, the mean time to death from baseline was 9.6 
years (sd = 3.5).  
To examine concordance between the two estimation methods (best linear 
unbiased predictors, BLUP, vs. latent growth models, LGM), the two estimates of level 
(intercept) and slope were compared.  The correlations between level estimates from the 
two methods ranged from 0.998 to 1.000 across the five cognitive tests.  The 
correlations between intercept estimates were 0.999 to 1.000, except for the estimate of 
NART slope.  The mixed model used to estimate NART scores did not converge with 
freely correlated random effects, so an uncorrelated (variance components) matrix was 
used instead.  Accordingly, the NART slopes estimated by BLUPs had a correlation of 
0.25 with the slopes estimated by LGM, which does not allow for an uncorrelated 
covariance structure using present software.  Examining correlations between slope and 
intercept revealed that participants with higher initial performance on SLMT (r = .48), 
NART (r = .32), MMSE (r = .27) and episodic memory (r = .52) had less decline over 
the follow-up period than those with lower performance, while participants with better 
verbal fluency had greater decline (r = -.41).  Mean estimated intercepts were 
approximately 102 for all tests (range: 101.3-102.0), with standard deviations for the 
intercepts ranging from 3.9 to 8.4.  As noted above, mean estimated slopes ranged  
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Table 1:  Baseline descriptive statistics for participants included in and excluded from 
the analyses 
 
 Included in analyses Excluded from analyses   
 (n = 592) (n = 304)   
 Mean (SD) or freq (%) Mean (SD) or freq (%) t or χ
2
 p 
Age 76.2 ( 4.6 ) 77.3 ( 5.4 ) 3.13 0.002 
Years of education 11.5 ( 2.6 ) 11.0 ( 2.4 ) -2.88 0.004 
Functional disability score 1.5 ( 1.9 ) 2.6 ( 3.4 ) 4.98 <0.001 
Disease count 2.7 ( 1.6 ) 3.0 ( 1.8 ) 2.09 0.038 
Grip strength, kg 25.2 ( 9.8 ) 23.5 ( 9.0 ) -2.65 0.008 
Goldberg Depression score 1.9 ( 1.8 ) 2.4 ( 2.1 ) 3.66 <0.001 
Goldberg Anxiety score 2.4 ( 2.2 ) 2.6 ( 2.4 ) 1.29 0.198 
Gender = male (%) 292 ( 49.3% ) 164 ( 53.9% ) 1.72 0.190 
Ever smoked (%) 261 ( 44.1% ) 122 ( 40.1% ) 1.28 0.257 
Current smoker (%) 65 ( 11.0% ) 38 ( 12.5% ) 0.46 0.499 
Died in follow-up period (%) 410 ( 69.3% ) 277 ( 91.1% ) 53.67 <0.001 
Cognitive outcomes       
SLMT score 99.3 ( 14.9 ) 89.7 ( 18.8 ) -7.47 <.0001 
NART score 113.3 ( 9.0 ) 108.4 ( 10.3 ) -6.70 <.0001 
MMSE score 27.8 ( 2.0 ) 26.2 ( 3.7 ) -7.17 <.0001 
Verbal fluency score 11.3 ( 3.3 ) 9.7 ( 3.4 ) -6.73 <.0001 
Episodic memory score 13.6 ( 1.9 ) 12.7 ( 3.0 ) -4.96 <.0001 
 
SLMT: Symbol-Letters Modalities Test; NART: National Adult Reading Test; MMSE: Mini-Mental State 
Examination 
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between -0.6 to -2.7, with standard deviations for the slopes from 0.5 to 2.5.  Estimates 
of intercept therefore had relatively less variance proportional to the mean than 
estimates of slope. 
To examine concordance between the two estimation methods (best linear 
unbiased predictors, BLUP, vs. latent growth models, LGM), the two estimates of level 
(intercept) and slope were compared.  The correlations between level estimates from the 
two methods ranged from 0.998 to 1.000 across the five cognitive tests.  The 
correlations between intercept estimates were 0.999 to 1.000, except for the estimate of 
NART slope.  The mixed model used to estimate NART scores did not converge with 
freely correlated random effects, so an uncorrelated (variance components) matrix was 
used instead.  Accordingly, the NART slopes estimated by BLUPs had a correlation of 
0.25 with the slopes estimated by LGM, which does not allow for an uncorrelated 
covariance structure using present software.  Examining correlations between slope and 
intercept revealed that participants with higher initial performance on SLMT (r = .48), 
NART (r = .32), MMSE (r = .27) and episodic memory (r = .52) had less decline over 
the follow-up period than those with lower performance, while participants with better 
verbal fluency had greater decline (r = -.41).  Mean estimated intercepts were 
approximately 102 for all tests (range: 101.3-102.0), with standard deviations for the 
intercepts ranging from 3.9 to 8.4.  As noted above, mean estimated slopes ranged 
between -0.6 to -2.7, with standard deviations for the slopes from 0.5 to 2.5.  Estimates 
of intercept therefore had relatively less variance proportional to the mean than 
estimates of slope. 
The models predicting survival time are shown in Table 2.  The models were 
estimated for each of the five cognitive tests (SLMT, NART, MMSE, verbal fluency 
and episodic memory) across six types of mortality (all-cause, cardiovascular, cancer, 
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respiratory, heart disease and stroke) using the two methods (latent growth models and 
BLUP models).  Each model included the level and slope estimates for the particular 
cognitive test, along with the effects of age, gender, years of education, smoking status, 
functional disability, disease count, depression and anxiety symptoms and grip strength.  
An alpha value of p < .01 was used to account for the six comparisons made for each 
cognitive test.  There was strong concordance between the two methods, with hazard 
ratios and p-values of similar magnitudes.  The only discrepancies between the two 
methods were in the effects of MMSE level on all-cause, cardiovascular and stroke 
mortality, where borderline p-values meant that the BLUP models showed significant 
relationships where the LGM models did not. 
Overall, most of the significant relationships were found in the level of initial 
performance.  Poorer SLMT performance was associated with higher all-cause, 
cardiovascular and heart disease mortality rates.  Poorer performance on the MMSE was 
associated with higher rates of all-cause, cardiovascular and stroke mortality.  In 
addition, greater declines in MMSE performance over the follow-up period were 
associated with significantly higher all-cause, cardiovascular and heart mortality.  
Poorer performance on the verbal fluency task was not associated with overall 
mortality, however it was associated with higher rates of cardiovascular and stroke 
mortality.  Neither NART nor episodic memory performance was associated with 
mortality.  None of the cognitive tasks significantly predicted cancer or respiratory 
mortality, either in terms of initial performance or changes in performance. 
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Discussion 
The present study aimed to assess the relationship between level and slope of 
cognitive performance on cause-specific mortality in the Canberra Longitudinal Study.  
Using two unbiased methods for estimating change in cognitive performance, the initial 
level of cognitive performance was found to be a better predictor of subsequent 
mortality than the rate of change in performance.  Processing speed (SLMT) and global 
cognition (MMSE) were the strongest indicators for mortality, with poorer performance 
having a significant relationship with increased mortality from all-causes and 
cardiovascular disease, including heart disease and/or stroke.  In addition, declining 
performance on MMSE was associated with greater rates of all-cause, cardiovascular 
and heart disease mortality.  Poorer performance on the verbal fluency task was 
associated with a greater hazard of cardiovascular and stroke death.  None of the 
cognitive tests predicted cancer or respiratory deaths.  Consequently, it appears that the 
relationship between cognition and all-cause mortality may be largely due to late-life 
changes in the cardiovascular system that are associated with both cognitive 
performance and death. 
These results concur with the findings of Shipley et al. (2008), who found that 
the relationship between cognitive performance and mortality was primarily evident for 
cardiovascular causes of death.  As in the Shipley et al. (2008) study, the present study 
excluded participants who died early in the study and adjusted for potential confounding 
from background characteristics, health behaviors, and physical and mental health 
status.  Many cognition-mortality effects remained strong after these adjustments.  The 
findings were somewhat different to the conclusions of the review by Anstey et al. 
(2006), who reported stronger associations between cognition and mortality among 
cancer and stroke patients than heart disease patients.  However, most of the papers in 
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Anstey‟s review examined all-cause mortality in these patient groups rather than cause-
specific mortality.  Disparate causes of death in cancer and heart disease patients may 
be responsible for the different findings, along with the largely clinical nature of the 
samples reviewed by Anstey et al. (2006).  The present community-dwelling sample 
may have included a broader array of trajectories of decline in physical and cognitive 
functioning.   
The finding that a range of cognitive abilities were associated with mortality was 
consistent with the conclusions of Ghisletta et al (2006), who reported that the effect of 
cognition on mortality was not specific to any domain of functioning, although tasks 
robust to aging effects such as vocabulary had no association with mortality.  Speeded 
tasks such as SLMT tend to decline as a response to both normative and pathological 
aging processes, so the SLMT was expected to show stronger relationships with 
mortality outcomes.  Nevertheless, measures of verbal fluency and global cognition also 
showed strong associations with cardiovascular deaths in particular, despite being 
somewhat more robust to the effects of aging.  These findings are at odds with the 
White and Cunningham (1988) hypothesis that terminal decline is limited to abilities 
that are robust to aging.  Our results suggest that both normative and pathological aging 
processes may contribute to the relationship between cognition and mortality.   
Bäckman and MacDonald (2006) have suggested that because verbal fluency 
tasks have aspects that reflect both fluid and crystallized intelligence, it may be an 
important predictor of terminal decline.  They observe, “verbal fluency may be 
particularly good for demonstrating terminal decline, because the task is simple enough 
for survivors but sufficiently taxing for decedents” (Bäckman & MacDonald, 2006, 
p225).  It is plausible that this combination of fluid and crystallized abilities may also 
explain the SLMT effects, as the SLMT uses a novel task (transcription of symbols) to 
assess processing speed.  The MMSE effects are likely associated with dementia and the 
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psychometric properties of the instrument.  MMSE scores generally remain fairly stable 
and at a ceiling in the absence of pathology (Small & Bäckman, 2007).  As the present 
sample was largely cognitively intact at the beginning of the study, most change in the 
MMSE would have occurred in the follow-up stages as the prevalence of dementia 
increased.  This may explain why there was less effect of the level of MMSE than on 
the slope of MMSE, likely reflecting pathological events that were associated with 
death in a subset of the sample.  Heart disease deaths were predicted only by changes in 
MMSE, whereas stroke deaths were predicted only by level, possibly because of the 
more acute effects of stroke on cognitive performance.  Correspondingly, combined 
cardiovascular deaths (which includes both stroke and heart disease deaths) and all-
cause mortality were predicted by both level and slope of MMSE.  In contrast to the 
MMSE, vocabulary as measured by the NART is robust to the effects of both normative 
aging and preclinical dementia (McGurn et al., 2004).  The lack of association between 
episodic memory and mortality may be related to the validity of the very brief measure 
used in the present study, as indicated by the relatively modest declines seen in the 
episodic memory task across the study period.   
As the effects across all tasks were primarily associated with cardiovascular 
deaths, the findings suggest that a range of cognitive deficits in late-life may be 
indicative of cardiovascular problems including vascular events in the brain.  Such 
vascular events may also occur in late-life or be precipitated by early- or mid-life 
disease or injury (Fischer et al., 2006; Herrup, 2010).  Furthermore, given the high 
comorbidity between dementia and cardiovascular diseases (Rastas et al., 2010; Skoog, 
1998), it is not surprising that cognitive performance is predictive of cardiovascular 
mortality, particularly changes in MMSE that may indicate dementia.  As a range of 
vascular events are associated with dementia, including hypertension, coronary heart 
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disease, atrial fibrillation and stroke (Skoog, 1998), it is likely that cardiovascular 
morbidity leads to reduced cognitive ability and eventual mortality. 
The present study expanded the investigation of the cognition-mortality 
relationship by including two unbiased estimates of cognitive change.  However, using 
measures of change resulted in limited evidence for terminal decline – there were few 
significant relationships between the slope of change and the mortality outcomes.  Such 
findings are similar to those of Johansson et al. (2004) and Ghisletta et al. (2006), who 
also reported stronger effects for level rather than slope of cognitive performance.  This 
finding may reflect the level of cognitive ability being indicative of a lifetime of 
development through education, health literacy and healthy behaviors (medication 
compliance, help seeking), along with insult through unhealthy behaviors (particularly 
substance use), injury, vascular problems and other physical health problems (Bäckman 
& MacDonald, 2006; Deary, 2005).  Other genetic and environmental influences 
through the lifespan may also influence the level of performance (Bäckman & 
MacDonald, 2006). These lifelong influences on the level of performance may be 
greater contributors to mortality than developmental cognitive processes that occur in 
proximity to death, which are reflected in the change estimates.  It appears to be only 
when pathological events occur, as reflected by declines in the MMSE, that changes in 
cognition may be directly predictive of mortality.  The lack of effects for slope 
estimates may also be related to the reliability of these estimates, which were assessed 
across up to four time points.  Although these few time points may result in less reliable 
estimates of slope, reducing the power to find effects, the large sample size would have 
somewhat mitigated this issue.  Furthermore, the variances of the slope estimates were 
proportionally greater than those of the level estimates, which indicate that restriction of 
range was likely not a problem for finding effects.  Ghisletta et al (2006) reported 
similar findings using up to eleven measurements, and none of the slope effects (other 
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those reported for MMSE) came close to being significant, so it is unlikely that the null 
effects of slope were purely the result of the estimation process.   
While latent growth models and best linear unbiased predictors (BLUPs) are 
unbiased, defensible methods for estimating cognitive change, linear estimates of 
cognitive change may not adequately capture the terminal decline phenomenon.  
Cognitive decline in proximity to death may be described instead as a threshold function 
using a change point model, as it does not accelerate continuously (Sliwinski et al., 
2006).  A previous analysis of the present cohort using a change point model did find 
evidence for terminal decline, starting around 6-8 years prior to death for different 
cognitive measures, with a two- to four-fold acceleration of decline in the terminal 
phase (Batterham, Mackinnon et al., in press).  Estimating the onset and rate of 
cognitive decline with respect to time-to-death assesses whether those in proximity to 
death show greater cognitive decline, which is a different research question to the 
present analysis, which assessed whether those who exhibit cognitive decline were at 
greater risk of dying (Bäckman & MacDonald, 2006).  Nevertheless, it is instructive to 
identify the differences in findings between these approaches.  Specifically, it appears 
that while there may be a significant acceleration of cognitive decline in proximity to 
death, the overall rate of decline is generally not a critical predictor of mortality. 
The second goal of the current study was to compare latent growth models and 
BLUPs for examining the relationship between cognitive change and mortality, as 
previous research on cognition and mortality has not explicitly assessed the 
comparability of these methods.  The comparison of the two methods demonstrated that 
they provide very similar results.  The latent growth model may be seen as a more 
elegant method, as the estimation of change scores and the survival analysis is done in 
an integrated model that is not reliant on predicted scores, in contrast to the present 
BLUP analysis.  However, the BLUP method can be achieved in any standard statistical 
98 
software (SAS, SPSS, S-Plus, Stata, etc.), while the latent growth method  requires an 
iterative process that is slower (hundred-fold increase in processing time) and more 
resource-intensive (each model must be run using a separate input file) than BLUPs.  
The non-convergence of the NART models using an unstructured covariance matrix 
was the only drawback of the BLUP models because of the reliance of these models on 
determining predicted scores, however, the outcome of these models was no different.   
The present results also suggest that the two methods may have equivalent 
power for finding effects, although the BLUP models appeared to give marginally 
smaller p-values for some of the effects.  The slight differences in the models may result 
from minute variations in the level and slope estimates, small differences due to the 
baseline hazard assumptions across the two software packages, or the difference 
between using a two-stage versus integrated modeling process.  The present findings 
support the use of multiple approaches of measuring change, although either of the 
methods used to generate unbiased estimates of change should provide comparable 
results.  Each of the models provide different possibilities for extending this research, 
for example, piecewise modeling may be possible using BLUPs but difficult to 
implement using latent growth models, while latent growth modeling may be extended 
to growth curve mixture modeling which is not feasible using BLUPs.  The present 
analysis used a two-stage approach in which BLUPs were estimated, while Ghisletta et 
al (2006) used a single-stage Bayesian joint longitudinal-survival model.  Although this 
single-stage model can be implemented in SAS as was done by Ghisletta et al (2006), 
its developers (Guo & Carlin, 2004) recommend the use of specialized Bayesian 
statistical packages, as confidence intervals produced by other approaches may be 
biased. 
There were some limitations of the research that could not be fully addressed in 
the present study.  Only linear changes in cognition over time were investigated.  
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Further research could investigate modeling cognitive change using nonlinear functions.  
A maximum of four measurements taken over 12 years were available for estimating 
change, as more measurements were not feasible given the large community-based 
elderly cohort.  A substantial proportion of participants were assessed on fewer 
occasions.  Such a pattern was sufficient only for estimating individual linear change 
using the present methods.  The analyses also excluded participants who died or 
withdrew from the study after the first interview.  This exclusion may have created a 
degree of bias, however, it also resulted in a more homogeneous sample, as the 
participants closest to death at the first interview were sicker, on average.  Inclusion of 
these participants would have skewed initial cognitive test scores.  Consequently the 
effects presented reflect conservative estimates that may be more reflective of the 
effects of normative aging than pathology.  Indeed, Shipley et al. (2008) recommended 
examining models that omit individuals who die early in the study period, as any 
outcomes may otherwise be confounded by the disproportionate contribution of sick 
participants who were close to death at the first assessment.  This relationship is 
reflected by the significantly lower cognitive scores among participants who were 
excluded from the analysis due to death or dropout before the second interview (Table 
1).  The cognitive measures used in the present analysis were selected prior to the 
beginning of the study in 1990 with the aim of briefly assessing a range of abilities.  
Studies using more comprehensive measures of episodic memory in particular, along 
with other domains of functioning may find different outcomes.  The relatively small 
declines observed in episodic memory (-0.10 sd/year) may be due to the performance of 
the scale. Finally, mortality and attrition across the study period inevitably reduced the 
sample by the fourth wave, however, its size was large for this type of community study 
and most participants (62%) contributed three or more measures to the estimates of 
cognitive change. 
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In conclusion, poorer cognitive performance in several domains predicted higher 
rates of all-cause mortality and cardiovascular mortality, including heart disease and/or 
stroke mortality.  These findings suggest the cognition-mortality relationship may be 
primarily driven by lifelong cardiovascular events which effectively overshadow subtler 
effects reflected by change in memory and cognition.  Global ability was the only 
domain to show a relationship between declines in performance and increased all-cause 
and cardiovascular mortality.  Other methods that do not rely on estimating linear trends 
may be more effective for capturing the terminal decline phenomenon.  Nevertheless, 
latent growth models and BLUP models are principled and useful methods for obtaining 
consistent unbiased estimates of linear change, and this is the first paper to demonstrate 
the comparability of the two methods for predicting mortality.  While results such as 
those presented may not be sufficiently consistent to facilitate the prediction of cause-
of-death, the methods used provide greater insight into the relationship between late-life 
cognitive performance and mortality. 
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Abstract 
 
Differences in the time of onset and magnitude of terminal decline were 
examined in three cognitive domains: processing speed, episodic memory and global 
function.  In addition, cognitive reserve was investigated by testing whether education 
effected the onset or rate of decline across these domains.  896 community-dwelling 
Australian adults aged ≥70 years were assessed up to four times over 12 years, with 
vital status followed for 17 years.  For each of the cognitive measures, a series of 
change point models were fitted across the 20 years prior to death to find the optimal 
point at which terminal decline was distinguished from preterminal decline.  Change 
points were then assessed separately for high- and low-education groups.  The change 
points were 8.5 years for processing speed (95% CI: 6.0-11.2 years), 7.1 years for 
global function (6.2-9.3), and 6.6 years for episodic memory (5.3-7.1).  The rate of 
decline was 2-4 times greater in the terminal phase relative to the preterminal phase, 
depending on the domain.  Increased education changed the terminal decline effect 
differently for each of the three tests, either by significantly hastening the onset of 
terminal decline and decreasing the rate of decline, or by increasing the rate of either 
preterminal or terminal decline.  Analyses were repeated excluding participants 
diagnosed with dementia, with no substantive change to the outcomes.  In conclusion, 
the rate and onset of terminal decline varied somewhat across cognitive domains.  
Education affected terminal decline differently across the domains, but this modification 
was not consistent with the predictions of cognitive reserve theory. 
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The terminal decline phenomenon was first described by Kleemeier (1962), and 
was characterized by Riegel & Riegel (1972) as a process in which cognitive 
functioning deteriorates in proximity to death.  It is generally agreed that terminal 
decline is related to pathological processes occurring prior to death, which may be 
distinguished from normal, age-related decline (Laukka, MacDonald, & Backman, 
2008; Sliwinski et al., 2006; Small & Backman, 1999; Wilson et al., 2007).  This 
distinction also reflects the concepts of primary aging (maturational processes) and 
secondary aging (disease processes) (Birren & Cunningham, 1985; Busse, 1969).  
However, a review of studies examining the relationship between changes in cognitive 
function and death reported limited evidence for terminal decline (Bosworth & Siegler, 
2002a).  These studies generally estimated cognitive change scores to predict survival.  
An alternative approach has been used more recently to examine the nature of terminal 
decline.  The aim of this method is to partition the effects of normative aging and 
terminal decline using change point models, resulting in estimate of both the onset and 
magnitude of terminal decline.  This method was proposed by Hall (2000) for the 
purpose of identifying the onset of cognitive decline prior to the diagnosis of 
Alzheimer‟s Disease.  Wilson et al. (2003), Sliwinski et al. (2006), Wilson et al. (2007) 
and Thorvaldsson et al. (2008) have used the method to distinguish terminal 
(pathological) cognitive decline from preterminal (normative, age-related) cognitive 
decline.   
The estimates from the four studies that have used the change point method are 
summarized in Table 1.  Change points were identified at 3.5 years for the two studies 
by Wilson and colleagues, while the other studies generally identified a change point 
between 5-9 years prior to death.  The magnitude of the ratio between terminal and 
preterminal decline was generally in the range of 2-5, although there were exceptions to 
this finding which may be attributable to near-zero rates of preterminal decline.  
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Overall, although there is some agreement in these studies about the timing and 
magnitude of terminal decline, there is also variation which warrants explanation. 
Sliwinski et al. (2006) suggested that the slightly different method used by Wilson et al. 
(2003), which included participants who survived the study period in the estimates, led 
to a possible underestimate of the terminal decline effect.  Furthermore, study design, 
particularly the length of follow-up, and sample composition may have an impact on the 
estimation of the change point (Thorvaldsson et al., 2008). 
 
 
Table 1:  Previous estimates of terminal decline from four studies using the change 
point method 
 
Study n 
Follow-up 
period 
(years) 
Cognitive domain(s) 
Change point  
(95% CI)
†
 
Magnitude 
of decline
‡
 
Wilson et al (2003) 763 8 Global cognition 3.5 5.0 
Sliwinski et al 
(2006) 
445 25 Episodic memory 8.4 (7.1, 9.8) 1.8 
Wilson et al (2007) 853 8 Global cognition 3.5 3.0 
Thorvaldsson et al. 
(2008) 
288 15 Verbal ability 6.6 (4.3, 11.7) 13.0 
Spatial ability 7.8 (6.3,10.6) 1.9 
Perceptual speed 14.8 (10.8, 16.6) 2.0 
† Years prior to death 
‡ Ratio of terminal to preterminal decline 
 
 
 
Perhaps of greater importance, terminal decline appears to commence at 
different times for different abilities.  In healthy older adults who age normatively, 
certain cognitive domains such as perceptual speed and explicit memory have been 
found consistently to decline earlier and more precipitously than other domains, such as 
verbal ability (Carlson, Xue, Zhou, & Fried, 2009; Royall, Palmer, Chiodo, & Polk, 
2005).  Bäckman, Jones, Berger, Laukka & Small (2005) have reported greater 
preclinical decline among participants who progressed to Alzheimer‟s Disease than 
those who did not on global cognitive ability, perceptual speed, executive functioning 
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and episodic memory (d < 1.0), while verbal ability, visuospatial skill and attention 
showed more modest levels of decline.  In studies of age-related cognitive decline, 
Lindenberger and Ghisletta (2009) reported greater decline in perceptual speed than in 
episodic memory, while Scuteri, Palmieri, Lo Noce and Giampaoli (2005) reported that 
decline in perceptual speed occurs earlier and more precipitously than decline in global 
functioning.  In examining terminal decline, Sliwinski et al. (2006) studied only an 
episodic memory task, while the studies of Wilson et al. (2003 and 2007) used a battery 
of 19 cognitive tests that were combined into a single measure.  In contrast, 
Thorvaldsson et al. (2008) examined verbal ability, spatial ability and perceptual speed 
separately, finding differences in both the onset and magnitude of terminal decline for 
different cognitive domains.  While Wilson et al. (2003 and 2007) only presented 
models for a composite cognitive score, many of the constituent tests they examined 
were reported to have change points around 3-4 years, although visuospatial ability had 
an earlier change point at six years.  Like Thorvaldsson et al. (2008), Wilson et al. 
(2003) found that the magnitude of terminal decline also varied across cognitive 
domains, with the slope increased anywhere from three-fold to eleven-fold in the 
terminal period compared to the preterminal period.   
It may be concluded that the processes involved in terminal decline – much like 
those in normative aging – affect different cognitive domains to varying extents, both in 
terms of the magnitude and time of onset of the decline.  Bäckman et al. (2005) 
attributed differential decline across cognitive domains to functional impairment and 
structural changes in multiple brain structures, including volume reductions in the 
medial-temporal lobe, anterior cingulate and temporal sulcus, posterior cingulate and 
neocortical temporoparietal regions, and frontal regions, along with decreased blood 
flow, reduced glucose metabolism and amyloid deposits in other regions.  Other factors 
including cardiovascular disease, inflammation, lifestyle and age-related 
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neurobiological changes may also have specific impacts on late-life cognitive 
performance (Deary et al., 2009).  Changes to structure and function in specific brain 
regions prior to death, whether due to dementia or other disease processes, may have 
differential impacts on both the onset and magnitude of decline across various cognitive 
domains.  Consequently, examining a range of cognitive domains is necessary to fully 
capture the nature of the terminal decline phenomenon (Small & Backman, 1999). 
More recently, the change point method has been used to determine whether 
particular risk factors such as poor education or the presence of the apolipoprotein E 
(APOE) 4 allele modify the onset and magnitude of terminal decline (Wilson et al., 
2007).  Education, childhood cognition and adult occupation are believed to protect 
against faster rates of cognitive decline in normal populations (Richards & Sacker, 
2003), and it may have specific effects on rate or onset of terminal decline.  Research 
suggests that the clinical onset of Alzheimer‟s disease appears to be delayed in those 
with higher education, but the rate of cognitive decline after onset is more rapid among 
more highly educated individuals (Stern et al., 1999).  Such findings are cited as 
evidence for cognitive reserve, suggesting that education increases the brain‟s ability to 
compensate for pathology (Stern, 2002).  The cognitive reserve hypothesis suggests that 
higher levels of education create a buffer against functional decline in the face of brain 
insult (Christensen, Anstey, Leach, & Mackinnon, 2008).  Education may be associated 
with a greater number of healthy synapses or neurons, more efficient circuits of synaptic 
connectivity or more efficient use of alternative brain networks (Scarmeas, Albert, 
Manly, & Stern, 2006).  Evidence for education being an indicator of reserve comes 
from functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of high-functioning older adults, 
which demonstrate functional compensation for declines in neural activity (Cabeza & 
Nyberg, 2000).  
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Change point models can test whether education protects against terminal 
decline by delaying the onset of terminal decline even if the subsequent rate of decline 
is accelerated.  Wilson et al. (2007) examined whether education, age, sex, vascular 
disease, APOE genotype or mild cognitive impairment modified terminal decline.  They 
found that the rate of decline did not accelerate during the terminal phase for individuals 
without an APOE 4 allele or with a history of vascular disease, but found no effect of 
education on the rate of decline.  However, these effects were examined using only a 
global cognition aggregate score (Wilson et al., 2007), without examining whether 
cognitive reserve may influence specific domains of cognitive decline.  Hall et al. 
(2007) also examined the role of education in memory decline prior to dementia 
diagnosis.  They found that increased education delayed the onset of dementia-related 
cognitive decline but the decline was more precipitous after onset (Hall et al., 2007), in 
support of the cognitive reserve theory.  However, the study did not examine decline 
with respect to death and also examined only a single measure of cognition. 
The present study examined terminal and preterminal decline in three domains 
as a function of education using the method proposed by Hall et al. (2000).  We 
explored decline by examining a series of models that incremented a change point over 
20 years.  The definition of the preterminal and terminal phases is dependent on whether 
the measurement occurs before or after the change point, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
When a measurement occasion is before the change point (e.g., “Measurement 1” in 
Figure 1), the length of the preterminal phase at that measurement is defined as the 
individual‟s current age, while the length of the terminal phase is zero.  When a 
measurement occasion is after the change point (e.g., “Measurement 2” in Figure 1), the 
length of the preterminal phase at that measurement is defined as the individual‟s age at 
death minus the change point, while the length of the terminal phase is the individual‟s 
current age minus their age at death plus the change point. 
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Figure 1:  Preterminal and terminal phases of cognitive decline, illustrating their 
dependence on the time of measurement 
 
The models included both fixed and random effects (slopes) of preterminal and 
terminal decline, in addition to a random intercept.  The change point that optimally 
differentiated between preterminal and terminal slopes was determined by varying the 
change point to identify the model with the largest likelihood function.  A 95% 
confidence interval for the identified change point was based on the difference in -2 log 
likelihood from the optimal change point, which has a chi-square distribution (Sliwinski 
et al., 2006).  The rates of preterminal and terminal decline were then assessed using the 
model at the optimal change point.  Taking this approach further, the present study 
examined the effect of education on terminal decline for each of the cognitive tasks by 
dividing the cohort based on educational attainment and repeating the analysis. 
The Canberra Longitudinal Study (Christensen et al., 2004) included seven 
cognitive domains that were assessed for terminal decline in the present study: episodic 
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memory, processing speed, global function, verbal and facial recognition, verbal fluency 
and verbal ability.  The three domains found to clearly exhibit terminal decline in the 
present study were episodic memory, processing speed and global function.  Based on 
the findings of (Thorvaldsson et al., 2008), it was hypothesized that there would be 
differences in both the onset and rate of terminal decline across domains.  We predicted 
that the onset of terminal decline would be earlier for processing speed than for other 
tasks, as reported by Thorvaldsson et al. (2008), while research on age-related and 
pathological cognitive decline suggests that the rate of decline for all three domains may 
be similar (Backman et al., 2005).  Based on the predictions of cognitive reserve theory 
(Stern, 2002), where higher reserve may initially slow the rate of decline, and previous 
findings with respect to the onset of dementia (Hall et al., 2007; Stern et al., 1999), 
where education initially protects, but then precipitates decline following diagnosis, we 
hypothesized that higher education may shorten the length of terminal decline but 
accelerate the rate of decline in the terminal period.  Furthermore, these differences 
might be more likely to be observed on tests sensitive to terminal decline such as 
processing speed.  These observations were undertaken with and without those with 
dementia diagnosis to determine the effect of a dementia diagnosis and to exclude the 
effect of dementia for the rest of the population sample. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
The Canberra Longitudinal Study is an epidemiological survey of mental health 
and cognitive functioning in older people that commenced in 1990.  The study design 
has previously been detailed by Christensen et al. (2004).  Eight hundred and ninety-six 
participants (456 men and 440 women) aged 70 or older at the time of the baseline 
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assessment were recruited for the baseline assessment.  All participants were initially 
living in the community in the cities of Canberra or Queanbeyan, Australia.  The sample 
was stratified by age and gender.  Participants were sampled from the compulsory 
electoral roll, with 69% responding.  Approval for the research was obtained from the 
Ethics in Human Experimentation Committee of The Australian National University. 
Survey Procedure 
Participants were interviewed up to four times over 12 years.  Baseline 
interviews lasted approximately two hours, incorporating a survey measuring a wide 
range of risk factors including socio-demographics, physical health and disease status, 
mental health status, cognitive performance and social support.  Interviews also 
included physical assessments of blood pressure, lung function, grip strength, vision and 
reaction time.  Trained professional interviewers conducted the interviews. 
Of the original sample of 896 participants, 185 (20.6%) were deceased by four 
years, 363 (40.5%) were deceased by eight years, and 544 (60.7%) were deceased by 12 
years.  At the end of vital status collection in June 2007, 687 (76.7%) of the participants 
were deceased.  Of the participants who remained in the study, 14.1% (100/711) refused 
or were unable to complete the first follow-up interview, 21.1% (100/474) for the 
second follow-up and 21.1% (57/270) for the third follow-up.  Participants surviving at 
the end of the follow-up period (n = 209) were excluded from the analyses. 
Measures 
Several tests were administered to assess the cognitive performance of study 
participants.  Speed of processing was measured by the Symbol-Letters Modalities Test 
(SLMT), a task similar to Smith‟s (1973) Symbol-Digit Modalities Test and Wechsler‟s 
(1981) Digit-Symbol Substitution.  Verbal ability was measured using the National 
Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1982), a test of vocabulary.  An episodic memory task 
consisted of brief episodic memory tasks testing word, face, name and address  recall 
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and figure reproduction (Jorm, 1992).  Verbal fluency was assessed as the number of 
animals named in 30 seconds.  Face and word recognition tasks were based on the 
Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (Wilson, Cockburn, Baddeley, & Hiorns, 1989).  
Global function was tested using the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, 
& McHugh, 1975a), scored out of 30.  To facilitate comparisons between tests, all of the 
tests were standardized to a common metric, with a mean of 100 and standard deviation 
of 10 at the baseline measurement. 
Mortality status and date of death were established by contacting relatives, 
searching the National Death Index, and from death notices in the local newspaper.  
Missing death identifications from the National Death Index would most likely have 
been a rare occurrence, as the index is a register of all deaths in Australia.  The 
additional methods used for death reporting (contacting relatives, newspaper searches) 
provide further confidence in the mortality status data.  Mortality status was followed 
for up to 17 years, from the start of baseline interviews in September, 1990 until June 
30, 2007.  For six participants with unknown day of death, the day was set to the 15
th
 of 
the month.  For two participants with an unknown month of death, the month was set to 
June.  Date of birth (age) was reported during the initial interview.  Educational status 
was based on responses to two questions regarding the number of years in school and 
the highest qualification obtained.  These two questions were combined into a single 
measure representing the number of years it took participants to attain their highest 
educational qualification.  For the analyses based on educational status, a median split 
was used to differentiate those with fewer than 11 years of education (low education) 
from those with 11 or more years (high education), which also corresponds to the 
number of years taken to complete standard secondary education for this cohort.  
Additional analyses controlled for a number of baseline risk factors for cognitive 
decline or mortality: gender, heart attack history (self-report binary measure), 
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hypertension history (self-report binary measure), grip strength (measured in kilograms 
using a hand dynamometer), smoking status (never, previous or current), Activities of 
Daily Living (a scale of functional disability ranging from 0 to 24), disease count (self-
reported history from a list of 14 diseases), and depression [Goldberg Depression Scale 
(Goldberg et al., 1988a), range 0-9]. 
To examine the effect of dementia and to determine any potential confounding 
arising from it, analyses were repeated with and without participants with this disorder.  
Participants who met criteria for an ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1993) 
diagnosis of dementia or severe dementia during the study (at waves 1-4, up to 12 years 
after baseline) were identified.  Diagnoses were made using the Canberra Interview for 
the Elderly (Social Psychiatry Research Unit, 1992), which provides information from 
which a diagnosis of dementia can be made according to ICD-10 (World Health 
Organization, 1993) and DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) by 
means of a computer algorithm (Mackinnon et al., 2003). The algorithm classifies 
participants into categories of non-case, possible dementia, probable dementia or actual 
dementia.  The “actual dementia” category was chosen for the selection of participants 
to exclude, as it is the most robust. 
Analyses 
Mixed model repeated measures analyses of variance (MMRM) were used to 
estimate the change point and magnitude of terminal decline, following the method 
described by Hall, et al. (2000).  This process segments the participant‟s age (in months) 
at each measurement point using a change point, .  The segmentation of age is shown 
in the equation (adapted from Sliwinski et al., 2006):  
 
cognitionit = 0 + 1 (min[Ageit, DeathAgei – ]) + 2 (max[0, Ageit – DeathAgei + ]) + it  
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where cognitionit represents a cognitive score for participant i at time t (each cognitive 
test was modeled separately), 0 is the intercept, 1 is the coefficient being estimated for 
the rate of cognitive decline during the preterminal interval, Ageit is the age of 
participant i age at time t (in months), DeathAgei is the age at death of participant i (in 
months),  is the change point being evaluated within a range of 1-20 years (in months), 
2 is the coefficient being estimated for the rate of cognitive decline during the terminal 
interval, and it is the error term.  Age at study commencement was centered at 75 (i.e., 
75 years were subtracted) to facilitate the interpretation of intercepts. 
The model was repeatedly evaluated using values for the change point, , 
incremented from 12 to 120 months prior to death in steps of one month.  The model 
with the largest log-likelihood value was selected, with the  for this model representing 
the change point at which terminal decline begins, with the estimates of 1 and 2 at this 
value of  representing the rates of preterminal and terminal decline respectively.  Both 
fixed and random effects for 1 and 2 were included in the model and maximum 
likelihood estimation was used in accordance with the method used by Hall et al. 
(2000).  An unstructured variance-covariance matrix was used and degrees of freedom 
were calculated using Satterthwaite‟s approximation (Steel & Torrie, 1980).  Mixed 
models use all available measurement points for each participant under the assumption 
that missing data are missing at random.  Analyses were repeated excluding participants 
who had received a dementia diagnosis and also repeated with the inclusion of multiple 
risk factors for mortality as independent fixed effects.  SAS v9.1 was used for all 
statistical analyses.  
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Results 
 
Participants who were deceased at June 2007 were included in the change point 
analyses (n = 687).  Of these 687 decedents, 423 completed the second interview (176 
deaths and 88 dropouts), 215 completed the third (183 new deaths, 57 new dropouts, 
including 31 former dropouts who died and one who returned to the study) and 81 
completed the fourth (176 new deaths and 28 new dropouts, including 69 former 
dropouts who died and one who returned to the study).  In all, 81 (11.8%) participants 
contributed data from all four time points, 135 (19.7%) from three, 208 (30.3%) from 
two and 263 (38.3%) from only the baseline measurement.  There was no significant 
difference between the rates of contribution between those with lower education (<11 
years, n = 376) and those with higher education [≥11 years, n = 520; χ2 (3) = 6.1, p = 
0.11].  Of the 1406 total observations from the 687 participants, 297 (21.1%) occurred 
10 or more years prior to death, while 791 (56.3%) occurred five or more years prior to 
death.   
The contribution of observations to the change point models across the span of 
the study is shown in Table 2, categorized by the number of years prior to death the 
observations were made, separately for the two education groups.  Approximately 35% 
of the observations fell in the 5-10 years prior to death where terminal decline is most 
commonly found to begin, while 44% were 0-5 years before death and the remaining 
21% were more than 10 years before death.  There was no significant difference in the 
distributions of observations across the two education groups [χ2 (16) = 7.3, p = 0.96).  
The mean age of participants used in the change point analyses (n = 687) was 77.3 years 
(sd = 5.1), with a mean educational attainment of 11.4 years (sd = 2.6).  Those who had 
died by June 2007 were older at the start of the study than those who survived.  
However, there was no significant difference between decedents and survivors in the 
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amount of education completed.  Performance on all seven cognitive tests was 
significantly better for survivors compared to decedents. 
 
Table 2:  Contribution of observations to the mixed effects models as a function of time 
to death and education 
 
  Low education group High education group 
 (n=376, 553 obs) (n=520, 853 obs) 
Time to death Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
0 to <1 year 40 7.2% 68 8.0% 
1 to <2 years 50 9.0% 82 9.6% 
2 to <3 years 53 9.6% 82 9.6% 
3 to <4 years 49 8.9% 80 9.4% 
4 to <5 years 42 7.6% 69 8.1% 
5 to <6 years 50 9.0% 74 8.7% 
6 to <7 years 39 7.1% 65 7.6% 
7 to <8 years 36 6.5% 51 6.0% 
8 to <9 years 45 8.1% 53 6.2% 
9 to <10 years 35 6.3% 46 5.4% 
10 to <11 years 24 4.3% 44 5.2% 
11 to <11 years 24 4.3% 42 4.9% 
12 to <13 years 27 4.9% 36 4.2% 
13 to <14 years 15 2.7% 18 2.1% 
14 to <15 years 7 1.3% 20 2.3% 
15 to <16 years 12 2.2% 18 2.1% 
16 to 17 years 5 0.9% 5 0.6% 
 
To determine whether change point models were justified, decline in each of the 
tasks was examined using base models testing linear and quadratic terms for age and, 
separately, time-to-death.  These models found little decline on several of the tests, 
possibly because the participants tended to be relatively well educated, were community 
dwelling (non-institutionalized) and had relatively low rates of dementia.  Furthermore, 
some of the tests were included in the study for their robustness to the effects of 
cognitive aging.  Consequently, change points could not be reliably estimated for 
NART, verbal fluency, face recognition or word recognition.  Three domains of 
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cognitive function were therefore used as outcomes in the analyses: speed of processing 
(SLMT), episodic memory and global function (MMSE).   
To identify the optimal change point and compare change points across 
domains, -2 log likelihood values from the 229 models (12-240 months) were 
standardized to create “profile likelihood” values, fitting a range between 0-1.  This was 
calculated by subtracting the -2LL value at each time point from the minimum -2LL 
value (i.e., the -2LL value at the change point), then dividing by 2 and taking the 
exponent (Hall et al., 2000).  This was done separately for each of the three domains 
investigated.  Profile likelihood values are plotted for the three domains in Figure 2, 
with time ranging from 1-15 years prior to death on the x-axis (death is time zero).  The 
95% confidence interval for change point estimate is also indicated, with the cutoff 
values for this interval being at approximately 0.15 for the transformed profile 
likelihood values on each of the tests.  The optimal change point for processing speed 
was 8.5 years (95% CI: 6.0-11.2 years), the MMSE change point was 7.1 years (6.2-
9.3), while the episodic memory change point was 6.6 years, (5.3-7.1).  Overlap is 
evident between the confidence intervals for all three cognitive tests, suggesting that 
change points for these tests are not significantly different. 
The models showing the effects of preterminal and terminal decline at the 
change points are displayed in Table 3.  Absolute rates of decline can be compared 
across tests, as they were standardized to mean of 100 and sd of 10 at baseline.  The 
parameter estimates given in the table represent monthly changes in these standardized 
units.  Likelihood ratio chi-square tests for the null model are provided in the table, 
showing the models fit well.  The covariance estimates for the random effects are also 
provided in the table.  In some cases, the random effect of preterminal decline was close 
to zero, as indicated in the table.  In these cases, models were reestimated without this 
random effect (not displayed).  The coefficients for intercept, preterminal and terminal 
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decline remained virtually unchanged when these random effects were excluded. 
Rates of decline were comparable for processing speed and global function, 
decreasing by 0.05 standard deviations per year in the preterminal phase and around 0.1 
sd per year in the terminal phase.  There was slightly less decline in episodic memory: 
0.02 sd per year preterminal and 0.07 sd per year terminal.  However, the magnitude of 
terminal decline relative to preterminal decline was greater for episodic memory, with a 
3.7-fold acceleration in decline over the terminal period, compared to 2.3-fold and 2.8-
fold accelerations for processing speed and global function respectively.  The change 
point models were also compared to single slope models of decline by comparing -2 log 
likelihood between nested models.  The change point models fit significantly better than 
single-phase models [processing speed: χ2 (1) = 176.4, p < 0.0001; global function: χ2 
(1) = 219.6, p < 0.0001; episodic memory: χ2 (1) = 85.3, p < 0.0001]. 
The analyses were repeated separately for two subgroups categorized by years of 
education (<11 years or ≥11 years) to examine the effect of cognitive reserve.  Based on 
profile likelihood plots, the change points and 95% confidence intervals were assessed 
for each of the cognitive domains, with these estimates shown in Table 4.  The upper 
limit of the confidence interval for processing speed could not be assessed, as the profile 
likelihood did not asymptote to zero within the follow-up period after reaching the 
maximum.  Regardless, the difference in the change points for the high- and low- 
education groups was not significant for processing speed.  The change point for global 
function was significantly later in the low education group than the high education 
group, while education did not significantly alter the change point for episodic memory. 
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Table 3:  Parameter estimates from mixed effects models of cognitive function based on 
preterminal and terminal decline segmented at optimal change points 
 
Cognitive domain Effect Estimate Std error df t/Z
1
 p 
Processing speed (SLMT) 
(change point 8.5 yr) 
χ
2
 (5) = 389.5, p <.0001  
Intercept 102.78 0.422 442 243.4 <.0001 
Preterminal decline -0.038 0.005 896 -7.9 <.0001 
Terminal decline -0.086 0.006 304 -13.7 <.0001 
Random effect covariance estimates 
β0, β0 59.246 6.272  9.45 <.0001 
β1, β0 0.001 0.045  0.02 0.9826 
β1, β1 0.000
 2
 —  — — 
β2, β0 0.037 0.071  0.53 0.5991 
β2, β1 0.000 0.001  0.33 0.7421 
β2, β2 0.002 0.001  1.49 0.0682 
Residual 27.727 2.142  12.94 <.0001 
Global function (MMSE) 
(change point 7.1 yr) 
χ
2
 (6) = 260.4, p <.0001 
Intercept 102.33 0.376 322 272.0 <.0001 
Preterminal decline -0.038 0.005 360 -7.2 <.0001 
Terminal decline -0.106 0.010 437 -10.3 <.0001 
Random effect covariance estimates 
β0, β0 29.082 5.604  5.19 <.0001 
β1, β0 0.151 0.050  3.00 0.0027 
β1, β1 0.001 0.001  0.85 0.1975 
β2, β0 -0.023 0.122  -0.19 0.8513 
β2, β1 0.004 0.001  2.81 0.0049 
β2, β2 0.026 0.004  6.25 <.0001 
Residual 39.366 3.430  11.48 <.0001 
Episodic memory 
(change point 6.6 yr) 
χ
2
 (5) = 79.4, p <.0001 
Intercept 101.49 0.394 341 257.4 <.0001 
Preterminal decline -0.016 0.005 774 -3.5 0.0005 
Terminal decline -0.060 0.011 402 -5.3 <.0001 
Random effect covariance estimates 
β0, β0 21.205 5.989  3.54 0.0002 
β1, β0 0.051 0.042  1.20 0.2301 
β1, β1 0.000
 2
 —  — — 
β2, β0 -0.306 0.153  -2.00 0.0451 
β2, β1 0.001 0.002  0.47 0.6405 
β2, β2 0.028 0.006  4.47 <.0001 
Residual 58.153 4.781  12.16 <.0001 
Notes 
1
 Tests of fixed effect parameters are t tests, tests of random parameter variation are Z tests. 
2
 Parameter on boundary of zero, unable to be tested. 
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Table 4:  Estimated change points (in years, with 95% confidence intervals) for 
segmenting preterminal and terminal decline based on cognitive function, estimated 
separately for each education group 
 
 
Low education (<11yr) 
(n=376) 
High education 
(≥11yr) 
(n=520) 
Processing speed (SLMT) 11.3 (4.8, >17) 7.8 (6.8, 9.3) 
Global function (MMSE) 2.6 (2.1, 3.8) 8.6 (7.7, 10.1) 
Episodic memory 5.5 (2.8, 8.3) 6.6 (5.5, 6.9) 
 
125 
T
ab
le
 5
: 
 M
ix
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
 m
o
d
el
s 
o
f 
co
g
n
it
iv
e 
fu
n
ct
io
n
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 p
re
te
rm
in
al
 a
n
d
 t
er
m
in
al
 d
ec
li
n
e 
at
 t
h
e 
ch
an
g
e 
p
o
in
t,
 e
st
im
at
ed
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 g
ro
u
p
 
 
 
L
o
w
 e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
 
H
ig
h
 e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
 
C
o
g
n
it
iv
e
 d
o
m
a
in
 
E
ff
e
c
t 
E
s
ti
m
a
te
 
S
E
 
d
f 
S
ta
ti
s
ti
c
1
 
p
 
E
s
ti
m
a
te
 
S
E
 
d
f 
S
ta
ti
s
ti
c
1
 
p
 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
in
g
 s
p
e
e
d
 
(S
L
M
T
) 
M
o
d
e
l 
fi
t 
(L
R
 t
e
s
t)
 
 
 
6
 
1
2
0
.5
2
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
 
 
5
 
2
3
8
.5
1
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
In
te
rc
e
p
t 
9
9
.7
5
 
0
.7
3
9
 
1
4
0
 
1
3
4
.9
9
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
1
0
5
.3
2
 
0
.4
8
6
 
2
1
8
 
2
1
6
.8
3
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
P
re
te
rm
in
a
l 
d
e
c
lin
e
 
-0
.0
3
4
 
0
.0
0
8
 
9
0
 
-4
.1
2
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
-0
.0
3
4
 
0
.0
0
5
 
2
5
4
 
-6
.3
4
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
T
e
rm
in
a
l 
d
e
c
lin
e
 
-0
.0
6
8
 
0
.0
0
9
 
1
1
2
 
-7
.6
3
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
-0
.1
0
3
 
0
.0
0
8
 
1
8
0
 
-1
2
.7
5
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
 e
ff
e
c
t 
c
o
v
a
ri
a
n
c
e
 e
s
ti
m
a
te
s
 
β
0
, 
β
0
 
5
3
.4
9
2
 
1
1
.7
0
0
 
 
4
.5
7
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
4
7
.7
6
5
 
7
.6
4
3
 
 
6
.2
5
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
β
1
, 
β
0
 
-0
.0
5
0
 
0
.0
9
6
 
 
-0
.5
2
 
0
.6
0
0
3
 
-0
.0
8
1
 
0
.0
5
8
 
 
-1
.3
8
 
0
.1
6
6
1
 
β
1
, 
β
1
 
0
.0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
2
 
 
0
.3
5
 
0
.3
6
2
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 2
 
—
 
 
—
 
—
 
β
2
, 
β
0
 
0
.0
5
4
 
0
.1
0
9
 
 
0
.4
9
 
0
.6
2
2
2
 
0
.1
3
6
 
0
.0
8
6
 
 
1
.5
8
 
0
.1
1
4
4
 
β
2
, 
β
1
 
0
.0
0
2
 
0
.0
0
2
 
 
1
.1
9
 
0
.2
3
3
8
 
0
.0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
1
 
 
0
.7
4
 
0
.4
5
9
8
 
β
2
, 
β
2
 
0
.0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
2
 
 
0
.7
 
0
.2
4
2
0
 
0
.0
0
2
 
0
.0
0
2
 
 
1
.2
1
 
0
.1
1
3
9
 
R
e
s
id
u
a
l 
3
1
.6
5
1
 
4
.0
3
9
 
 
7
.8
4
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
2
5
.0
1
2
 
2
.5
2
0
 
 
9
.9
3
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
G
lo
b
a
l 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
 
(M
M
S
E
) 
 
M
o
d
e
l 
fi
t 
(L
R
 t
e
s
t)
 
 
 
6
 
1
0
1
.6
2
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
 
 
5
 
1
8
0
.8
6
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
In
te
rc
e
p
t 
9
9
.5
6
 
0
.7
4
5
 
1
6
2
 
1
3
3
.7
1
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
1
0
4
.0
7
 
0
.3
6
6
 
1
5
5
 
2
8
4
.5
1
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
P
re
te
rm
in
a
l 
d
e
c
lin
e
 
-0
.0
5
5
 
0
.0
0
9
 
1
2
9
 
-6
.0
1
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
-0
.0
2
5
 
0
.0
0
6
 
5
6
1
 
-4
.4
1
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
T
e
rm
in
a
l 
d
e
c
lin
e
 
-0
.2
2
4
 
0
.0
7
8
 
4
4
.9
 
-2
.8
5
 
0
.0
0
6
5
 
-0
.0
8
6
 
0
.0
1
0
 
2
7
9
 
-8
.8
9
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
 e
ff
e
c
t 
c
o
v
a
ri
a
n
c
e
 e
s
ti
m
a
te
s
 
β
0
, 
β
0
 
6
3
.8
7
1
 
1
3
.0
2
5
 
 
4
.9
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
7
.7
6
1
 
3
.9
7
6
 
 
1
.9
5
 
0
.0
2
5
5
 
β
1
, 
β
0
 
-0
.0
6
5
 
0
.1
4
1
 
 
-0
.4
6
 
0
.6
4
5
0
 
0
.1
3
3
 
0
.0
3
5
 
 
3
.7
4
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 
β
1
, 
β
1
 
0
.0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
2
 
 
2
.1
3
 
0
.0
1
6
7
 
0
.0
0
0
 2
 
—
 
 
—
 
—
 
β
2
, 
β
0
 
-4
.2
6
5
 
1
.3
0
1
 
 
-3
.2
8
 
0
.0
0
1
0
 
0
.0
4
9
 
0
.0
8
1
 
 
0
.6
1
 
0
.5
4
3
0
 
β
2
, 
β
1
 
0
.0
3
1
 
0
.0
1
2
 
 
2
.5
5
 
0
.0
1
0
7
 
0
.0
0
3
 
0
.0
0
1
 
 
2
.5
4
 
0
.0
1
1
1
 
β
2
, 
β
2
 
0
.3
9
4
 
0
.1
4
7
 
 
2
.6
9
 
0
.0
0
3
6
 
0
.0
1
8
 
0
.0
0
3
 
 
6
.2
3
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
R
e
s
id
u
a
l 
4
7
.9
3
8
 
6
.6
8
4
 
 
7
.1
7
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
3
1
.3
4
1
 
3
.1
1
2
 
 
1
0
.0
7
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
E
p
is
o
d
ic
 m
e
m
o
ry
 
M
o
d
e
l 
fi
t 
(L
R
 t
e
s
t)
 
 
 
5
 
2
9
.0
2
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
 
 
5
 
5
6
.9
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
In
te
rc
e
p
t 
9
9
.2
6
 
0
.6
8
8
 
1
9
8
 
1
4
4
.3
7
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
1
0
2
.7
6
 
0
.4
4
3
 
1
5
6
 
2
3
1
.9
3
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
P
re
te
rm
in
a
l 
d
e
c
lin
e
 
-0
.0
0
9
 
0
.0
0
7
 
2
4
6
 
-1
.2
2
 
0
.2
2
2
0
 
-0
.0
2
0
 
0
.0
0
6
 
5
4
6
 
-3
.5
9
 
0
.0
0
0
4
 
T
e
rm
in
a
l 
d
e
c
lin
e
 
-0
.0
6
9
 
0
.0
2
5
 
1
7
1
 
-2
.8
1
 
0
.0
0
5
6
 
-0
.0
6
3
 
0
.0
1
4
 
1
8
1
 
-4
.5
8
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
 e
ff
e
c
t 
c
o
v
a
ri
a
n
c
e
 e
s
ti
m
a
te
s
 
β
0
, 
β
0
 
2
4
.2
3
5
 
9
.6
0
6
 
 
2
.5
2
 
0
.0
0
5
8
 
1
7
.4
5
8
 
7
.4
8
3
 
 
2
.3
3
 
0
.0
0
9
8
 
β
1
, 
β
0
 
-0
.0
4
8
 
0
.0
4
9
 
 
-0
.9
9
 
0
.3
2
3
7
 
0
.1
3
9
 
0
.0
5
4
 
 
2
.5
5
 
0
.0
1
0
6
 
β
1
, 
β
1
 
0
.0
0
0
 2
 
—
 
 
—
 
—
 
0
.0
0
0
 2
 
—
 
 
—
 
—
 
β
2
, 
β
0
 
-0
.4
6
8
 
0
.3
1
3
 
 
-1
.5
 
0
.1
3
4
1
 
-0
.2
4
7
 
0
.1
9
2
 
 
-1
.2
9
 
0
.1
9
8
6
 
β
2
, 
β
1
 
0
.0
0
5
 
0
.0
0
3
 
 
1
.8
 
0
.0
7
1
9
 
-0
.0
0
1
 
0
.0
0
2
 
 
-0
.5
8
 
0
.5
6
0
7
 
β
2
, 
β
2
 
0
.0
4
0
 
0
.0
1
5
 
 
2
.7
3
 
0
.0
0
3
2
 
0
.0
3
1
 
0
.0
0
9
 
 
3
.5
2
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 
R
e
s
id
u
a
l 
7
8
.6
9
3
 
8
.5
6
0
 
 
9
.1
9
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
4
2
.1
8
7
 
5
.9
8
3
 
 
7
.0
5
 
<
.0
0
0
1
 
N
o
te
s 
1
 T
es
ts
 f
o
r 
m
o
d
el
 f
it
 a
re
 χ
2
 t
es
ts
, 
fi
x
ed
 e
ff
ec
t 
p
ar
am
et
er
s 
ar
e 
t 
te
st
s,
 t
es
ts
 o
f 
ra
n
d
o
m
 p
ar
am
et
er
 v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
 a
re
 Z
 t
e
st
s.
 
2
 P
ar
am
et
er
 o
n
 b
o
u
n
d
ar
y
 o
f 
ze
ro
, 
u
n
ab
le
 t
o
 b
e 
te
st
ed
. 
126 
 Table 5 shows the parameter estimates and p-values for MMRM models at the 
change points identified in Table 4.  The models include the likelihood ratio chi-square 
tests, indicating good fit, along with the fixed effects and random effects.  Once again, 
models where random effects were close to zero were reestimated without this effect, 
with little change to the estimates of the fixed effects.  To illustrate the models fitted, 
predicted cognitive scores for members of the high education group and the low 
education group were plotted, for age at baseline of 77.3 years and age at death of 85.3 
years (corresponding to the mean values for the sample).  These plots are shown in 
Figure 3.  Steeper terminal decline in processing speed was evident in the high 
education group (0.12 sd per year) than the low education group (0.08 sd per year), 
while preterminal processing speed decline (0.04 sd per year) was similar in both 
groups (Figure 3a).  A contrary pattern was seen in global function, where the rates of 
both preterminal (0.07 vs. 0.03 sd per year) and terminal decline (0.27 vs. 0.10 sd per 
year) were greater in the low education group than the high education group (Figure 
3b).  A third pattern emerged in the episodic memory measure, where those with higher 
education had a greater rate of preterminal decline (0.02 vs. 0.01 sd per year) but similar 
rate of terminal decline (0.08 sd per year for both) compared to those in the low 
education group (Figure 3c). 
All analyses were repeated excluding 41 participants with a dementia diagnosis 
(n = 646).  Based on the confidence intervals, the exclusion did not significantly alter 
the change point estimates for processing speed (7.3 years when excluding participants 
with dementia versus 8.5 years when including participants with dementia), global 
function (6.4 years versus 7.1 years) or episodic memory (6.6 years in both analyses).  
There was little change in the rates of preterminal decline (less than 0.004 sd per year 
difference on all tasks) and terminal decline (less than 0.024 sd per year) after excluding  
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Figure 3:  Predicted cognitive performance in the 15 years prior to death for prototypical 
participants with high or low education: (A) processing speed, (B) global function, and, 
(C) episodic memory 
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participants with dementia.  For example, the largest change was in the estimate of 
terminal decline for MMSE, which changed from -0.106 to -0.089.  The exclusion of 
participants with dementia also had little impact on the findings regarding the effect of 
education.   The estimated change points varied by fewer than six months in each case.  
Likewise, the estimates of preterminal and terminal decline were changed little, in each 
case by less than 0.002 sd per year.  For example, the largest change was in the terminal 
decline estimate for global function among the low education group, which changed 
from -0.086 to -0.068 after controlling for covariates. 
The models for high and low education groups were also re-estimated with the 
inclusion of other independent risk factors for cognitive decline or mortality: gender, 
heart attack and hypertension history, grip strength, smoking status, functional ability, 
disease count and depression as covariates.  Although many of these variables were 
significantly associated with cognitive performance, their inclusion in the models had 
very little impact on the estimated change points, which varied by fewer than 13 months 
in most cases.  However, for episodic memory among the high education group, the 
change point was shifted from 79 to 27 months due to problems estimating the variance 
matrix for these models.  Due to this estimation problem, models of episodic memory 
for the high education group were assessed at the original change point.  For all of the 
cognitive tests, the estimates of preterminal and terminal decline were changed little by 
the inclusion of covariates, in each case by less than 0.002 sd per year.  For example, 
the largest change was in the terminal decline estimate for episodic memory among the 
low education group, which changed from -0.069 to -0.054 after controlling for 
covariates. 
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Discussion 
In a community sample of 896 adults over the age of 70, terminal decline effects 
were found in tasks tapping processing speed, global function and episodic memory.  
The onset of terminal decline was found to be around 8½ years for processing speed, 7 
years for global function and 6½ years for episodic memory.  Although there was less 
overall decline in episodic memory than in the other domains, the rate of decline in the 
terminal phase was increased almost fourfold compared to the preterminal phase on the 
episodic memory task.  The ratio was 2.3 for processing speed and 2.8 for global 
function, suggesting that episodic memory drops later but more precipitously than these 
domains.  While the onset of terminal decline for processing speed was not significantly 
later than for other domains as hypothesized, the change points for processing speed and 
episodic memory were similar to previous studies, particularly those of Thorvaldsson et 
al. (2008) and Sliwinski et al. (2006).  The identified change points were earlier than 
those reported by Wilson et al. (2003) and Wilson et al. (2007), possibly due to the 
inclusion of survivors and shorter follow-up period in those studies.  The rates of 
terminal decline were in a similar range to previous studies, while the finding of 
variability in both the onset and rate of terminal decline across cognitive domains 
(Thorvaldsson et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2003) was also replicated. 
Education changed the terminal decline effect for all three of the cognitive 
domains, but in different ways.  The onset of decline in global function was delayed 
significantly for those with lower levels of education, however the rate of decline was 
greater in the terminal phase for the low education group.  For the processing speed and 
episodic memory tasks, education did not significantly modify the onset of terminal 
decline.  Rather, for processing speed, the rate of decline in the terminal phase was 
greater for those with higher education.  For episodic memory, the rate of decline in the 
preterminal phase was not significantly different from zero for those with a lower level 
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of education, but higher in those with more education.  The finding that education 
modifies terminal decline and that the nature of the modification varies across cognitive 
domains has not previously been reported.  Wilson et al. (2007) found no modification 
by education on terminal decline.  Their null finding may have resulted from using only 
a cognitive composite score, which could have obscured any domain-specific effects 
such as those identified here.  The findings are also contrary to those of Hall (2007), 
who reported that memory decline prior to dementia diagnosis occurred later but more 
precipitously in participants with higher education levels. 
Together, these findings suggest that terminal decline does not occur uniformly 
across different cognitive domains.  Since the physiological basis of these forms of 
cognitive functioning are different, this may reflect the differential impact of particular 
brain or systemic disease, although the situation is likely to vary as a function of disease 
and individual vulnerability.  For example, there is a dissociation between explicit and 
implicit memory performance in those with Alzheimer‟s Disease due to the differential 
affects of the disease on specific structures such as the mesial temporal lobe (Golby et 
al., 2005). The findings also suggest that terminal decline may reflect a diversity of 
physiological processes occurring in the years prior to death, including preclinical 
dementia (Laukka, MacDonald, & Backman, 2008), or other forms of cerebral 
deterioration, including stroke and cardiovascular disease (Hassing et al., 2002; Wilson 
et al., 2007).  Such processes may affect cognitive function in different ways, such that 
the onset of decline may be accelerated for some tasks while the rate of decline may be 
increased for others.   
Analyses excluding participants with a dementia diagnosis did not substantively 
change the outcomes.  Laukka et al. (2008) proposed that terminal decline effects are 
largely a result of preclinical dementia, although they found selective terminal decline 
effects after controlling for this condition.  The present study controlled only for actual 
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dementia cases, and found very little evidence that dementia may modify the onset and 
rate of terminal decline.  In conjunction with similar findings by Thorvaldsson et al. 
(2008), it appears that the terminal decline effects cannot be fully explained by 
dementia.  Consequently, the findings support a multifaceted model of terminal decline 
like the one proposed by Bäckman and MacDonald (2006), who suggest that the 
phenomenon is influenced by both normative age-related decline and pathological 
events (including dementia, cardiovascular disease and cancer), along with more distal 
factors such as health literacy, childhood intelligence, genes and environment. 
The effect of education was contrary to what would be predicted by cognitive 
reserve or compensation theories of cognitive aging (Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009; 
Stern, 2002).  While increased education was associated with higher initial levels of 
performance, it was also associated with more rapid declines in performance or earlier 
onset of decline.  This pattern of change is not consistent with a straightforward 
interpretation of cognitive reserve theories which would suggest that education protects 
against cognitive decline either by recruiting compensatory networks or through more 
efficient use of existing networks (Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009). Other than improving 
initial performance, the only suggestion of a protective effect of education was seen in 
the global function task, where the rate of decline was lower in the group with more 
education.  However, there was also a hastening of terminal decline on this task for 
those with high education, at odds with findings suggesting that cognitive reserve may 
delay the onset but accelerate declines that are related to pathological processes (Stern 
et al., 1999).   
These divergent findings may be related to either the diversity of skills tested by 
the MMSE or its psychometric properties.  The MMSE includes psychomotor, attention 
and recall tasks in addition to measures of orientation and registration.  The earlier onset 
of terminal decline in global function for those with higher education may also reflect 
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the imperfect psychometric properties of the MMSE, specifically scaling artifacts, 
ceiling effects and unreliability of change scores (Hensel, Angermeyer, & Riedel-
Heller, 2007). Nevertheless, the results with respect to all three cognitive domains may 
suggest that individuals who begin with better cognitive performance simply have more 
potential for decline, whereas those who initially perform poorly may not decline 
considerably unless significant pathology develops.  There was no significant change in 
the onset of terminal decline in processing speed or episodic memory, and education did 
not slow the rate of decline in either of these domains.  It could be the case that some of 
the biological processes associated with terminal decline are different to those 
associated with dementia-related cognitive decline, in that terminal decline is the 
response to a more diverse range of pathological events.  Cognitive reserve may only 
buffer against specific types of brain pathology. 
There are some issues in examining terminal decline that the present analysis 
was not able to address directly.  Firstly, the present study only obtained four (or fewer) 
measurements, across a period of 12 years.  This may have been insufficient to detect 
terminal decline for some of the cognitive tasks, particularly those in which there was 
little decline over the follow-up period.  The four-year retest intervals may also have 
been insufficient to detect accelerated terminal decline in some domains, particularly 
given previous findings suggesting terminal decline may occur less than four years prior 
to death (Wilson et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2003).  However, the change point method 
estimated preterminal and terminal slopes aggregated across all participants, rather than 
relying on individual slope estimates.  While this method of estimation may thus be 
robust to a paucity of data, a degree of confounding by between-person effects in the 
estimating the rates of decline might be expected as a consequence.  However, the 
potential for between-person confounding was mitigated in the present study by 
excluding survivors (Sliwinski et al., 2006) and by the inclusion of random effect terms 
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for the preterminal and terminal periods in the mixed models.  Further research 
comparing alternative methods for modeling terminal decline may determine the extent 
to which between-person effects might influence change point estimates.  Terminal 
decline effects could not be reliably estimated in this cohort for tasks of verbal ability, 
verbal fluency, face recognition and word recognition using the change point method.  
Our inability to detect terminal decline on these measures may not reflect an absence of 
terminal decline, but a lack of power for this type of model to detect small rates of 
decline in this type of sample, particularly for measures which are more robust to age-
related decline.  Future studies studying the terminal decline phenomenon would benefit 
from a shorter interval between follow-up interviews and more follow-ups, although 
briefer retest periods or more interviews may lead to other undesirable outcomes such as 
increased attrition (Deeg, van Tilburg, Smit, & de Leeuw, 2002) or larger retest effects 
(Salthouse, Schroeder, & Ferrer, 2004). 
Secondly, the analyses did not include survivors.  This was because the model 
used was chosen to replicate that used in previous research (Sliwinski et al., 2006; 
Thorvaldsson et al., 2008).  However, Sliwinski et al. (2006) noted that the inclusion of 
survivors may lead to an underestimate of the terminal decline effect.  Thirdly, 
education was the only reliable baseline measure of cognitive reserve able to be 
included in the present study.  Other factors that may impact reserve, such as brain 
atrophy and white matter hyperintensities, may provide clearer insight into the observed 
effects.  Apolipoprotein E 4 genotype, previously examined by Wilson et al. (2007), 
was only measured at the second wave of the current study, resulting in an inadequate 
sample size for the type of analysis used here.  There were also too few cases of head 
injury (McMillan & Teasdale, 2007) or cognitive disorders (Wilson et al., 2007) in the 
present sample to examine these as separate indicators.  Furthermore, the number of 
years of education may not a good indicator of the quality of education, which may 
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affect how adequately the measure reflects cognitive reserve.  Fourthly, the model 
estimated a single change point for the whole cohort (or for each education subgroup), 
rather than estimating individual change points.  However, Hall, Ying, Kuo, & Lipton 
(2003) compared the profile likelihood method used here to a Bayesian method that 
estimated individual change points and concluded that individual change points are not 
necessary to adequately model heterogeneity across subjects.  Finally, change point 
models are not the only method that may be used to characterize terminal decline.  
Other methods that could be considered for future research include retrospective models 
that account for individual differences (Gerstorf et al., 2008) and prospective models 
that link individual rates of change to the hazard of mortality (Ghisletta et al., 2006).   
The present study found that the onset and rate of terminal decline may be 
different across cognitive domains and that education can modify the onset and rate of 
decline.  The modification of terminal decline by education is a new finding that has not 
previously been investigated in specific cognitive domains.  These findings were not 
changed by excluding participants with dementia or by controlling for other risk factors 
for cognitive decline and mortality.  As education was the only reliable baseline 
measure of cognitive reserve included in the present study, further research is warranted 
to investigate modification of terminal decline effects by other measures of reserve, 
such as head injury, apolipoprotein E genotype and brain characteristics including 
atrophy and white matter hyperintensities.  Additional research into the nature of 
terminal decline and how this decline varies according the characteristics of individuals 
and their exposures will continue to illuminate the processes that lead to late-life 
cognitive decline. 
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Abstract 
The dedifferentiation hypothesis proposes that specific cognitive abilities 
become more highly associated with general ability in old age, as a result of increasing 
biological constraints on fluid intelligence.  There is limited evidence for the hypothesis 
and research has not tended to clearly distinguish age dedifferentiation from ability 
differentiation and other age-related phenomena.  The present study examined age 
dedifferentiation using a structural equation model that controlled for ability 
differentiation, along with linear and quadratic effects of age.  Time-to-death was 
examined as an alternative time metric to chronological age, as it may better represent 
biological constraints.  The Canberra Longitudinal Study community-based cohort, 
consisting of 896 Australian adults aged 70 and over, provided data from 687 decedents 
who were followed for up to 17 years.  Results indicated little support for the age 
dedifferentiation hypothesis, with only two of seven cognitive tests showing significant 
age dedifferentiation.  The time-to-death metric showed more evidence of 
dedifferentiation, with four of the seven tests exhibiting dedifferentiation.  However, 
after excluding participants with possible cognitive impairment, all of the 
dedifferentiation effects were attenuated to non-significance.  Age dedifferentiation 
effects may therefore reflect dementia and other mortality-related pathology, rather than 
being an inevitable outcome of advanced age.  Alternative developmental theories for 
cognitive function must better account for the diversity of late-life abilities and 
pathology. 
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The concept of a general factor of intelligence had its origins more than one 
hundred years ago (Spearman, 1904).  Subsequent research suggested a range of 
specific factors of intelligence and led to the development of the theory of fluid and 
crystallized intelligence by Horn and Cattell (Cattell, 1941; Horn, 1968; Horn & Cattell, 
1966).  The fluid-crystallized theory suggests that there are two higher order factors of 
intelligence that form distinct dimensions: fluid intelligence, general ability derived 
from basic neural and sensory structures, and crystallized intelligence, knowledge-based 
ability derived from experience, education and acculturation (Horn & Cattell, 1966).  
Cattell‟s investment theory (Cattell, 1971, 1987) extended the fluid-crystallized theory 
into a developmental framework.  According to the investment theory, the fluid 
component of intelligence develops rapidly through childhood and adolescence, peaking 
in the early twenties, then decreasing through adulthood, more rapidly in old age.  The 
crystallized component grows incrementally, driven by fluid ability, peaks in mid-life 
and declines very little and only in late old age (Cattell, 1987).  However, there has been 
little evidence to support the theory that fluid intelligence drives the development of 
crystallized intelligence, with more recent longitudinal research reporting that higher 
levels of fluid intelligence are not associated with subsequent increased growth in 
crystallized intelligence (Ferrer & McArdle, 2004).  Nevertheless, research examining 
performance on fluid and crystallized tasks across the lifespan (Li et al., 2004; McArdle, 
Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & Woodcock, 2002; Tucker-Drob, 2009) has replicated the 
patterns of development and decline for fluid and crystallized ability reported by Cattell 
(1987).  So while the investment theory may not accurately explain the processes 
behind the development of intelligence, the patterns of development and decline 
reported by Cattell (1987) have been supported. 
Alternative explanations have been provided for individual differences in 
developmental patterns of cognitive performance.  The observation that a general factor 
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of intelligence accounts for a greater amount of variability in children and the elderly 
compared to adults (Balinsky, 1941; Garrett, 1946) led to the development of the 
differentiation-dedifferentiation hypothesis (Baltes et al., 1980; Reinert, 1970), which 
suggests that intellectual abilities are unspecialized in childhood, differentiate during 
maturation and become undifferentiated in late life (Li et al., 2004).  Contributions from 
the environment and non-cognitive influences, such as motivation and interest, are 
postulated to engender differentiation (Tucker-Drob, 2009).  Late-life dedifferentiation 
is hypothesized to occur when, as a result of increasing biological constraints on 
information processing mechanisms, declines in fluid abilities limit subsequent 
development in crystallized abilities (Li et al., 2004).  The cognitive processes involved 
with fluid and crystallized abilities consequently become more strongly coupled 
together (Li et al., 2004), such that general ability accounts for a greater proportion of 
performance across domains. 
These constraints on information processing have been linked to decreased 
neurobiological efficiency (Li, Lindenberger, & Sikstrom, 2001; Li & Sikstrom, 2002; 
Park et al., 2002).  Changes in neuromodulation and neuroanatomy result in decreasing 
differentiation between the patterns of neuronal representations elicited by different 
stimuli as people age (Li & Sikstrom, 2002).  This neurocomputational model of 
cognitive aging posits that deficits in neuromodulation lead to increased neural noise, 
resulting in less distinctive cortical representations in the aging brain, and finally to 
cognitive aging deficits, which manifest as decreases in performance, increases in 
variability and increased relationships among cognitive abilities (Li et al., 2001).  The 
relationship between neuronal dedifferentiation and cognitive dedifferentiation is 
purported to be based on the need for some form of compensatory neural recruitment in 
older adults (Park et al., 2002) as the cortical representations become less distinctive.  
On a neuroanatomical level, this compensation could come from contralateral 
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recruitment of a homologous brain area, from unique recruitment of nonhomologous 
sites or from substitution of brain areas (Park et al., 2002).  In cognitive terms, abilities 
may be seen as hierarchical (Vernon, 1971), with an overall general factor of ability 
which comprises several broad ability factors, which can themselves be further 
deconstructed into specific abilities.  When neuronal compensation is required in 
response to neuronal deficits, greater reliance may be given to broader abilities such as 
processing speed, retrieval and fluid and crystallized intelligence, rather than specific 
abilities.  Recruitment of these higher order abilities to perform lower order tasks leads 
to declines in performance, increases in variability and, in particular, dedifferentiation 
of cognitive abilities. 
There has, however, been mixed evidence for the late-life dedifferentiation of 
cognitive abilities.  Several studies have reported late-life increases in the correlation 
between cognitive abilities (Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997; Ghisletta & Lindenberger, 
2003; Li et al., 2004) while other studies have found no systematic relationship (Anstey 
et al., 2003; Juan-Espinosa et al., 2002; Sims et al., 2009; Tucker-Drob & Salthouse, 
2008; Zelinski & Lewis, 2003).  De Frias, Lovden, Lindenberger, & Nilsson (2007) 
found evidence for dynamic dedifferentiation beginning in old age, suggesting that 
common sources increasingly account for the development of abilities.  Likewise, 
Ghisletta and colleagues (Ghisletta & de Ribaupierre, 2005; Ghisletta & Lindenberger, 
2003) found longitudinal age-associated dedifferentiation, reporting that the 
dedifferentiation was a consequence of the constraints of mechanic ability, a notion 
similar to fluid intelligence. 
Recently, Tucker-Drob (2009) used a statistical model able to distinguish the 
effects of ability differentiation from age dedifferentiation, and found no support for age 
dedifferentiation in a lifespan cohort.  In examining the age dedifferentiation 
hypothesis, it is important to rule out confounding by ability differentiation, which is 
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defined as differences in the correlations between cognitive abilities at different ability 
levels, with stronger correlations often observed among groups with lower ability levels 
(Deary et al., 1996; Tucker-Drob, 2009).  Specifically, unless ability differentiation is 
accounted for, any age-based dedifferentiation effect may simply reflect the poorer 
performance among older individuals.  Other sources of individual differences should 
also be accounted for in examining the dedifferentiation hypothesis, to exclude more 
parsimonious explanations for the phenomenon and determining whether 
dedifferentiation is an independent phenomenon of aging.  Non-normative sources of 
heterogeneity, particularly the influences of preclinical dementia (Sliwinski, Hofer, & 
Hall, 2003), should be examined to determine whether dedifferentiation is an inevitable 
consequence of normative aging or simply a reflection of pathological decline. 
To date, research on dedifferentiation has used chronological age as the metric 
of time.  However, ability differentiation may vary widely across individuals of the 
same age, depending on their lifetime accumulation of biological damage and resulting 
cognitive health (Lovden et al., 2005; Sliwinski, Hofer, & Hall, 2003).  To observe the 
effects of dedifferentiation in a heterogeneous cohort, time-to-death may be a better 
metric for age, as it is a strong indicator of declines in both physical health and 
cognitive performance (Batterham et al., 2009; Hassing et al., 2002; Small & Backman, 
1999).  For example, while two 80-year-olds may differ markedly in their health and 
cognitive performance, less average variation may be expected in two individuals that 
are one year from death.  Dedifferentiation occurring as a function of proximity to death 
would provide evidence that dedifferentiation occurs in response to late-life pathology, 
particularly if the amount of dedifferentiation is greater than when modeling as a 
function of age.  If there was more evidence for dedifferentiation as a function of age 
than time to death, it may be concluded that dedifferentiation was not directly indicative 
of pathology. 
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The present study aimed to compare the two time metrics, chronological age and 
time to death, in modeling the degree to which dedifferentiation may be observed in late 
life.  It was hypothesized that time to death would be a be a more sensitive metric for 
observing dedifferentiation than age.  This hypothesis was tested with the statistical 
model used by Tucker-Drob (2009) that can account for non-linear relationships 
between cognitive measures and factors while controlling for any effects of ability 
differentiation.  It is important that non-linear relationships can be accounted for, as the 
predictions of the hypothesis are inherently non-linear across the life span.  Tucker-
Drob‟s (2009) model simultaneously estimates the effects of age dedifferentiation and 
ability differentiation, in addition to age, age
2
, the general ability factor (G), and the 
interaction between age dedifferentiation and ability differentiation.  Age 
dedifferentiation is operationalized as the interaction between age and the general 
ability factor, that is, how the amount of variability accounted for by the general factor 
changes as a function of age.  Ability dedifferentiation is defined in the model as G
2
, 
which reflects how the amount of variability accounted for by the general factor 
changes as a function of the level of performance on that factor.  As previous research 
has shown some evidence that age may modify ability differentiation (Facon, 2006; 
Tucker-Drob, 2009), the interaction between age dedifferentiation and ability 
differentiation was also included in the model.  This is defined as the interaction 
between age and G
2
, that is, how the amount of variability explained by the general 
factor as a function of overall performance changes in response to age.   
Re-estimation of the model using time-to-death in place of age enabled a 
comparison of the two time metrics.  It was hypothesized that a greater degree of 
dedifferentiation would be observed when using time to death as the time metric rather 
than age.  Such an outcome would suggest that dedifferentiation is due to increasing 
pathology in proximity to death rather than being due to age-related developmental 
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changes.  Likewise, exclusion of participants with possible cognitive impairment was 
hypothesized to attenuate any observed dedifferentiation due to age or proximity to 
death. 
 
Method 
Sample 
The Canberra Longitudinal Study is an epidemiological survey of mental health 
and cognitive functioning in older people that commenced in 1990.  The study design 
has previously been detailed by Christensen et al. (2004).  Eight hundred and ninety-six 
community-dwelling adults aged 70-97, living in the cities of Canberra and 
Queanbeyan, Australia, participated in the baseline assessment.  The sample was 
stratified by age and gender.  Participants were sampled from the compulsory electoral 
roll, with 69% responding.  For the present study, only participants who had died at the 
end of the vital status collection period (June 2007) were included in the analysis (n = 
687, 76.7%), as time-to-death cannot be assessed for survivors. 
Procedure 
Participants were interviewed up to four times over 12 years, although only the 
baseline assesssment was used in the present analysis.  Baseline interviews lasted 
approximately two hours, incorporating a survey with a wide range of measures 
including socio-demographics, physical health and disease status, mental health status 
and cognitive performance.  Interviews also included physical assessments of blood 
pressure, lung function, grip strength, vision and reaction time.  Trained professional 
interviewers conducted the assessments.  Approval for the research was obtained from 
the Ethics in Human Experimentation Committee of The Australian National 
University. 
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Measures 
Tests assessing a variety of cognitive domains were administered to assess the 
cognitive functioning of study participants.  Speed of processing was measured by the 
Symbol-Letters Modalities Test (SLMT), a task similar to Smith‟s (1973) Symbol-Digit 
Modalities Test and Wechsler‟s (1981) Digit-Symbol Substitution.  Verbal ability was 
measured using the National Adult Reading Test, a test of vocabulary (Nelson, 1982).  
An episodic memory task consisted of brief episodic memory tasks testing word, face, 
name and address  recall and figure reproduction (Jorm, 1992).  Verbal fluency was 
assessed as the number of animals named in 30 seconds.  Face and word recognition 
tasks were based on the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (Wilson et al., 1989).  
Global function was tested using the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) 
(Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), scored out of 30.  For the factor analysis and to 
facilitate comparisons across tests, all of the tests were standardized to a common 
metric, with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 10 at the baseline measurement. 
Mortality status and date of death were established by searching the National 
Death Index, contacting relatives and from death notices in the local newspaper.  The 
National Death Index is a register of all deaths in Australia.  The additional methods 
used for death reporting were included to provide added confidence in the mortality 
status data.  Mortality status was followed for up to 17 years, from the start of baseline 
interviews in September, 1990 until June 30, 2007.  For six participants with unknown 
day of death, the day was set to the 15
th
 of the month.  For two participants with an 
unknown month of death, the month was set to June.  Date of birth (age) was reported 
during the initial interview.  
Analysis 
The model detailed by Tucker-Drob (2009) was adopted for the analyses.  The 
model is a structural equation model that combines a nonlinear factor analysis to 
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estimate the general ability factor with a regression that tests the effects of age 
dedifferentiation and ability differentiation.  The regression component uses each of the 
cognitive tests as dependent variables, estimating the effects of general ability (G, a 
latent variable based on the seven cognitive test scores), age [or time-to-death (TTD)], 
age
2
 (or TTD
2
), ability differentiation, age/TTD dedifferentiation, and the interaction 
between ability differentiation and age/TTD dedifferentiation.  The age-based model 
may be written as: 
 
g [x]n = ν [x]  +  1[x] × agen  +  2[x] × age
2
n  +  1[x] × Gn  +  2[x] × G
2
n  +  3[x] × 
agen × Gn  +  4[x] × agen × G
2
n  +  u[x]n 
 
where g [x] represents the matrix of n specific cognitive abilities that were assessed, the 
n subscript indicates terms that vary, ν [x] represents the intercepts for each ability, 
1[x] and 2[x] are the coefficients for age and age
2
, G is general ability, 1[x] are the 
loadings of each specfic ability on G, 2[x] is the coefficient representing ability 
differentiation (G
2
), 3[x] is the coefficient for age differentiation (G  age), 4[x] 
represents the degree to which age modifies ability differentiation (G
2
  age) and u[x] is 
the error term that represents the component of each broad ability not accounted for by 
the other terms in the model (Tucker-Drob, 2009).   The time-to-death model simply 
replaced age with TTD.  Age was centered by subtracting 70 years from chronological 
age (range: 0 – 27.5 years), while time to death was measured in years (range: 0 – 16.75 
years), and both measures were converted to decades to enable interpretation of small 
estimates of the squared components.  The model was estimated using seven cognitive 
tests to examine a range of cognitive domains.  A criterion for significance of p < .01 
was used for all analyses to adjust for the multiple comparisons across the seven 
cognitive tests.  Finally, to examine whether dedifferentiation effects were attributable 
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to dementia, models were re-estimated excluding participants with MMSE scores < 24, 
as this criterion is a conservative indicator for cognitive impairment reflecting dementia 
(Folstein et al., 1975).  All analyses were conducted in Mplus version 6. 
 
Results 
Sample characteristics for the analysis sample (n = 687) are shown in Table 1.  
Compared to participants who were excluded on the bases of survival or missing 
baseline data, the participants included in the analysis were significantly older (t894 = -
8.58, p < .0001), were more likely to be male [χ2 (1) = 13.6, p = .0002], and performed 
more poorly on all of the cognitive tasks, including processing speed (t851 = 7.52, p < 
.0001), vocabulary (t833 = 2.32, p = .0204), global cognition (t877 = 4.54, p < .0001), 
verbal fluency (t881 = 3.75, p = .0002), word recognition (t865 = 3.79, p = .0002), face 
recognition (t871 = 3.15, p = .0017), and episodic memory (t894 = 3.15, p = .0017) at 
baseline.  There were, however, no significant differences in years of education (t892 = -
1.18, p = .24) or marital status [χ2 (3) = 5.3, p = .15].  The participants in the analysis 
sample were, on average, fairly well-educated and cognitively intact. 
The two models testing age and time-to-death dedifferentiation are shown in 
Table 2.  The first column of values is the estimate of the intercept for each of the 
cognitive tests at age 70 (or at death for the TTD model) for a participant with general 
ability score of zero (i.e., mean level of general ability), with each cognitive test score 
standardized to mean=100 and sd=10.  The second column is the effect per decade of 
age (or per decade closer to death), while the third column is the quadratic effect per 
decade of age (or per decade closer to death).  The fourth column is the effect of general 
ability, which would be expected to reflect ability on each of the tests.  The fifth column 
is the effect of ability differentiation, where negative values indicate that G accounts for 
less of the variability in performance at higher levels of performance.  The sixth column  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the analysis sample at baseline (n = 687) 
 
 Mean or frequency SD or percent 
Gender = male 373 54.3% 
Marital status = Married 366 53.3% 
  Widowed 261 38.0% 
Age 77.30 5.09 
Years of education 11.41 2.66 
Processing speed (SLMT) 93.91 16.97 
Vocabulary (NART) 111.32 10.08 
Global cognition (MMSE) 27.07 2.98 
Verbal fluency 10.52 3.43 
Word recognition 0.94 0.09 
Face recognition 0.78 0.11 
Episodic memory task 13.16 2.48 
 
SLMT: Symbol-Letters Modalities Test; NART: National Adult Reading Test; MMSE: 
Mini-Mental State Examination 
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is the effect of age/TTD differentiation, where positive values in the age model indicate 
that G accounts for more of the variability across cognitive domains as age increases 
(i.e., age dedifferentiation), whereas negative values in the TTD model indicate that G  
accounts for more of the variability across cognitive domains as time to death decreases 
(i.e., TTD dedifferentiation).  The final column is the interaction between age/TTD 
differentiation and ability differentiation, where negative values in the age model or 
positive values in the TTD model indicate that age/TTD dedifferentiation decreases at 
higher ability levels. 
The effect of primary interest was that of age/TTD dedifferentiation.  In the age-
based model, significant age dedifferentiation was observed only for global cognition 
and episodic memory, suggesting G accounted for larger amounts of variance on these 
two tasks at older age, independent of ability.  In the time-to-death model, significant 
TTD dedifferentiation was observed in four of the seven domains, with G accounting 
for more of the variance in global cognition, word recognition, face recognition and 
episodic memory performance as death approached.  In addition, significant ability 
differentiation was observed for global cognition, word recognition and episodic 
memory in both models, suggesting that G accounted for more of the variance on these 
tasks in those with poorer general ability.  There was also a significant interaction 
between age dedifferentiation and ability differentiation on global cognition, suggesting 
that the effect of age dedifferentiation is decreased at higher levels of performance.  
There was no significant effect of TTD or TTD
2
 on any of the tests, while processing 
speed performance decreased significantly by 0.1 sd per decade of age.  Not 
surprisingly, general ability (G) had strong positive associations with all of the cognitive 
tests, although the effect did not reach significance (p = .055) for face recognition in the 
age-based model. 
153 
T
ab
le
 3
: 
P
ar
am
et
er
 e
st
im
at
es
 (
9
9
%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
al
s)
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
m
o
d
el
s 
o
f 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
n
 t
h
e 
se
v
en
 c
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
ta
sk
s 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 a
g
e 
an
d
 t
im
e-
to
-d
ea
th
, 
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 w
it
h
 M
M
S
E
 <
 2
4
 (
n
=
6
0
6
) 
   
In
te
rc
e
p
t 
A
g
e
/T
T
D
 
A
g
e
2
/T
T
D
2
 
G
 
A
b
ili
ty
 d
if
fe
re
n
ti
a
ti
o
n
 
A
g
e
/T
T
D
 d
if
fe
re
n
ti
a
ti
o
n
 
A
b
ili
ty

A
g
e
/T
T
D
 
d
if
fe
re
n
ti
a
ti
o
n
 
A
g
e
 m
o
d
e
l 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
in
g
 s
p
e
e
d
 
1
0
5
.7
2
 (
1
0
2
.2
3
, 
1
0
9
.2
1
) 
-0
.9
5
1
 (
-1
.5
7
7
, 
-0
.3
2
5
) 
0
.0
1
1
 (
-0
.0
2
5
, 
0
.0
4
7
) 
6
.3
2
0
 (
4
.0
2
0
, 
8
.6
2
0
) 
-1
.4
5
1
 (
-5
.4
9
5
, 
2
.5
9
3
) 
-0
.0
6
3
 (
-0
.2
7
7
, 
0
.1
5
1
) 
0
.2
4
0
 (
-0
.0
5
4
, 
0
.5
3
4
) 
V
o
c
a
b
u
la
ry
 
1
0
1
.7
2
 (
9
6
.1
6
, 
1
0
7
.2
8
) 
-0
.2
6
6
 (
-0
.9
1
8
, 
0
.3
8
6
) 
0
.0
1
0
 (
-0
.0
2
3
, 
0
.0
4
3
) 
6
.9
4
6
 (
3
.4
3
3
, 
1
0
.4
5
9
) 
-0
.6
6
4
 (
-6
.9
9
0
, 
5
.6
6
2
) 
-0
.1
2
8
 (
-0
.3
3
1
, 
0
.0
7
5
) 
0
.0
9
5
 (
-0
.2
8
1
, 
0
.4
7
1
) 
G
lo
b
a
l 
c
o
g
n
it
io
n
 
1
0
3
.2
6
 (
1
0
1
.0
7
, 
1
0
5
.4
4
) 
-0
.0
0
4
 (
-0
.3
7
5
, 
0
.3
6
7
) 
-0
.0
1
2
 (
-0
.0
3
3
, 
0
.0
0
9
) 
2
.9
7
1
 (
1
.5
0
5
, 
4
.4
3
7
) 
-0
.8
1
7
 (
-2
.9
9
6
, 
1
.3
6
2
) 
0
.0
3
7
 (
-0
.0
6
6
, 
0
.1
4
0
) 
0
.0
5
9
 (
-0
.0
8
3
, 
0
.2
0
1
) 
V
e
rb
a
l 
fl
u
e
n
c
y
 
1
0
4
.6
6
 (
9
8
.5
9
, 
1
1
0
.7
4
) 
-0
.5
0
9
 (
-1
.1
3
0
, 
0
.1
1
2
) 
0
.0
1
5
 (
-0
.0
1
3
, 
0
.0
4
3
) 
6
.0
1
8
 (
3
.6
5
1
, 
8
.3
8
5
) 
1
.5
2
8
 (
-0
.3
1
9
, 
3
.3
7
5
) 
-0
.1
3
5
 (
-0
.3
7
2
, 
0
.1
0
2
) 
-0
.1
0
2
 (
-0
.2
4
9
, 
0
.0
4
5
) 
W
o
rd
 r
e
c
o
g
n
it
io
n
 
1
0
2
.8
3
 (
9
9
.5
6
, 
1
0
6
.1
0
) 
-0
.1
1
2
 (
-0
.8
7
7
, 
0
.6
5
3
) 
-0
.0
0
6
 (
-0
.0
4
2
, 
0
.0
3
0
) 
3
.0
4
0
 (
1
.4
4
3
, 
4
.6
3
7
) 
-2
.1
7
5
 (
-6
.9
6
6
, 
2
.6
1
6
) 
0
.1
3
2
 (
-0
.1
3
6
, 
0
.4
0
0
) 
-0
.0
3
2
 (
-0
.2
7
9
, 
0
.2
1
5
) 
F
a
c
e
 r
e
c
o
g
n
it
io
n
 
1
0
2
.1
4
 (
9
8
.9
9
, 
1
0
5
.2
8
) 
-0
.2
9
3
 (
-1
.0
2
2
, 
0
.4
3
6
) 
-0
.0
0
3
 (
-0
.0
3
9
, 
0
.0
3
3
) 
0
.7
0
2
 (
-1
.1
9
4
, 
2
.5
9
8
) 
-0
.3
8
5
 (
-2
.6
5
4
, 
1
.8
8
4
) 
0
.1
1
3
 (
-0
.1
6
5
, 
0
.3
9
1
) 
0
.0
4
3
 (
-0
.2
8
4
, 
0
.3
7
0
) 
E
p
is
o
d
ic
 m
e
m
o
ry
 
1
0
3
.8
7
 (
1
0
0
.8
0
, 
1
0
6
.9
4
) 
-0
.1
5
7
 (
-0
.6
2
8
, 
0
.3
1
4
) 
-0
.0
0
7
 (
-0
.0
3
5
, 
0
.0
2
1
) 
4
.0
0
2
 (
0
.6
4
3
, 
7
.3
6
1
) 
-2
.1
8
4
 (
-5
.8
4
7
, 
1
.4
7
9
) 
0
.0
4
6
 (
-0
.1
7
8
, 
0
.2
7
0
) 
0
.1
2
5
 (
-0
.1
1
7
, 
0
.3
6
7
) 
T
T
D
 m
o
d
e
l 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
in
g
 s
p
e
e
d
 
9
6
.6
8
 (
9
2
.7
4
, 
1
0
0
.6
2
) 
0
.0
6
5
 (
-0
.7
5
7
, 
0
.8
8
7
) 
0
.0
3
2
 (
-0
.0
1
7
, 
0
.0
8
1
) 
6
.2
0
1
 (
4
.2
7
9
, 
8
.1
2
3
) 
1
.7
4
3
 (
-1
.6
2
9
, 
5
.1
1
5
) 
-0
.0
4
3
 (
-0
.2
8
0
, 
0
.1
9
4
) 
-0
.1
9
8
 (
-0
.4
1
4
, 
0
.0
1
8
) 
V
o
c
a
b
u
la
ry
 
9
9
.2
7
 (
9
5
.1
6
, 
1
0
3
.3
8
) 
-0
.0
6
5
 (
-0
.8
9
2
, 
0
.7
6
2
) 
0
.0
2
6
 (
-0
.0
2
6
, 
0
.0
7
8
) 
5
.1
9
7
 (
3
.1
6
0
, 
7
.2
3
4
) 
1
.2
2
2
 (
-2
.5
7
2
, 
5
.0
1
6
) 
0
.0
9
2
 (
-0
.1
8
4
, 
0
.3
6
8
) 
-0
.1
9
1
 (
-0
.3
6
1
, 
-0
.0
2
1
) 
G
lo
b
a
l 
c
o
g
n
it
io
n
 
1
0
0
.9
4
 (
9
8
.4
1
, 
1
0
3
.4
7
) 
-0
.0
2
5
 (
-0
.4
8
6
, 
0
.4
3
6
) 
0
.0
2
0
 (
-0
.0
0
8
, 
0
.0
4
8
) 
4
.4
3
4
 (
3
.3
6
2
, 
5
.5
0
6
) 
0
.1
1
2
 (
-1
.5
9
8
, 
1
.8
2
2
) 
-0
.1
4
7
 (
-0
.2
9
4
, 
0
.0
0
0
) 
-0
.0
7
4
 (
-0
.1
8
2
, 
0
.0
3
4
) 
V
e
rb
a
l 
fl
u
e
n
c
y
 
1
0
2
.5
3
 (
9
9
.6
8
, 
1
0
5
.3
8
) 
-0
.2
6
5
 (
-1
.0
9
2
, 
0
.5
6
2
) 
0
.0
3
6
 (
-0
.0
1
6
, 
0
.0
8
8
) 
4
.1
9
8
 (
1
.9
0
6
, 
6
.4
9
0
) 
0
.2
2
5
 (
-2
.6
1
9
, 
3
.0
6
9
) 
0
.1
0
4
 (
-0
.1
5
6
, 
0
.3
6
4
) 
0
.0
6
9
 (
-0
.2
0
9
, 
0
.3
4
7
) 
W
o
rd
 r
e
c
o
g
n
it
io
n
 
9
9
.5
7
 (
9
4
.8
1
, 
1
0
4
.3
3
) 
-0
.0
0
5
 (
-0
.6
3
9
, 
0
.6
2
9
) 
0
.0
0
8
 (
-0
.0
2
8
, 
0
.0
4
4
) 
6
.5
8
8
 (
1
.8
5
4
, 
1
1
.3
2
2
) 
-3
.7
6
0
 (
-9
.4
3
4
, 
1
.9
1
4
) 
-0
.3
2
0
 (
-0
.6
4
2
, 
0
.0
0
2
) 
0
.1
8
9
 (
-0
.0
9
9
, 
0
.4
7
7
) 
F
a
c
e
 r
e
c
o
g
n
it
io
n
 
9
8
.7
1
 (
9
5
.3
6
, 
1
0
2
.0
6
) 
-0
.2
0
4
 (
-1
.1
6
5
, 
0
.7
5
7
) 
0
.0
3
1
 (
-0
.0
2
3
, 
0
.0
8
5
) 
2
.8
3
6
 (
0
.3
3
2
, 
5
.3
4
0
) 
0
.5
7
6
 (
-3
.0
9
5
, 
4
.2
4
7
) 
-0
.1
5
4
 (
-0
.4
3
0
, 
0
.1
2
2
) 
-0
.0
9
0
 (
-0
.5
0
5
, 
0
.3
2
5
) 
E
p
is
o
d
ic
 m
e
m
o
ry
 
1
0
1
.4
4
 (
9
6
.9
4
, 
1
0
5
.9
4
) 
-0
.0
4
1
 (
-0
.6
6
2
, 
0
.5
8
0
) 
0
.0
1
4
 (
-0
.0
2
2
, 
0
.0
5
0
) 
5
.8
6
3
 (
3
.6
3
8
, 
8
.0
8
8
) 
-1
.5
8
2
 (
-5
.1
4
7
, 
1
.9
8
3
) 
-0
.1
8
8
 (
-0
.3
8
9
, 
0
.0
1
3
) 
0
.0
3
2
 (
-0
.1
3
3
, 
0
.1
9
7
) 
 B
o
ld
 v
a
lu
es
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
 p
 <
 0
.0
1
; 
T
T
D
: 
ti
m
e-
to
-d
ea
th
; 
G
: 
g
en
er
a
l 
a
b
il
it
y 
fa
ct
o
r 
154 
 The fit of the models presented in Table 1 was tested by repeatedly excluding 
single cognitive tests from the models.  For example, the -2 log likelihood of the age-
based model increased from 44920.2 to 45029.0 [χ2 (6) = 108.8, p < .0001] after 
excluding face recognition, indicating that the model fit was significantly better when 
face recognition was included.  Exclusion of each of the cognitive tests significantly 
decreased the fit of both the age model [χ2 (6) range 108.8 to 759.1, p < .0001] and the 
time-to-death model [χ2 (6) range 105.4 to 767.3, p < .0001].  Consequently, all of the 
cognitive tests were retained in the models. 
In a further analysis to examine whether the observed dedifferentiation effects 
were attributable to dementia, the models in Table 2 were estimated with the exclusion 
of participants who scored <24 on the MMSE [n = 606, 81 (11.8%) excluded].  These 
models are shown in Table 3.  All of the age dedifferentiation, TTD dedifferentiation 
and ability differentiation effects became non-significant after this exclusion. 
 
Discussion 
Significant age dedifferentiation was observed on two of the seven cognitive 
tests, global cognition and episodic memory, while significant time-to-death (TTD) 
dedifferentiation was observed on four of the tests: global cognition, word recognition, 
face recognition and episodic memory.  This is the first study to examine 
dedifferentiation as a function of time-to-death.  As the effects of TTD dedifferentiation 
were more consistent than the effects of age dedifferentiation, any strengthening in the 
relationship between general and specific abilities as a function of advancing age 
appears to be attributable to increasing pathology in proximity to death.  This finding 
was as predicted and likely reflects the closer relationship of pathology with time-to-
death than chronological age (B. Johansson et al., 2004; Kerber, Whitman, Brown, & 
Baloh, 2006; Sliwinski, Hofer, & Hall, 2003).   However, after excluding participants 
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with possible cognitive impairment, nearly all of the age/TTD dedifferentiation effects 
were markedly attenuated and all became non-significant.  Consequently, the effects 
were not sufficiently robust to support the theory of age dedifferentiation.  The findings 
suggest that brain pathology, both as a result of dementia and mortality-related 
biological events, are likely to play a significant role in any late-life dedifferentiation of 
cognitive abilities.  Dedifferentiation was not found to be an inevitable consequence of 
aging. 
Memory was found to be the primary domain of functioning where some 
evidence of dedifferentiation was observed, with episodic memory, face recognition and 
word recognition all showing dedifferentiation in proximity to death.  As dementia 
results in a broad range of memory declines (Spaan, Raaijmakers, & Jonker, 2003), it is 
perhaps not surprising that the observed effects disappeared after accounting for 
cognitive impairment.  Likewise, the global cognition measure, the MMSE, is sensitive 
to dementia (Mitchell, 2009) and showed dedifferentiation as a function of both age and 
time-to-death.  The MMSE includes a memory component, with the recall items being 
the most difficult for people with dementia (Teng, Chui, Schneider, & Metzger, 1987).  
Processing speed also declines as a result of aging, however, decrements in processing 
speed are observed in the absence of pathological aging processes.  The lack of 
dedifferentiation in processing speed is therefore further evidence that dedifferentiation 
is a product of pathological rather than normative aging.  Verbal performance (verbal 
fluency, vocabulary) is generally robust to the normative and pathological effects of 
aging, so it is not surprising that no dedifferentiation was observed on the verbal tasks. 
The absence of robust age dedifferentiation effects was in line with a growing 
body of research in this area (for example, Anstey et al., 2003; Tucker-Drob, 2009; 
Tucker-Drob & Salthouse, 2008; Zelinski & Lewis, 2003).  Age related 
dedifferentiation is proposed to be the result of common or normative constraints on 
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functioning in late adulthood (Li & Lindenberger, 1999).  It may be that in community-
based cohorts which vary widely in both ability and pathology, age-related effects are so 
diverse that they cannot be classified as “common”.  While age dedifferentiation may be 
observed in certain cohorts and on specific measures, alternative developmental models 
for late-life cognition should be explored.  Such models need to better account for 
multiple trajectories that occur in response to both normative aging and the range of 
pathologies that occur in late life.  Furthermore, the lack of evidence for age 
dedifferentiation suggests that the decline of abilities in old age is not as analogous to 
the development of abilities in childhood as suggested by the differentiation-
dedifferentiation hypothesis. 
The results also provide little evidence for a relationship between 
neurobiological dedifferentiation and cognitive dedifferentiation.  Park et al. (2002) 
suggest that while there are few changes in the structure of working memory across the 
lifespan, changes in processing speed may be broadly implicated in a range of cognitive 
abilities.  This explanation for how neuronal compensation may lead to changes in the 
relationship between cognitive abilities is based on the common cause theory of aging 
(Salthouse, 1996).  However, processing speed would appear to have less association 
with the tasks that showed any evidence of age dedifferentiation in the present study, 
particularly face recognition, word recognition and global function, than on tasks that 
showed no evidence of dedifferentiation, particularly speeded tasks such as verbal 
fluency.  Thus it would seem that the patterns of relationships observed show little 
evidence of the recruitment of higher order abilities, such as processing speed, to 
perform lower order tasks.  It could be argued that higher order retrieval processes may 
be implicated in the observed dedifferentiation effects, which tended to be related to 
memory.  However, these effects do not appear to be the result of normative aging 
processes in the present cohort.  Rather, such higher order recruitment may only be 
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occurring in response to pathological processes, most likely the effects of preclinical 
dementia.  The critical link between less distinctive cortical representations in the aging 
brain and increased relationships among cognitive abilities proposed by Li et al. (2001) 
could not be supported by the present study. 
There were some limitations to the present study.  The cognitive measures used 
were selected at the beginning of the study, 20 years ago.  Alternative measures 
covering a wider range of cognitive domains might provide further insight into the 
phenomena of interest.  The use of single cognitive tests to measure each domain of 
ability also precludes assessing the common variance across multiple tests of the same 
ability, which may make it harder to detect dedifferentiation effects.  However, it is 
generally not feasible to repeatedly administer a large battery of cognitive tests to a 
large community-based sample that is retested every four years.  There are few 
community-based studies that have the breadth of data of the Canberra Longitudinal 
Study.  Nevertheless, other study designs may be better able to account for a wider 
range of abilities and assess each ability using multiple tests.  Secondly, only cross-
sectional cognitive information was used in the present analysis.  The complexity of the 
structural equation model used for this analysis precluded adaption to a longitudinal 
analysis.  Other methods for longitudinal examination of dedifferentiation may reveal 
more about the phenomenon by examining within-individual patterns of change in the 
relationship between abilities (Anstey et al., 2003; Sliwinski, Hofer, Hall, Buschke & 
Lipton, 2003; Zelinski & Lewis, 2003).  Other types of analyses that account for 
intraindividual change may also provide greater insight into relationships between 
terminal decline and dedifferentiation.  However, the current cross-sectional analysis 
was sufficient to show that the dedifferentiation effects were not robust when dementia 
was excluded.  Finally, while the role of background factors such as gender, education, 
social support and mental health may be investigated in relation to dedifferentiation, the 
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lack of evidence for age dedifferentiation in the present study rendered any such 
investigation largely unnecessary. 
In conclusion, little support was found for the age dedifferentiation hypothesis in 
the present study, and dedifferentiation was found to result from dementia and terminal 
pathology rather than being an inevitable outcome of advanced age.  The lack of robust 
age dedifferentiation effects is in line with the findings of Tucker-Drob (2009) who 
accounted for ability differentiation using a similar method.  The necessity to use 
models that account for confounding by ability dedifferentiation remains clear.  Further 
research should examine the conditions that are associated with the emergence of age-
associated dedifferentiation effects, particularly examining whether such effects are 
associated with subsequent conversion to dementia.  Examining the range of individual 
late-life cognitive trajectories (Lovden et al., 2005) or explicitly decomposing cognitive 
performance as a function of preclinical dementia, study attrition, terminal decline and 
chronological age (Sliwinski, Hofer et al., 2003) may enable further exploration of the 
role of pathology in dedifferentiation.  The present findings with respect to 
dedifferentiation as a function time-to-death are novel, and suggest that 
dedifferentiation is not a phenomenon that results from normative aging. 
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Abstract 
Purpose:  Six previous reviews have found a relationship between depression and 
mortality.  However, many past studies have failed to adequately control for the role of 
physical health.  A proposed mechanism of the depression-mortality relationship 
suggests that physical health may mediate the relationship.  The present study used new 
methods to examine relationships between mental health symptoms and mortality in an 
elderly community cohort while accounting for potential mediation of these 
relationships by physical health. 
Method:  896 community-dwelling participants aged 70-97 were assessed four times 
over 12 years and vital status was tracked for up to 17 years.  Relationships of 
depression and anxiety with survival time, controlling for physical health, age and 
gender, were tested using Cox proportional hazards regressions embedded in structural 
equation models. 
Results:  A significant unadjusted relationship between depression symptoms and 
mortality (HR = 1.09, p < .001) was attenuated to non-significance after controlling for 
measures of physical health (HR = 1.03, p = .18).  No significant relationship was found 
between anxiety symptoms and mortality. 
Conclusions:  The relationship between depression and mortality was accounted for by 
physical health status in this cohort.  This finding casts doubt on studies that report a 
relationship between depression and mortality without adequately considering the effect 
of physical health.   
 
165 
There is a large body of literature examining whether depression is a risk factor 
for death.  Evidence for the relationship has been summarized in six reviews, each of 
which has concluded that depression is associated with an increased all-cause mortality 
rate (Cole & Bellavance, 1997; Cuijpers & Schoevers, 2004; Harris & Barraclough, 
1998; Saz & Dewey, 2001; Schulz et al., 2002; Wulsin et al., 1999).  The earliest of 
these, a review of 57 studies published between 1966 and 1996 (Wulsin et al., 1999) 
found 29 (51%) reported a positive relationship between depression and mortality.  A 
follow-up review of 61 articles published between 1996 and 2001 (Schulz et al., 2002) 
reported that 72% had positive findings.  A meta-analysis (Saz & Dewey, 2001) 
reported a combined odds ratio for mortality with depression of 1.73 (95% CI 1.53-
1.95).  The most recent review (Cuijpers & Schoevers, 2004) reported a relative risk for 
mortality in depressed subjects of 1.81 (95% CI 1.58-2.07) compared to non-depressed 
subjects.  However, Wulsin et al. (1999) cautioned against drawing strong conclusions 
about the nature of the relationship due to (i) a lack of adequate controlling for 
confounders, (ii) the potential of publication bias in favor of positive studies, and (iii) 
the heterogeneity of samples and methods used in the studies. 
With respect to the first of these limitations, 44% of the 57 studies reported by 
Wulsin et al. (1999), 33% of the 61 studies reported by Schulz et al. (2002), and 79% of 
the 21 studies reported by Saz and Dewey (2001) did not control for physical health 
status.  Moreover, very few of the studies used objective measures of health status, with 
most using less reliable measures such as presence/absence of chronic disease or disease 
counts.  Only one of the 57 studies reviewed by Wulsin et al. (1999) controlled for both 
the effect of physical health and other potential confounders of the relationship such as 
smoking, alcohol use and suicide.  The strength of evidence for an association between 
depression and mortality is further diminished by the inconsistency of the effect over 
extended follow-up periods, in heterogeneous populations or using a variety of methods.  
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Saz and Dewey (2001) found that the odds ratio of depression on mortality appears to 
be significantly attenuated over time, in that studies with longer follow-up periods 
predicted smaller effect sizes.  Studies examining community samples rather than 
clinical populations have tended to report mixed or null effects, with only four of the 
twelve (33%) high-quality community studies reviewed by Wulsin et al. (1999) 
reporting positive findings.  Furthermore, the majority of the studies reviewed used a 
clinical diagnosis or a cut-off on a scale as the depression measure, rather than 
investigating the continuum of depressive symptomatology.  Using diagnostic 
instruments to create binary categorizations of participants precludes drawing 
conclusions on the incremental impact of depression severity on mortality. 
Many mechanisms for the association between depression and mortality have 
been proposed (Cuijpers & Schoevers, 2004).  Schulz et al. (2002) presented a general 
theoretical model proposing that depressive symptoms either lead directly to mortality 
or are mediated by a cascade of risk factors ranging from behavioral and biological 
factors to subclinical and clinical disease.  Cuijpers and Schoevers (2004) describe a 
model of the relationship that suggests physical health status might play a mediating 
role.  Specifically, depression may directly increase vulnerability to physical illness by 
compromising physiological systems, particularly through changes in immune response.  
There is evidence that depression promotes increased production of inflammatory 
cytokines and reduced cellular immune response (Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 2002).  Such 
changes in immunological processes have been implicated in a range of conditions 
including cardiovascular disease, arthritis, type 2 diabetes, certain cancers, frailty and 
functional decline (Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 2002).  Other physiological responses 
associated with depression include increased platelet aggregation and heart rate 
variability brought about by dysregulation of the autonomic nervous system (Carney, 
Freedland, Miller, & Jaffe, 2002), both of which increase the risk of cardiovascular 
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disease.  In addition, there is evidence that depression is associated with hazardous 
health behaviors, including smoking, alcohol use and poor diet, that lead to further 
declines in physical health (Cuijpers & Schoevers, 2004).  As people with poorer 
physical health are more likely to die, the interactions between physical health and 
depression may account for much of the association between depression and mortality.  
Given the methodological inadequacies of some previous studies, the relationship 
between depression on mortality may have been overstated and requires more thorough 
testing. 
There have been fewer studies on the relationship between anxiety and 
mortality.  One review has examined the effects of a array of mental disorders on 
mortality among patient cohorts (Harris & Barraclough, 1998).  Harris and Barraclough 
(1998) found increased risks of premature death for all disorders.  Their review 
examined four studies of “neurosis”, one of “anxiety neurosis” and one of panic 
disorder.  Harris and Barraclough (1998) reported that the risk of death from all causes 
was significantly greater for those with neurosis or panic disorder but not for anxiety 
neurosis.  A more recent meta-analytic review of seven studies of the impact of anxiety 
on mortality in elderly cohorts (Dewey & Chen, 2004) concluded that although anxiety 
diagnoses tended to be associated with mortality, the effect was not significant.  The 
review also reported that there was no association found between levels of anxiety 
symptoms and mortality. 
The present study sought to determine whether depression and anxiety 
symptoms were associated with long-term all-cause mortality in an elderly community 
sample and to explore the impact of controlling for physical health status.  To better 
account for the complex pattern of relationships between mental health, physical health 
and mortality, a recently-developed statistical method was used for the analysis.  The 
majority of studies investigating the effect of depression on mortality have used Cox 
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proportional hazards regression, with time to death as the outcome.  However, Cox 
proportional hazards regression cannot directly test whether one independent variable 
mediates the effect of another on the survival outcome.  Structural equation modeling 
(SEM) allows theories of mediation to be assessed, and has been applied widely to 
conventional regression analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  However until recently 
SEM software has not accommodated survival data.  By employing a Cox proportional 
hazards regression model within a SEM context using the Mplus application 
(Asparouhov et al., 2006), it is possible to test for mediation when modeling survival 
data.  We hypothesized a significant direct relationship between depression and 
mortality.  After accounting for physical health, the indirect effect of depression on 
mortality was hypothesized to be non-significant, particularly given the advanced age of 
the cohort and the extended follow-up period.  Any relationship between anxiety and 
mortality was hypothesized to be non-significant. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
The Canberra Longitudinal Study was an epidemiological survey of mental 
health and cognitive functioning in older people that commenced in 1990.  The study 
design has been detailed by Christensen et al. (2004).  Eight hundred and ninety-six 
participants (456 men and 440 women) aged 70 or older at the time of the baseline 
assessment were recruited for the baseline assessment.  All participants were initially 
living in the community in the cities of Canberra or Queanbeyan, Australia.  The sample 
selection was stratified by age and gender.  Participants were sampled from the 
compulsory electoral roll, with 69% responding.  Approval for the research was 
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obtained from the Ethics in Human Experimentation Committee of The Australian 
National University. 
Survey Procedure 
Participants were interviewed up to four times over 12 years.  Baseline 
interviews lasted approximately two hours, incorporating a survey measuring a wide 
range of risk factors including socio-demographics, physical health and disease status, 
mental health status, cognitive performance and social support.  Interviews also 
included physical assessments of blood pressure, lung function, grip strength, vision and 
reaction time.  Trained professional interviewers conducted the interviews. 
Of the original sample of 896 participants, 185 (20.6%) were deceased by four 
years, 363 (40.5%) were deceased by eight years, and 544 (60.7%) were deceased by 12 
years.  At the end of vital status collection in June 2007, 687 (76.7%) of the participants 
were deceased.  Of the participants who remained in the study, 14.1% (100/711) refused 
or were unable to complete the first follow-up interview, 21.1% (100/474) for the 
second follow-up and 21.1% (57/270) for the third follow-up.  
Measures 
Mortality status and date of death were established by contacting relatives, 
searching the National Death Index, and from death notices in the local newspaper.  
Mortality status was followed for up to 17 years, from the start of baseline interviews in 
September, 1990 until June 30, 2007.  Survival was calculated as the time from the 
baseline interview to death for deceased participants, or from baseline until June 30, 
2007 for surviving (right-censored) participants.  For six participants with unknown day 
of death, the day was set to the 15
th
 of the month.  For two participants with an 
unknown month of death, the month was set to June.   
Depression and anxiety symptoms were measured using the Goldberg 
Depression and Anxiety Scales (Goldberg, Bridges, Duncan-Jones, & Grayson, 1988), 
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which each comprise nine items that measure symptoms of affective disorders in the 
four weeks prior to reporting. The number of “yes” responses were summed for these 
scales to derive two scores (range 0-9), with higher scores reflecting a greater level of 
depression/anxiety.  Age and gender were reported during the initial interview.  Several 
indices of physical health were measured in the study.  Four of these measures were 
chosen as being objective health measures that cover different aspects of physical 
wellbeing.  Heart attack history and hypertension history were included as dichotomous 
variables, based on self-report at the initial interview.  Grip strength was taken using a 
Smedley hand dynamometer which measures the force exerted in kilograms 
(Christensen et al., 2000).  A scale of functional ability was based on difficulty ratings 
for eight Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), including transportation, walking, getting 
out of bed, getting out of a chair, dressing and bathing.  Using a four-point response 
scale (no difficulty, some difficulty but no help needed, need help, bedridden) for the 
eight items, functional ability scores ranged from 0 to 24, with higher scores indicating 
greater functional disability. 
Analyses 
Survival time was graphed using Kaplan Meier curves and modeled using Cox 
proportional hazards regression analyses within a SEM framework.  A series of three 
Cox regression analyses were completed using structural modeling (Asparouhov et al., 
2006), for both depression and anxiety: (i) a univariate model (depression or anxiety 
only), (ii) a model with age and gender included, and (iii) a model with age, gender and 
physical health measures included and accounting for the relationship between 
depression and physical health in the structural model.  Mediation by physical health of 
the relationship between depression/anxiety and mortality was tested by comparing 
model (iii) with an identical model (iv) that omitted the relationship between 
depression/anxiety and mortality, using the difference in -2 log likelihood values that  
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are distributed as χ2 for nested models.  No significant change between the fit of model 
(iv) and model (iii) would indicate full mediation of the depression/mortality 
relationship by physical health.  To comprehensively measure multiple aspects of 
physical health, four measures were included in the model: heart attack history, 
hypertension history, grip strength and functional disability.  These measures were 
chosen to be somewhat independent measures of past and present physical health, with 
absolute correlation coefficients less than 0.1 for every pairing except functional 
disability and grip strength (r = -.41).  Consequently, a robust latent variable could not 
be constructed, so the physical health measures remained separate in the structural 
equation models.  The four models are shown in Figure 1.  Among the variables used in 
the analysis, 3% of the sample had one missing value and a further 3% of the sample 
had two or more missing values, resulting in a sample size of 865 for the depression 
analyses and 870 for the anxiety analyses. Stata version 10 was used to construct 
Kaplan-Meier survival curves, while Mplus version 5.1 was used for the modeling. 
 
Results 
Among the cohort of 896 participants, the mean initial age was 77 (range 70-97), 
with males representing 51% of the stratified sample.  Participants had a mean of 2.0 
depression symptoms and 2.5 anxiety symptoms.  Thirteen percent of the sample had 
four or more depression symptoms, while 19% had four or more anxiety symptoms.  
Participants had a mean of 11 years of education.  Considering the age of the cohort, 
participants were reasonably healthy at baseline, with 18% reporting heart attack history 
and 42% with hypertension history.  Most of the participants had high functional ability, 
with 36% requiring no assistance for any of the eight listed activities and a further 46% 
requiring assistance for just one or two of the activities. 
   
173 
 
Figure 2:  Kaplan-Meier curve of mortality over 17 years based on presence/absence of 
elevated depression symptoms 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Kaplan-Meier curve of mortality over 17 years based on presence/absence of 
elevated anxiety symptoms 
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Kaplan-Meier curves show the univariate relationships between depression 
(Figure 2) and anxiety (Figure 3) with mortality.  For these figures, the Goldberg scales 
were split at a value of four, which represented the approximate 80
th
 percentile of 
depression or anxiety levels in this sample.  Figure 2 shows that participants with 
elevated depression tend to have a higher mortality rate than those lower or no 
depression, as there is evident separation between these groups.  The overlap of the two 
curves in Figure 3 suggests that there is no effect of elevated anxiety, although more 
anxious participants appear to have a lower mortality rate after the eighth year.  
Table 1 shows the Cox regression models for mortality using (i) only depression 
symptoms, (ii) adjusting for age and gender, and (iii) adding the effect of physical 
health and adjusting for the effect of depression on physical health.  Table 2 shows 
parameters for the same models using anxiety symptoms.  The coefficients in the tables 
are hazard ratios for the effects of depression/anxiety, age and gender on mortality, and 
standardized path coefficients for the effects of physical health on mortality and 
depression/anxiety on physical health.  The univariate hazard ratio (HR) for depression 
on mortality was 1.09 (p < .001), suggesting mortality risk increased by 9% for each 
depression symptom.  This changed little after adjusting for age and gender (HR = 1.10, 
p < .001).  However, after adjusting for age, gender, the physical health measures and 
the relationship between depression and physical health, the HR was 1.03 (p = .18).  To 
examine whether the depression-mortality relationship provided a significant 
contribution to the adjusted model, the likelihood functions for models (iii) and (iv) 
were compared (see Figure 1).  The difference in -2 log likelihood, which is distributed 
as χ2 (1), was 1.18 (p = .28), suggesting that the direct path from depression to mortality 
could be omitted from the model.  
Anxiety symptoms had a univariate HR for mortality of 1.004 (p = 0.82) and 
1.03 (p = .08) after adjusting for age and gender (Table 2).  After adjusting for age,  
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Table 1:  Cox Proportional Hazards regression models predicting time to death over 17 
years of follow-up using depression symptoms 
 
 Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) 
 
Univariate Hazard 
Ratio (95% CI) 
+ Age & gender + Health status 
Goldberg depression score 1.09 (1.04, 1.13)
***
 1.10 (1.05, 1.14)
***
 1.03 (0.99, 1.08) 
Age  1.10 (1.08, 1.12)
***
 1.08 (1.06, 1.09)    
***
 
Male gender   1.71 (1.46, 2.00)
***
 2.69 (2.07, 3.51)    
***
 
Grip strength   0.97 (0.96, 0.99)    
***
 
Physical disability (ADL)   1.11 (1.07, 1.15)    
***
 
Heart attack history   1.40 (1.16, 1.70)    
***
 
Hypertension history   1.28 (1.09, 1.50)    
**
 
Depression  Grip strength†   -1.19 (-1.50, -0.88) 
***
 
Depression  ADL†   0.40 (0.31, 0.49)    
***
 
Depression  Heart attack†   0.03 (-0.06, 0.11) 
Depression  Hypertension†   0.06 (-0.01, 0.13) 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; 
†
 Path coefficients presented instead of hazard ratios 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Cox Proportional Hazards regression models predicting time to death over 17 
years of follow-up using anxiety symptoms 
 
 Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) 
 
Univariate Hazard 
Ratio (95% CI) 
+ Age & gender + Health status 
Goldberg anxiety score 1.00 (0.97, 1.04) 1.03 (1.00, 1.07) 0.99 (0.95, 1.02) 
Age  1.10 (1.08, 1.12)
***
 1.07 (1.05, 1.09)    
***
 
Gender   1.65 (1.41, 1.93)
***
 0.37 (0.29, 0.48)    
***
 
Grip strength   0.97 (0.96, 0.98)    
***
 
Physical disability (ADL)   1.12 (1.08, 1.16)    
***
 
Heart attack history   1.42 (1.17, 1.72)    
***
 
Hypertension history   1.29 (1.10, 1.51)    
**
 
Anxiety  Grip strength†   -0.88 (-1.15, -0.61) 
***
 
Anxiety  ADL†   0.22 (0.15, 0.29)    
***
 
Anxiety  Heart attack†   0.09 (0.02, 0.16)    
*
 
Anxiety  Hypertension†   0.09 (0.03, 0.15)    
**
 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; 
†
 Path coefficients presented instead of hazard ratios 
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gender and physical health status, the HR was 0.99 (p = .49).  The difference in -2 log 
likelihood between models (iii) and (iv) was 0.24 (p = .62), suggesting that the direct 
path from anxiety to mortality did not contribute significantly to the model.  In both the 
depression and anxiety models,  older age and male gender were, predictably, 
significantly associated with higher rates of death.   Weaker grip strength, increased 
physical disability, and history of heart attack or hypertension were also associated with 
increased mortality.  Depression and anxiety were both associated with weaker grip 
strength and increased physical disability, however, only anxiety was associated with an 
increased likelihood of reporting a history of heart attack or hypertension. 
 
Discussion 
In this cohort of community-dwelling elderly participants, the relationship 
between more depression symptoms and greater mortality was accounted for by 
physical health status.  Structural models demonstrated a strong association between 
depression symptoms and poorer physical health.  These findings provide further 
evidence that the observed univariate relationship between depression and mortality 
may be due to the strong associations of physical health with both depression and 
mortality.  There was no relationship found between anxiety symptoms and mortality, a 
protective effect of anxiety on mortality was found after controlling for physical health.  
The present study tested the proposed mechanism that the association between 
depression and mortality was mediated by physical health.  There was strong evidence 
found for a relationship between depression and physical health, supporting the 
hypothesis that the depression-mortality relationship is a result of physical health.  This 
finding may be reflective of the physiological effects of depression, specifically, 
immunological and cardiac processes which are strongly associated with mortality risk 
(Carney et al., 2002; Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 2002).  While there is a strong 
177 
association between depression and morbidity, there appears to be no direct link 
between depression and mortality.  
The results for depression are somewhat inconsistent with previous research.  
However, reviews of the depression research have noted that many of the studies 
examined insufficiently controlled for physical health (Saz & Dewey, 2001; Wulsin et 
al., 1999), with control variables often limited to binary measures of disease presence.  
Despite this methodological inadequacy, only 62% of the combined articles reviewed 
by Wulsin et al. (1999) and Schulz et al. (2002) reported positive findings, suggesting 
that the relationship may only be observed in specific populations, particularly clinical 
populations.  Other differences from previous studies may also contribute to the 
divergence in findings.  The majority of reviewed studies have examined depression or 
anxiety as a binary diagnostic measure.  The continuous measures used in the present 
study allowed for the continuum of symptomatology, rather than examining the upper 
tail of the distribution.  The reviews also included studies of clinical and medical 
cohorts, and studies primarily consisted of middle-aged and early-old aged cohorts.  The 
present study used a community sample that was comparatively older.  It is possible that 
using a more highly symptomatic clinical population may result in different 
relationships and that the impact of depressive illness on mortality may occur earlier in 
the lifespan.  Furthermore, as Wulsin et al. (1999) reported, the relationship between 
depression and mortality becomes weaker over extended follow-up periods.  The 17-
year follow-up of the present study is longer than that of any of the reviewed 
community-based studies of elderly cohorts (Saz & Dewey, 2001; Schulz et al., 2002; 
Wulsin et al., 1999). 
There are limitations to this study that should be noted.  The depression and 
anxiety measures involved a symptom count rather than a diagnostic instrument.  As 
previously observed, there are advantages to using a measure that assesses a range of 
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severities, including non-clinical states.  However, this conceptualization of depression 
or anxiety may not always be in accordance with diagnosis based on DSM or ICD 
criteria.  Symptom scales do not reveal the prevalence in the sample of chronic 
disorders (e.g., dysthymia), acute disorders (e.g., major depressive episode) or 
subclinical states.  The administration of a more comprehensive clinical measure that 
could reliably assess mood and anxiety disorders was not feasible in this large 
epidemiological study.  Secondly, depression tends to be an episodic illness, whereas 
the depression measure captured only those individuals who experienced symptoms in 
the four weeks prior to the baseline survey.  Examining lifetime history of depressive 
episodes may result in a different outcome.  Thirdly, while the model provided a formal 
test of mediation, it was not possible to fully account for temporal effects using the 
present dataset.  Specifically, the onset of depression may have preceded physical health 
problems in some cases.  Nevertheless, the strong attenuation of the direct effect of 
depression on mortality is clear evidence of confounding by physical health status, and 
indicates possible mediation of the effect.  Finally, the analyses did not account for 
other measures related to mortality, including cognitive performance, education, 
socioeconomic status, subjective health, health behaviors, additional physical diseases 
and additional markers of physical health, including objective markers for cancer and 
other diseases.  Measures that are closely related to depression, such as subjective health 
ratings, were omitted to ensure that the attenuation of the effect was not entirely due to 
multicollinearity.  However, the small number of health indices used in the Cox 
regression model fully accounted for the direct effect of depression, despite no direct 
adjustment for the presence of cancer, respiratory disease or many other diseases.  
Further adjustments were consequently deemed unnecessary.  While mediation of the 
depression-mortality effect is primarily through physical health, indirect mediation 
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through health behaviors such as inactivity, sleep problems or substance use (Schulz et 
al., 2002) and the direct effect of suicide were not tested. 
Future research should aim to clarify how the type of sample and methods of 
measurement affect relationships between mental health and mortality.  In addition, a 
range of specificities in the association between depression and mortality should be 
examined.  In particular, younger cohorts may exhibit stronger relationships between 
depression and mortality than older cohorts, there may be decay of the relationship over 
long follow-up periods, and the presence of certain depressive symptoms may be more 
strongly predictive of death than others.  Regardless of the nature of the relationship, 
future studies must be rigorous in accounting for the confounding effects of physical 
health.  While the present study found no evidence of a relationship between anxiety 
and mortality, there is a possibility for future research to investigate whether specific 
types of anxiety disorders have differential impacts on physical health and mortality.  
Given the attenuation to non-significance of the relationship between depression and 
mortality after adequately controlling for physical health in the present study, a degree 
of uncertainty may be placed upon studies that report a strong relationship between 
depression and mortality without adequately controlling for physical health.  
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INTEGRATED DISCUSSION 
 
Summary of results 
The aim of the thesis was to examine the relationship between cognition and 
mortality in late life.  This aim was achieved by examining cognition-mortality 
relationships from multiple perspectives in a series of studies using the Canberra 
Longitudinal Study cohort.  The first study aimed to determine whether initial 
performance on tasks with a fluid or crystallised intelligence component was associated 
with mortality, and whether this association could be explained by three previously 
proposed mechanisms (Batterham, Christensen & Mackinnon, 2009).  The second study 
aimed to assess whether initial cognitive performance and changes in performance were 
related to mortality from a range of specific causes (Batterham, Mackinnon & 
Christensen, submitted).  The second study also aimed to compare two unbiased 
methods for estimating change.  The aim of the third study was to investigate evidence 
for terminal decline in the cohort and determine whether education modified terminal 
decline as predicted by the cognitive reserve theory (Batterham, Mackinnon & 
Christensen, in press).  The fourth study aimed to test the dedifferentiation hypothesis, 
which suggests that a general ability factor accounts for a greater proportion of the 
variance in performance across different cognitive domains (Batterham, Christensen & 
Mackinnon, in press-a).  Finally, the aim of the fifth study was to determine whether 
depression and anxiety symptoms were associated with mortality after accounting for 
physical health status (Batterham, Christensen & Mackinnon, in press-b). 
In a community sample of 896 elderly Australians, cognitive performance was 
found to be associated with mortality.  Poorer performance in several domains of 
cognitive ability, specifically processing speed, global cognition, and verbal fluency, 
was found to be significantly associated with higher mortality rates (Batterham et al., 
2009; Batterham et al., submitted).  These relationships existed even after accounting 
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for a range risk factors, including physical health, mental health, health behaviours and 
sociodemographics (Batterham et al., 2009).  Although initial levels of performance 
tended to be strongly associated with mortality, changes in cognition over time tended 
to be poor predictors of mortality (Batterham et al., submitted).  Nevertheless, using 
change point models to identify changes in the rate of cognitive decline with respect to 
time-to-death demonstrated that rates of decline increased 2-4 fold starting around 6-9 
years before death (Batterham, Mackinnon et al., in press).  Terminal decline was 
modified by education with the pattern of modification differing between the three 
abilities investigated.  Together, these findings suggest that while terminal decline 
existed within the cohort, overall rates of decline were not predictive of time to death. 
Performance across various cognitive domains was found to become more 
strongly associated with a general factor of intelligence in proximity to death, which 
was suggestive of the dedifferentiation of cognitive abilities (Batterham, Christensen et 
al., in press-a).  However, this dedifferentiation did not occur with respect to age and 
was completely accounted for by the prevalence of possible dementia in the sample.  
Consequently, these findings did not support the hypothesis of late-life dedifferentiation 
(Baltes et al., 1980; Li & Lindenberger, 1999), as the hypothesis did not adequately 
portray the developmental processes of aging independent of the effects of dementia in 
the present sample.  Finally, depression and anxiety were found to have no relationship 
with mortality after accounting for physical health (Batterham, Christensen et al., in 
press-b), providing further evidence that the cognition-mortality relationship is not an 
artefact of late life depression or anxiety. 
 
Relationship to previous research and theory 
Many of these findings were consistent with previous research on late-life 
mortality, although several of the studies presented here reported novel findings or used 
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novel methods.  Deary (2005) summarised three mechanisms that might explain the 
observed relationships between levels of intelligence or cognitive ability and mortality.  
The mechanisms suggest that the relationship between cognition and mortality is 
indicative of: (i) mediation by socio-economic position reflecting disadvantage, (ii) 
mediation by health behaviours and knowledge reflecting inability to enact positive 
health behaviours and propensity to engage in unhealthy behaviours, or (iii) mediation 
by physical health status, which reflects both developmental events and physical 
integrity or the lack of pathology (Deary, 2005).  In the first study (Batterham et al., 
2009), these mechanisms were explicitly tested in the Canberra Longitudinal Study 
cohort.  Although evidence was found for a univariate association between both 
processing speed and verbal ability with all-cause mortality, limited support was also 
found for each of the three proposed mechanisms.  Specifically, the effects of cognition 
were attenuated after adjustment for measures assessing socio-economic position 
(education, manual work), health behaviours (smoking status, activity) and physical 
health status (in particular, self-rated health, cardiovascular disease history, grip 
strength, and anxiety symptoms).  Nevertheless, poorer cognitive ability, particularly on 
the processing speed measure, had a strong significant association with greater mortality 
even after adjusting for measures of all three mechanisms.  This finding suggests that 
some domains of cognitive ability may have an independent effect on mortality. 
These relationships were explored in further detail by examining the relationship 
between both the level and slope of cognitive performance and cause-specific mortality 
(Batterham et al., submitted).  This study was the first to establish the comparability of 
two unbiased estimates of change (Best Linear Unbiased Predictor and latent growth 
models) in predicting mortality from multiple causes.  Initial levels of performance on 
tasks measuring processing speed, verbal fluency and global ability were associated 
with all-cause and/or cardiovascular (including stroke or heart disease) mortality in 
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adjusted Cox proportional hazards models.  The slope of decline in performance was 
also associated with all-cause and cardiovascular mortality, however, this effect only 
occurred for the global ability measure, suggesting that late-life changes in performance 
are less strongly associated with mortality than initial levels of ability.  Cognition was 
not associated with deaths from either cancer or respiratory disease, supporting previous 
research on cause-specific mortality (Shipley et al., 2007; Shipley et al., 2008).  The 
relationship between cognition and mortality may therefore be largely influenced by 
cardiovascular events rather than overall physical health.  The primacy of level of 
performance over slope was also consistent with previous research (Ghisletta et al., 
2006; Johansson et al., 2004).  The associations between level of cognitive performance 
and mortality may reflect the lifelong influences of education, health literacy, healthy 
and unhealthy behaviours, injury, vascular problems and other physical health problems 
on both cognitive ability and mortality (Bäckman & MacDonald, 2006; Deary, 2005).  
Further individual influences such as genetics, developmental events and the 
environment may also contribute to these associations.  While the models adjusted for 
many of these factors, it is not possible to fully account for the multitude of influences 
across the lifespan that contribute to an individual‟s cognitive ability.  Nevertheless, as 
the level of cognitive ability had a direct effect on mortality, cognitive performance 
appears to be a significant marker for predicting survival. 
While there was limited evidence for terminal decline using measures of change 
in cognition over the study period, such estimates may not directly capture the terminal 
decline phenomenon.  As cognitive decline does not accelerate continuously in 
proximity to death, it may more appropriately be described using a threshold function 
(Sliwinski et al., 2006).  Batterham, Mackinnon and Christensen (in press) used a 
change point model to assess evidence for terminal decline in the cohort, providing 
estimates of both the onset and magnitude of decline.  Similarly to other studies using 
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the change point methodology (Sliwinski et al., 2006; Thorvaldsson et al., 2008; Wilson 
et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2003), a reliable change point was found for three cognitive 
domains: 8.5 years before death for processing speed, 7.1 years for global function and 
6.6 years for episodic memory.  The rate of decline in the terminal phase, which is the 
period after the change point, was 2-4 times greater than in the preterminal phase before 
the change point.  This finding suggests that events related to impending mortality 
influence the rate at which cognitive performance declines. 
In an extension of the change point methodology, the analysis also investigated 
whether education modified the onset or rate of decline (Batterham, Mackinnon et al., in 
press).  According to the cognitive reserve theory, education and other markers of 
cognitive or brain reserve increases the brain‟s ability to compensate for pathology, 
such that the onset of terminal or pathological decline may be delayed but such decline 
accelerates more rapidly in those with more education (Stern, 2002).  While education 
modified the terminal decline effect for all three of the cognitive domains, the changes 
were not consistent across domains.  More education was associated with earlier onset 
but decreased rate of terminal decline for the global function task.  On the contrary, less 
education was associated with a decreased rate of terminal decline for the processing 
speed task, although the onset of the terminal period was not significantly modified.  
More education was associated with an increased rate of preterminal decline on the 
episodic memory task but had no effect on the change point or the rate of terminal 
decline.  Consequently, the findings did not show any systematic evidence for cognitive 
reserve theory and suggests that terminal decline does not occur uniformly across 
different cognitive domains.  The differing patterns of decline may reflect the different 
physiological bases of various cognitive abilities, which may vary as a function of 
disease and individual vulnerability.  The lack of evidence for cognitive reserve 
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suggests that the range of biological processes associated with terminal decline may be 
more diverse than those associated with dementia-related cognitive decline. 
The developmental processes responsible for late-life decline were further 
investigated by assessing evidence for the dedifferentiation theory (Batterham, 
Christensen et al., in press-a), which suggests that cognitive abilities become more 
strongly associated with a general factor of intelligence in late life (Baltes et al., 1980; 
Li & Lindenberger, 1999).  Late-life dedifferentiation is hypothesised to occur when, as 
a result of increasing biological constraints on information processing mechanisms, 
declines in fluid abilities limit subsequent development in crystallised abilities (Li et al., 
2004).  The dedifferentiation hypothesis was tested with the statistical model reported 
by Tucker-Drob (2009) to account for non-linear relationships between cognitive 
measures and factors and control for effects of ability differentiation.  The model was 
extended by using two time metrics, age and time to death, the latter of which has not 
previously been used to examine dedifferentiation.  There was evidence for 
dedifferentiation as a function of time to death, but not as a function of age, which is not 
consistent with the dedifferentiation hypothesis.  Furthermore, the dedifferentiation 
effects were attenuated after excluding participants with possible dementia, such that 
none of the effects were significant.  These findings indicate that the dedifferentiation of 
cognitive abilities was not a result of aging per se, but may be related to pathological 
events related to death and particularly dementia.  Other recent research has also failed 
to find evidence for dedifferentiation in late life (Anstey et al., 2003; Tucker-Drob, 
2009; Zelinski & Lewis, 2003).  Any evidence of age-associated dedifferentiation 
effects may instead be indicative of the prevalence of subclinical or clinical dementia. 
The final study assessed the effects of depression and anxiety on survival time 
(Batterham, Christensen et al., in press-b).  Using a series of Cox regression models 
embedded in structural equation models, it was determined that the relationship between 
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depression and mortality in the Canberra Longitudinal Study cohort was fully mediated 
by physical health, while anxiety was not related to mortality.  The findings related to 
depression were in contrast to four previous reviews which have reported that 
depression is associated with mortality (Cuijpers & Schoevers, 2004; Saz & Dewey, 
2001; Schulz et al., 2002; Wulsin et al., 1999).  One theoretical model suggests that 
physical health status might mediate the relationship between depression and mortality 
by increasing vulnerability to physical illness through changes in immune response 
(Cuijpers & Schoevers, 2004).  The study (Batterham, Christensen et al., in press-b) 
provided evidence for this model by controlling for a range of physical health measures 
and suggests that there is no direct effect of depression on mortality, over and above its 
effects on morbidity.  Up to half of the studies reported in the four previous reviews of 
the relationship controlled for no measures of physical health status (Cuijpers & 
Schoevers, 2004; Saz & Dewey, 2001; Schulz et al., 2002; Wulsin et al., 1999), which 
may explain the difference in findings and suggests that the direct effect of depression 
may have been overstated in previous research.  As cognitive performance is diminished 
in the presence of depression (Christensen et al., 1997; Jorm, 2000; Willner, 1984), it is 
important to assess whether the cognition-mortality relationship may be explained by 
late-life depression.  Given the present findings that there is no direct effect of 
depression and no effect of anxiety on mortality (Batterham, Christensen et al., in press-
b), along with the adjustments for mental health symptoms in examining the association 
between cognition and mortality (Batterham et al., 2009; Batterham et al., submitted), it 
appears that depression and anxiety do not account for the cognition-mortality 
relationship. 
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Limitations of the research 
The studies presented data from the Canberra Longitudinal Study, an 
epidemiological cohort of community-dwelling elderly participants.  The study sample 
was large (n = 896) and was followed over a long period, with up to four assessments 
over 12 years and vital status collected for up to 17 years.  The interviews assessed a 
wide range of domains including multiple cognitive abilities, subjective and objective 
measures of physical health, symptoms of anxiety and depression, health behaviours 
including substance and medication use, background characteristics and social support.  
Consequently, the study was well suited to assessing a wide range of risk factors for 
cognitive decline and mortality.  However, as in any study, there were some aspects of 
the design that limited some areas of the research. 
The four assessment points included in the study allowed for longitudinal 
analyses but limited the types of trends that could be estimated.  Intraindividual 
estimates of linear change were assessed in both the cognitive change and terminal 
decline studies (Batterham, Mackinnon et al., in press; Batterham et al., submitted).  
While the large sample size ensured that reliable, unbiased change estimates could be 
made by the inclusion of random effect terms, a greater number of measurement points 
would allow for greater reliability of estimates and the investigation of other patterns of 
change, such as quadratic effects.  The four-year interval between assessment points 
may also have reduced the power of some types of longitudinal models to detect small 
rates of decline.  Since changes in cognition related to terminal decline may occur in a 
relatively small window, other studies may benefit from a shorter interval between 
follow-up interviews and more follow-ups.  However, the need for briefer retest periods 
and more interviews must be balanced with undesirable outcomes that may occur in 
epidemiological studies, such as increased attrition (Deeg et al., 2002) or larger retest 
effects (Salthouse et al., 2004).   
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In addition, the measurement of cognition and some risk factors could be 
improved in future studies.  The cognitive measures used in the present analysis were 
selected prior to the beginning of the study in 1990 with the aim of briefly assessing a 
range of abilities.  Some of these tests, such as the episodic memory task, were very 
brief and may be inferior to longer or more established tests.  The inclusion of more 
cognitive tests covering multiple domains of performance, along with tests of general 
intelligence, might provide further insight into relationships between cognitive ability 
and mortality.  Once again, given the resource limits involved in large epidemiological 
studies, it is difficult to administer large batteries of demanding cognitive assessments.  
In addition, the measurement of cognitive performance at the start of the study may 
potentially have been influenced by the poor health of the participants, who were all 
aged 70 or over.  Participants who were close to death at the first assessment may have 
influenced some the effects of poor cognitive performance on mortality.  Nevertheless, 
the longitudinal analyses presented here excluded participants who died before the first 
follow-up and cross-sectional analyses were adjusted for multiple physical health 
measures, mitigating the effects of initial physical health status.   
Clinical assessments of mental health status may also have provided more 
information about the mental health status of the sample.  Depression and anxiety 
symptoms were used in place of a diagnostic assessment.  Nevertheless, symptom scales 
are easier to administer and assess a range of severities, including non-clinical states, 
which are often overlooked by clinical instruments.  Health behaviours were another 
area which could have been measured more comprehensively.  The initial interview did 
not include measures of alcohol and other substance use, diet, healthcare utilization or 
medication adherence.  Likewise, the collection of genetic markers, objective sensory 
measures such as visual acuity, brain imaging markers and additional physical 
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performance measures may have provided further information about risk factors for 
cognitive decline and mortality. 
Finally, as the primary outcome of the study was mortality and the cohort was 
elderly, attrition due to mortality and other factors inevitably reduced the sample over 
time.  Despite this attrition, the sample was still large for this type of cohort, with 374 
participants completing three or four assessments.  Further research to examine 
predictors of attrition from sources other than mortality may provide additional 
understanding of patterns of cognitive performance in late life.  
 
Future research directions 
While the studies presented examined the relationship between cognition and 
mortality from a range of perspectives, there are other methods, or extensions to the 
current methods, which may further explain the observed relationships.  As previously 
mentioned, the current study only examined linear trends in late-life cognitive change.  
Modelling other types of trends, such as quadratic change, may more adequately capture 
the terminal decline phenomenon and provide greater insight into how cognitive 
performance changes in proximity to death.  However, these types of analyses would 
require a larger number of observations for each participant, and the change point 
approach provides adequate estimates of terminal decline.  Due to the complex nature of 
the models involved, the two analyses examining dedifferentiation and mental health 
used a cross-sectional approach.  Longitudinal versions of these models would be 
further complicated by age effects and the potential inconstancy of factors over time.  
Other methods may be used to examine how within-person change might affect 
dedifferentiation or the relationship between mental health and mortality.  Nevertheless, 
these two analyses had null results which are unlikely to be changed by the inclusion of 
longitudinal analyses.  There are also different types of models for assessing terminal 
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decline or relationships between cognition and survival.  Terminal decline may be 
further investigated using Bayesian models or retrospective models that estimate 
individual change points and account for individual differences (Gerstorf et al., 2008; 
Hall et al., 2003).  In addition, the association between level and slope of cognitive 
ability may be modelled using a variety of unbiased methods similar to those presented 
(Ghisletta et al., 2006; Johansson et al., 2004). 
Another extension of the present research would be to examine the conditions in 
which certain outcomes occur.  For example, at an individual level, terminal decline 
may be precipitated by a number of health-related events, such as heart problems, 
strokes or falls.  Likewise, the relationship between cognitive performance and 
mortality may be stronger among certain subgroups such as those who are older or have 
poorer physical health.  As discussed previously, examining additional tasks assessing a 
wider range of cognitive abilities may also lead to a greater understanding of the 
cognition-mortality relationship.  Indeed, it is conceivable that certain patterns of 
cognitive performance, or changes in these patterns, may be predictive of death from 
particular causes.  Likewise, such patterns may be reflective of physiological events that 
are either manifest or subclinical.  Testing these additional hypotheses may require 
different study designs, particularly studies with smaller samples but more observations, 
more frequent observations and additional cognitive measures.  Additional research 
focussed on specific risk groups such as those with late-life conditions including 
cardiovascular disease would provide additional tests of these hypotheses.  Such studies 
would ideally be integrated with data from larger population studies, like the Canberra 
Longitudinal Study. 
While the current studies focussed on mortality as an outcome, these types of 
analyses could also be applied to range of different outcomes such as conversion to 
dementia, study attrition, hospital admissions or a range of physical or mental health 
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outcomes.  Such analyses would further contribute to our understanding of the pathways 
of aging, from healthy states to disease states and death.  Investigating the roles of 
cognitive ability and various risk factors in these outcomes may facilitate early 
identification and intervention to prevent disease and extend healthy aging. 
 
Conclusions 
The presented studies demonstrate that there was a strong link between cognitive 
ability and mortality in the Canberra Longitudinal Study cohort.  The relationship was 
stronger for certain types of abilities, such as processing speed, and for particular causes 
of mortality, such as cardiovascular disease.  Furthermore, level of ability was more 
strongly predictive of survival than changes in ability.  While late-life decline in 
cognitive abilities did not appear to be a critical predictor of subsequent mortality, there 
was evidence for terminal decline in the cohort.  Specifically, the rate of cognitive 
decline was related to time-to-death, with a two- to four-fold increase in the rate of 
decline at around 6-9 years prior to death.  Education was shown to modify terminal 
decline, but the cognitive reserve theory was not supported, as the effects of education 
were not consistent across domains.  The developmental bases for late-life decline were 
not related to dedifferentiation of abilities, as cognitive abilities did not become more 
strongly associated with a general ability factor as a function of increasing age.  In 
addition, the effects of depression and anxiety on mortality were explained by physical 
health status, so mental health was unlikely to have influence on the cognition-mortality 
relationship. 
The relationship between cognition and mortality may substantially be explained 
by physical health status, health behaviours and background characteristics such as 
socioeconomic status, education, developmental events and genetics, which influence 
cognitive ability across the life span.  Nevertheless, cognitive ability appears to have an 
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independent effect on mortality, despite controlling for multiple measures of the factors 
that predict both cognitive performance and mortality.  Consequently, cognitive ability 
provides a useful indicator for the risk of mortality.  Continued examination of the 
relationship between cognition and mortality will provide a greater understanding of the 
changes in cognition that occur in late life. 
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Available online 22 November 2008The long-term relationship between lower intelligence and mortality risk in later life is well
established, even when controlling for a range of health and sociodemographic measures.
However, there is some evidence for differential effects in various domains of cognitive
performance. Specifically, tests of fluid intelligence may have a stronger association with
mortality than do tests of crystallized intelligence. The present study examines the relationship
between intelligence and mortality in a sample of 896 Australian community-dwelling males
and females, aged 70–97 at recruitment and followed for up to 17 years. There were 687 deaths
during the follow-up period. Cox proportional hazard regressionmodels examinedwhether the
relationship between intelligence andmortality might bemediated by socioeconomic status, by
health behaviors, by health status, or a combination of these. Higher fluid intelligence — as
measured by the Symbol–Letter Modalities Test—was strongly associated with lowermortality
rates (Hazard ratio=0.80; 95% confidence interval=0.72–0.88), even after accounting for any
combination of potential mediators and confounders. A significant association between
crystallized intelligence, as measured by the National Adult Reading Test, and mortality
(HR=0.89; 95% CI=0.80–0.99) was attenuated by the inclusion of socioeconomic, health
status measures, and health behavior measures and when deaths from the first four years of the
study were excluded. The findings show little support for the hypothesized mechanisms of the
intelligence–mortality relationship.
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Health behaviorsLong-term studies of intelligence and mortality demon-
strate that higher intelligence is associated with lower all-
cause mortality. A recent review (Batty, Deary, & Gottfredson,
2007) examined nine studies investigating the relationship
between early-life intelligence and later mortality risk. The
studies followed cohorts for between 17 and 69 years. All
found that higher IQ was associated with lower mortality. For
example, one of the reviewed studies retrospectively traced
the vital status of 2230 participants in the 1932 ScottishResearch, Building 63,
Canberra ACT 0200,
.
Batterham).
ll rights reserved.Mental Survey after 65 years (Whalley & Deary, 2001). The
hazard of mortality over the 65 year follow-up period was
decreased by 21% for each 15-point increase in intelligence as
measured by the Moray House test. Studies reporting follow-
up into old age have also reported consistent findings (Deeg,
Hofman, & van Zonneveld,1990; Rabbitt, Lunn, &Wong, 2006;
Shipley, Der, Taylor, & Deary, 2006). However, the intelli-
gence–mortality relationshipmay be dependent of the type of
test administered, the age of the cohort and the length of the
follow-up period.
Poor performance on executive tests such as theMini-Mental
State Exam (Bassuk, Wypij, & Berkman, 2000; Dartigues et al.,
2007)or theShort PortableMental StatusQuestionnaire (Blazer,
Sachs-Ericsson, & Hybels, 2005; Liang, Bennett, Sugisawa,
Kobayashi, & Fukaya, 2003) tends to be associated with higher
552 P.J. Batterham et al. / Intelligence 37 (2009) 551–560mortality risk, however the relationship has not always been
foundtobe significant (Ganguli, Dodge, &Mulsant, 2002;Ostbye
et al., 2006) andmay be dependent on the length of the follow-
up period (Ganguli et al., 2002; van Gelder, Tijhuis, Kalmijn,
Giampaoli, & Kromhout, 2007). Performance on tests of crystal-
lized intelligence, such as the National Adult Reading Test (Abas,
Hotopf, & Prince, 2002; Anstey, Luszcz, Giles, & Andrews, 2001)
or Raven's Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (Rabbitt et al., 2002) tends
to be robust to the effects of aging and is less likely to exhibit
an association with mortality after health and social status are
taken into account.
Tests offluid intelligence, such asDigit–Symbol Substitution
(Anstey et al., 2001; Ghisletta, McArdle, & Lindenberger, 2006;
Pavlik et al., 2003; Portin et al., 2001) or various learning tasks
(Abas et al., 2002; Ghisletta et al., 2006; Rabbitt et al., 2002;
Royall, Chiodo, Mouton, & Polk, 2007) tend to decline more
with age and aremore strongly associatedwithmortality than
performance on tests of general intelligence or tests of execu-
tive functioning. However, the effect size may be greater for
long-term (e.g., Ghisletta et al., 2006) rather than short-term
(e.g., Bosworth, Schaie, & Willis, 1999) studies and for older
rather than younger cohorts (Lyyra, Heikkinen, Lyyra, & Jylha,
2006; Shipley et al., 2006). The association between short-
term memory performance and mortality among non-demen-
ted adults is also well documented (Ghisletta et al., 2006;
Portin et al., 2001; Shipley et al., 2006). In addition, two
reviews have reported an association between dementia or
mild cognitive disorders and mortality (Dewey & Saz, 2001;
Guehne et al., 2006; Guehne, Riedel-Heller, & Angermeyer,
2005). Indeed, it has been contended that the relationship
between intelligence and mortality is largely mediated by
dementia (Backman & MacDonald, 2006).
Given the evidence for the relationship between intelli-
gence and mortality, potential mechanisms driving this asso-
ciation warrant further examination. In early research on the
relationship between cognitive decline and mortality, Riegel
and Riegel (1972) described the effect in terms of “terminal
drop”. While the relationship between childhood intelligence
and mortality cannot be explained by terminal decline alone,
two theories posited by Riegel and Riegel (1972) form the
basis of contemporary understanding of the intelligence–
mortality relationship. Firstly, a biological theory suggested
that physiological mechanisms related to cell aging were
responsible for the decline and also for death. Secondly, a
sociological theory suggested that performance and chance of
survival drops earlier in life for those who cope less well with
their environment due to disadvantages in, for example,
education, income, nutrition and medical assistance.
More recently, three potential mechanisms for the rela-
tionship have been detailed by Whalley and Deary (2001) and
Deary (2005) and tested by Kuh, Richards, Hardy, Butterworth,
and Wadsworth (2004) and Shipley et al. (2006). First, socio-
economic status (SES) may mediate the relationship between
intelligence and mortality. This theory, advocated by Siegrist
and Marmot (2004), is similar to the sociological theory of
Riegel and Riegel (1972), suggesting that disadvantages in
intelligence lead to burdens in occupation, which are linked to
poorer health outcomes. Siegrist andMarmot (2004) elaborate
on the relationship by taking into account the mediating effect
of control on health outcomes. The demand–control model
(Karasek,1979) proposes thathighworkdemands interactwithlow levels of perceived control to cause such outcomes as
depression and exhaustion, which adversely effect health
outcomes and consequent mortality. A second explanation is
that the relationship between intelligence and mortality is
mediated by health behaviors and knowledge, which include
substance use, diet, physical activity, healthcare utilization, and
accident and illness prevention (Deary, 2005). Gottfredson and
Deary (2004) argued that a high level of cognitive resources is
required to prevent disease and to ameliorate illness through
behaviors such as health monitoring, screening, medication
adherence, understanding health information and becoming
health literate. Failure to adequately undertake these health
behaviors can lead to illness or more severe illness, resulting in
hospitalization and health costs, and consequently, greater risk
of mortality (Gottfredson & Deary, 2004).
A third explanation is that the relationship between in-
telligence and mortality may be due to a common association
with health status. There are two possible explanations for an
association between intelligence and health (Deary, 2005):
(i) intelligence may be viewed as a marker of biological “fit-
ness” or of system integrity, or (ii) intelligence may be an
indicator of developmental problems that impact on later
health. The former explanation aligns with the biological
theory proposed by Riegel and Riegel (1972), with evidence
from studies of the common cause hypothesis linking sensory
function, lung function, grip strength and other biological
markers with performance on cognitive tests (Christensen
et al., 2000; Christensen, Mackinnon, Korten, & Jorm, 2001;
Salthouse, Hancock, Meinz, & Hambrick, 1996). The latter
explanation suggests that development in early life, such as
fetal events, birth weight and early nutrition, shape future
patterns of health and disease, which confound the relation-
ship between intelligence and mortality (Deary, 2005). A
refinement of (i) is that intelligence is associated with mor-
tality because it reflects basic or core information processing
mechanisms reflected inmeasures such as RTand grip strength
(Deary & Der, 2005; Shipley et al., 2006). These two studies
demonstrated that SES and health factors affect the relation-
ship but that core processes such as reaction time are critical in
predicting mortality.
The three proposed explanations of the link between mor-
tality and intelligence are testable. The first predicts that
education, employment history and other measures of lifetime
opportunity will be associated with both intelligence and
mortality andwill consequently reduce theeffect of intelligence
onmortality. The second predicts that health behaviors, such as
substance use history and healthcare utilizationmeasured both
currently and retrospectively over the lifespan, will likewise
mediate the association between intelligence and mortality.
The third set of explanations is more complex but suggests that
disease status and a range of health or biological markers may
account for a large proportionof thevariance in the relationship
between intelligence and mortality. The refinement of the
explanation proposed by Deary and Der (2005) is that after
accounting for core biological processes (reflected in biological
measures suchasgrip strength, sensoryprocessingand reaction
time), the relationship between intelligence and mortality
should be reduced or eliminated.
Two tests that capture the construct of intelligence are
used in the present study. The Symbol–Letter Modalities
Test (SLMT), a task similar to Smith's (1973) Symbol–Digit
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Symbol Substitution, is a perceptual speed test that provides
a measure of fluid intelligence. SLMT measures the efficiency
of visual search and memory for the symbols presented in the
task (Gilmore, Spinks, & Thomas, 2006) and performance on
the task is correlated with measures of general intelligence
such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Waldmann,
Dickson, Monahan, & Kazelskis, 1992). The National Adult
Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982) is a test of vocabulary that
provides a measure of crystallized intelligence. NART perfor-
mance is also correlated withmeasures of general intelligence
and, unlike SLMT, is resistant to the effects of dementia
(Bright, Jaldow, & Kopelman, 2002). Having the two tests
allowed us to formulate differential predictions of the effect of
these cognitive variables onmortality. Based on past research,
SLMT performance was hypothesized to be a better predictor
of mortality than NART. We also predicted that the relation-
ship between SLMT and mortality would be more strongly
mediated by health status than the relationship between
NART and mortality, since NART performance is more re-
sistant to the effects of declining health.
1. Method
1.1. Participants
The Canberra Longitudinal Study (CLS) was a large epide-
miological survey of mental health and cognitive functioning
that began in 1990. The study design is more fully detailed by
Christensen et al. (2004). Eight hundred and ninety-six
participants (456 men and 440 women) aged 70 or older at
the time of the baseline assessment were recruited for the
baseline assessment. All participants were initially living in
the community in the cities of Canberra or Queanbeyan,
Australia. Participants were sampled from the compulsory
electoral roll, with 69% responding. Approval for the research
was obtained from the Ethics in Human Experimentation
Committee of The Australian National University.
1.2. Survey procedure
Participants were interviewed on up to four occasions over
12 years. Interviews were sought from both the participant
and an informant, although the present study only examines
participant data. Baseline interviews lasted approximately
2 hours, incorporating a survey measuring a wide range of
risk factors including socio-demographics, physical health
and disease status, mental health status, cognitive perfor-
mance and social support. Interviews also included physical
assessments of blood pressure, lung function, grip strength,
vision and reaction time. Trained professional interviewers
conducted the interviews.
Of the original sample of 896 participants, 185 (20.6%)
were deceased by four years, 363 (40.5%) were deceased by
eight years, and 544 (60.7%) were deceased by 12 years. At
the end of vital status collection in June 2007, 687 (76.7%) of
the participants were deceased. Of the participants who re-
mained in the study, 14.1% (100/711) refused or were unable
to complete the first follow-up interview, 21.1% (100/474) for
the second follow-up and 21.1% (57/270) for the third follow-
up.1.3. Assessment of mortality
Mortality status and date of death were established by
contacting relatives, searching the National Death Index, and
fromdeath notices in the local newspaper. The National Death
Index, a register of all deaths in Australia, was searched by
name and date of birth. Missing death identifications from the
National Death Index would most likely have been a rare
occurrence, as the index provides nationwide coverage. The
additional methods used for death reporting (contacting
relatives, newspaper searches) provide further confidence in
the mortality status data. Mortality status was followed for up
to 17 years, from the start of baseline interviews in September,
1990 until June 30, 2007. Survival was calculated as the time
from the baseline interview to death for deceased partici-
pants, or from baseline until June 30, 2007 for surviving
(right-censored) participants. For six participants with un-
known day of death, the day was set to the 15th of the month.
For two participants with an unknown month of death, the
month was set to June. Taking deaths into account, the mean
follow-up time was 9.7 years – 16.4 years for surviving parti-
cipants and 7.6 years for deceased participants.
1.4. Assessment of intelligence
Two tasks were used to assess different domains of intelli-
gence. The Symbol LetterModalities Test is a test of perceptual
speed that has been used as a measure of fluid intelligence.
This test is based on earlier tests of fluid intelligence such as
Digit–Symbol Substitution (Wechsler, 1981) and the Symbol–
Digit Modalities Test (Smith, 1973). Participants were pro-
vided with a key which linked 10 symbols with letters of the
alphabet (A to I). They were given 90 s to call out to the
examiner the letters of the alphabet that corresponded to
symbols printed in rows on the page. The key to the symbol–
letter pairings was printed above the array. The test measures
both fluid intelligence and cognitive speed. However, it allows
an oral response to be made by the participants, thereby
limiting possible contamination from impaired psychomotor
functioning. The number of correct symbol–letter pairs made
in 90 s was summed and the scores were standardized to
produce an IQ-type score (SLMT IQ).
The National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982)
assessed crystallized intelligence by testing the vocabulary
of participants. The NART is a list of 50 words that are not
pronounceable phonetically. Participants read the words
aloud and testing is discontinued whenever there were 14
failures out of 15 items. The number of correct pronunciations
made was summed and the scores were standardized to pro-
duce an IQ-type score (NART IQ).
1.5. Control variables
All of the control variables were measured in the baseline
interview, with the exception of subsequent dementia diag-
nosis which was made on each wave of measurement.
1.5.1. Socio-economic status
Educational status was based on responses to two ques-
tions regarding the number of years in school and the highest
qualification obtained. These two questions were combined
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for predictor variables by vital status after 17 years
(n=896).
N Survivors
(n=191–209)
Decedents
(n=566–687)
p value
Mean (SD)
or freq (%)
Mean (SD)
or freq (%)
SLMT IQ score 853 103.80 (14.10) 93.91 (16.97) b0.001
NART IQ score 835 113.16 (8.35) 111.32 (10.08) 0.001
Age 896 74.09 (3.38) 77.30 (5.09) b0.001
Gender: male 896 83 (39.7%) 373 (54.3%) b0.001
Socio-economic status
Years of education 894 11.17 (2.29) 11.41 (2.66) 0.275
Work history: manual work 896 141 (67.5%) 551 (59.7%) 0.039
Self as locus of control 759 4.36 (0.61) 4.21 (0.60) b0.001
Health behaviors
Smoking status 877 0.004
Never smoked 110 (52.9%) 391 (42.0%)
Previously smoked 78 (37.5%) 383 (45.6%)
Currently smoke 20 (9.6%) 103 (12.4%)
Activity score 875 12.72 (2.43) 11.51 (3.17) b0.001
Physical health
Self-rated health 874 b0.001
Excellent 59 (28.5%) 160 (15.1%)
Good 120 (58.0%) 478 (53.7%)
Fair 27 (13.0%) 192 (24.7%)
Poor 1 (0.5%) 44 (6.4%)
Heart attack history 885 23 (11.1%) 157 (19.8%) b0.001
Hypertension history 887 80 (38.5%) 371 (42.9%) 0.553
Stroke history 887 45 (78.4%) 269 (67.0%) 0.002
Disease count 896 1.69 (1.35) 2.12 (1.47) b0.001
Symptom count 896 2.93 (2.74) 3.58 (2.87) b0.001
ADL score 877 0.98 (1.31) 2.14 (2.78) b0.001
IADL score 877 0.28 (0.67) 0.86 (1.61) b0.001
Choice RT (s) 798 0.46 (0.12) 0.48 (0.15) b0.001
Grip strength (kg) 877 25.95 (9.91) 24.29 (9.44) 0.012
Visual impairment 887 163 (78.4%) 455 (67.0%) b0.001
Hearing impairment 887 156 (75.0%) 475 (70.0%) 0.069
Subsequent dementia
diagnosis
896 3 (1.4%) 41 (6.0%) 0.013
Mental health
Goldberg depression score 865 1.71 (1.79) 2.13 (2.00) b0.001
Goldberg anxiety score 870 2.49 (2.35) 2.46 (2.25) 0.761
Notes: p values are from Z tests (binary and continuous variables) and χ2
tests (categorical variables) from univariate Cox regressions using imputed
data; SLMT IQ: Symbol–Letter Modalities Test IQ score; NART IQ: National
Adult Reading Test IQ score; ADL: Activities of Daily Living; IADL: Instrumental
Activities of Daily Living; RT: reaction time.
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participants to attain their highest educational qualification.
Work history was asked as an open-ended question that was
then given a standard job classification coding. From these
codings, participantswere classified into one of six categories:
unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, white collar, lower profes-
sional, managerial/professional. However, given the advanced
age of the sample (the categorizations are based on a con-
temporary coding system) and a lack of predictive power
providedby these categories, theywere collapsed into a binary
measure reflecting manual or non-manual employment. Par-
ticipants who were involved in home duties were classified
based on their spouse's occupational status.
1.5.2. Locus of control
A 14-item locus of control scale was administered, with
participants rating items such as “I am confident of being able
to deal successfully with future problems” on a six-point
Likert scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. The
scale was based on the 17-item Locus of Control of Behavior
scale (Craig, Franklin, & Andrews, 1984) with three symptom-
related items removed. Eight items were negatively-worded
and were reverse scored. The score was a mean of the ratings
(range 1–6), with higher scores indicating that the participant
saw themselves as the locus of control.
1.5.3. Health behaviors
Participants reported whether they were current smokers,
past smokers who had quit, or had never smoked. Level of
activity was based on a six-item scale asking participants how
often they engaged in activities “these days”, with possible
scores ranging from 0–18. The activities were reading,
some sort of physical activity, active involvement in interests
or hobbies, sitting at home (inactivity, negatively scored),
and planned activities such as household tasks and visiting
people. (Christensen et al., 1996) While there is a relationship
between the activity scale and the level of physical disability
(r=− .44), participation in social and intellectual pursuits
are not captured by measures of physical disability.
1.5.4. Physical health
A brief self-reported medical history for each participant
was takenduring the survey. Heart attack history, strokehistory
(combining strokes, mini-strokes and transient ischemic
attacks) and hypertension history were measured as dichot-
omous variables. A disease count covering 14 other diseases
(including diabetes and cancer) and a symptom count for 21
symptoms (including falls, dizziness and chest pain) were
generated. To measure functional ability, eight Activities of
Daily Living (ADLs) were rated for difficulty on a four-point
scale (no difficulty, some difficulty but no help needed, need
help, bedridden) andfive Instrumental Activities of Daily Living
(IADLs) were rated on a three-point scale (no help needed,
need help, cannot do). Two scales of functional ability were
generated from these items, with ADL scores ranging from 0 to
24 and IADL scores ranging from 0 to 8. Higher scores on these
scales indicate greater functional disability. Self-rated health
wasmeasuredbyaskingparticipants to rate their generalhealth
on a four-point scale from “Excellent” (1) to “Poor” (4).
Sensory indicators of physical health included reaction
time, grip strength, visual and auditory function. To measurechoice reaction time, participants were asked to press a
button with their left or right hand depending on which of
two stimulus lights were illuminated (interstimulus intervals
ranged from 0.5 to 2.0 s) (Christensen et al., 2000). The trials
were performed mid-way through the survey, and choice
reaction time was measured as the mean response time over
20 trials. Grip strength was taken using a Smedley hand
dynamometer which measures the force exerted in kilograms
(Christensen et al., 2000). Visual impairment was self-rated,
with participants reporting “poor” eyesight or blindness
classified as visually impaired. Hearing impairment was also
self-rated, with participants who used a hearing aid or re-
ported poor hearing classified as hearing impaired.
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Mental health ratings were included in the analysis as
supplementary measures of health status. The Goldberg De-
pression Scale and Goldberg Anxiety Scale each consist of nine
yes/no items measuring symptoms of depression and anxiety
(Goldberg, Bridges, Duncan-Jones, & Grayson, 1988). Scores on
these tests reflect a symptom count ranging from 0 to 9.
1.5.6. Dementia
To control for potential confounding by dementia, parti-
cipants whowere given an ICD-10 (World Health Organization,
1993) diagnosis of dementia or severe dementia later in the
study (atwaves 2, 3 and 4 4, 8 and 12 years after baseline)were
identified. Diagnoses were made using the Canberra Interview
for the Elderly (CIE) (Social Psychiatry Research Unit, 1992),
which provides information from which a diagnosis of
dementia can be made according to ICD-10 (World Health
Organization, 1993) and DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric
Association, 1987) by means of a computer algorithm.Fig. 1. Kaplan–Meier curves of cumulative survival over 17 years plotted separate1.6. Analyses
Descriptive analyses compared living participants to de-
ceased participants to investigate which predictors were
associated with death during the follow-up time. Survival
time was graphed using Kaplan–Meier curves and modeled
using Cox proportional hazards regression analyses. A
series of six regression analyses included the intelli-
gence measures with a combination of potential mediators
or confounders, corresponding to the hypothesized me-
chanisms of the intelligence–mortality relationship. To
facilitate interpretation of the Cox regression analyses,
continuous variables (excluding age, years of education and
disease and symptom counts) were standardized by sub-
tracting the mean for the entire sample and dividing by the
standard deviation. To account for potential confounding
by end-of-life illness, specifically, sub-clinical disease states
not captured by the health status measures, the analyses
were repeated with the exclusion of participants who diedly for participants with IQ above and below the sample median (n=896).
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repeated separately by gender to investigate whether the
intelligence–mortality relationship differed for males and
females.
Incomplete data for the survival analyses were imputed
using the ICE procedure in Stata. Ten imputed data sets were
generated by simultaneously modeling all of the independent
variables from the baseline survey that were used in the
analyses. The imputation procedure used linear regression to
impute continuous variables, logistic regression to impute
dichotomous variables and multinomial logistic regression to
impute the two categorical variables (smoking status and
self-rated health). Survival was not imputed, as complete data
were available. Among the variables used in the analysis, 13%
of the sample had one missing value and a further 10% of the
sample had two or more missing values. The imputed data
sets were combined using the micombine procedure in Stata,
in conjunction with the stcox procedure that was used for the
Cox proportional hazards regression models. SPSS version 15
was used for the descriptive analysis. Stata version 9 was used
for the imputation and survival analyses.
2. Results
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. These are based
on the raw data, with p-values taken from Wald tests from
univariate Cox regressions combined from analyses of the ten
imputed data sets. Overall, the mean age was 76.6 years, with
11.4 years of education. With the exceptions of education,Table 2
Cox proportional hazards regression models of mortality over 17 years using baseli
Model (1) Univariate (2) With age &
gender
(3) SES & loc
control
SLMT IQ score 0.69 (0.64, 0.75)⁎⁎⁎ 0.76 (0.70, 0.82)⁎⁎⁎ 0.74 (0.67, 0.8
Age 1.08 (1.07, 1.10)⁎⁎⁎ 1.08 (1.06, 1.1
Gender = male 1.62 (1.39, 1.89)⁎⁎⁎ 1.60 (1.37, 1.8
Yrs of education 1.06 (1.03, 1.1
Manual worker 1.02 (0.85, 1.2
Self as locus of control 0.91 (0.83, 1.0
Smoking status
Never
Previous
Current†
Activity scale
Self-rated health
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor†
Heart attack history
Hypertension history
Stroke history
Disease count
Symptom count
ADL score
IADL score
Choice RT
Grip strength
Visual impairment
Hearing impairment
Goldberg depression
Goldberg anxiety
Dementia diagnosis
†Reference category; ⁎pb .05; ⁎⁎pb .01; ⁎⁎⁎pb .001.hypertension history, hearing impairment and Goldberg An-
xiety score, all variables were significantly associated with
mortality (pb0.05).
The effects of SLMT (Fig. 1a) and NART (Fig. 1b) on survival
time were plotted using Kaplan–Meier curves. A median split
was chosen to separate high and low performance on the two
tasks. The figures show that the effect of SLMT on survival is
much more pronounced than that of NART. There is a 20%
difference in cumulative survival between high and low SLMT
groups after approximately five years, and this difference is
maintained until the end of the period of observation. The
difference between high and low NART groups, however, is
only apparent between approximately four and thirteen years
after baseline.
Six models of mortality risk were tested using Cox pro-
portional hazards regression models (Table 2). The univariate
effect of SLMT was tested in Model 1, then age and gender
were added to create Model 2. Model 3 built on Model 2,
simultaneously testing the effect of SES (education and em-
ployment background) in conjunction with locus of control, a
potential mediator of the effect of SES on mortality (Siegrist &
Marmot, 2004). Health behaviors (smoking status and
activity level) were entered into a separate model with
SLMT, age and gender (Model 4). Health status, including
physical health and mental health measures and dementia,
was included simultaneously with SLMT, age and gender in
Model 5. Finally, the significant predictors (at pb .05) from
Models 2–5 were combined into a single model (Model 6).
The six models were also fitted with the NART (Table 3).ne fluid intelligence measure (n=896; 687 decedents).
us of (4) Health behaviors (5) System integrity (6) Combined model
1)⁎⁎⁎ 0.81 (0.74, 0.89)⁎⁎⁎ 0.81 (0.74, 0.89)⁎⁎⁎ 0.80 (0.72, 0.88)⁎⁎⁎
0)⁎⁎⁎ 1.08 (1.06, 1.10)⁎⁎⁎ 1.07 (1.05, 1.09)⁎⁎⁎ 1.07 (1.05, 1.09)⁎⁎⁎
7)⁎⁎⁎ 1.56 (1.31, 1.84)⁎⁎⁎ 2.43 (1.87, 3.14)⁎⁎⁎ 2.41 (1.89, 3.06)⁎⁎⁎
0)⁎⁎⁎ 1.06 (1.03, 1.09)⁎⁎⁎
2)
0)⁎ 0.93 (0.85, 1.02)
1.13 (0.95, 1.35)
1.05 (0.81, 1.35)
1.00
0.83 (0.76, 0.90)⁎⁎⁎ 0.91 (0.83, 1.00)⁎
0.44 (0.27, 0.73)⁎⁎ 0.38 (0.24, 0.61)⁎⁎⁎
0.53 (0.34, 0.83)⁎⁎ 0.46 (0.30, 0.69)⁎⁎⁎
0.71 (0.45, 1.13) 0.63 (0.41, 0.98)⁎
1.00 1.00
1.42 (1.16, 1.74)⁎⁎ 1.50 (1.24, 1.83)⁎⁎⁎
1.24 (1.05, 1.45)⁎ 1.28 (1.09, 1.51)⁎⁎
1.13 (0.89, 1.43)
1.05 (0.99, 1.11)
1.00 (0.97, 1.04)
1.11 (0.98, 1.25)
1.06 (0.94, 1.19)
1.02 (0.90, 1.16)
0.80 (0.70, 0.92)⁎⁎ 0.76 (0.67, 0.86)⁎⁎⁎
1.12 (0.93, 1.34)
0.99 (0.84, 1.18)
1.03 (0.93, 1.14)
0.89 (0.80, 0.99)⁎ 0.91 (0.83, 0.99)⁎
1.14 (0.82, 1.58)
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with mortality irrespective of which other variables were in
the model. The effect of fluid intelligence on mortality was
reduced but not fully accounted for when adjusting for age
and gender, and including the ‘competing’ predictors measur-
ing SES, health behavior, health status and sensory proces-
sing. A 15-point (one SD) disadvantage in SLMT IQ score was
associated with between 23–45% increase in the risk of
mortality (25% for the combinedmodel), depending onwhich
variables were included in the model. When age and gender
were excluded from the models, attenuation of the SLMT
hazard ratios from the inclusion of predictors representing
the three proposed mechanisms ranged from 0–7%. In con-
trast, the effect of NART IQ on mortality was reduced when
accounting for SES or health status and no longer significant
after adjusting for health behaviors. A 15-point (one SD)
disadvantage in NART IQ score was associated with between
8 and 14% increase in the risk of mortality, depending on
the model. Attenuation for the NART hazard ratios ranged
from 0–4%, after excluding the effects of age and gender.
Subsequent dementia onset was not responsible for the
association between intelligence and mortality.
Additional analyses were conducted to further account for
potential confounding by baseline health status. Participants
who died in the first four years of the study, prior to the first
follow-up interview (n=190 decedents), were excluded from
the analysis. The effect of SLMT on mortality remained stable,
as estimated by the six models presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Hazard ratios remained between 0.72 and 0.84 with pb .001Table 3
Cox proportional hazards regression models of mortality over 17 years using baseli
Model (1) Univariate (2) With age and
gender
(3) SES and lo
control
NART IQ score 0.88 (0.81, 0.95)⁎⁎ 0.89 (0.82, 0.97)⁎⁎ 0.90 (0.81, 0.99
Age 1.10 (1.08, 1.12)⁎⁎⁎ 1.10 (1.08, 1.11
Gender = male 1.61 (1.38, 1.87)⁎⁎⁎ 1.64 (1.40, 1.92
Yrs of education 1.05 (1.01, 1.08
Manual worker 1.09 (0.90, 1.31
Self as locus of control 0.87 (0.79, 0.95
Smoking status
Never
Previous
Current†
Activity scale
Self-rated health
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor†
Heart attack history
Hypertension history
Stroke history
Disease count
Symptom count
ADL score
IADL score
Choice RT
Grip strength
Visual impairment
Hearing impairment
Goldberg depression
Goldberg anxiety
Dementia diagnosis
†Reference category; ⁎pb .05; ⁎⁎pb .01; ⁎⁎⁎pb .001.for all models. However, the effect of NART was further atte-
nuated, with only the univariate effect of NART significantly
associated with mortality status (HR=0.89, p=.015). When
age and gender (HR=0.91, p=.055), socioeconomic status
(HR=0.90, p=.087), health behaviors (HR=0.94, p=.223)
and health status (HR=0.93, p=.146) were entered, the
effect of NART became non-significant. A second supplemen-
tal analysis investigated whether the intelligence–mortality
relationship was different for men and women. The effect of
SLMT on mortality was consistent across males and females,
with pb .01 for all six models across both genders and hazard
ratios ranging from 0.64 to 0.84. However, the effect of NART
tended to beweaker amongmen thanwomenwhen adjusting
for age (HRfemale=0.86, p=.014; HRmale=0.91, p=.078)
and when adjusting for health behaviors (HRfemale=0.88,
p=.039; HRmale=0.95, p=.349). The univariate effect of
NART was significant for both genders, but after adjusting for
socioeconomic variables or health status, the effect of NART
did not reach significance for either males or females (HRs
ranging from 0.88 to 0.90).
3. Discussion
The present study examined the intelligence–mortality
relationship using data collected from the Canberra Long-
itudinal Study (CLS) over 17 years in an older cohort of com-
munity dwellers. Better SLMT performance was found to be
significantly associated with lower mortality risk. This effect
persisted after 17 years of follow-up, extending the findingsne crystallized intelligence measure (n=896; 687 decedents).
cus of (4) Health behaviors (5) System integrity (6) Combined model
)⁎ 0.93 (0.85, 1.01) 0.90 (0.83, 0.98)⁎ 0.89 (0.80, 0.99)⁎
)⁎⁎⁎ 1.09 (1.07, 1.11)⁎⁎⁎ 1.07 (1.05, 1.09)⁎⁎⁎ 1.08 (1.06, 1.10)⁎⁎⁎
)⁎⁎⁎ 1.56 (1.32, 1.85)⁎⁎⁎ 2.65 (2.05, 3.41)⁎⁎⁎ 2.51 (1.97, 3.18)⁎⁎⁎
)⁎ 1.05 (1.02, 1.09)⁎⁎
)
)⁎⁎ 0.92 (0.83, 1.01)
1.13 (0.94, 1.35)
1.09 (0.85, 1.40)
1.00
0.78 (0.72, 0.85)⁎⁎⁎ 0.86 (0.79, 0.94)⁎⁎
0.42 (0.26, 0.68)⁎⁎⁎ 0.35 (0.23, 0.56)⁎⁎⁎
0.51 (0.33, 0.80)⁎⁎ 0.43 (0.29, 0.64)⁎⁎⁎
0.69 (0.44, 1.10) 0.59 (0.38, 0.90)⁎
1.00 1.00
1.41 (1.15, 1.73)⁎⁎ 1.51 (1.24, 1.84)⁎⁎⁎
1.22 (1.04, 1.44)⁎ 1.27 (1.08, 1.50)⁎⁎
1.14 (0.90, 1.44)
1.05 (0.99, 1.11)
0.99 (0.96, 1.03)
1.12 (1.00, 1.27)
1.08 (0.96, 1.21)
1.10 (0.97, 1.24)
0.80 (0.70, 0.92)⁎⁎ 0.75 (0.66, 0.85)⁎⁎⁎
1.09 (0.91, 1.31)
1.02 (0.86, 1.21)
1.04 (0.94, 1.16)
0.89 (0.81, 0.99)⁎ 0.91 (0.83, 0.99)⁎
1.16 (0.83, 1.61)
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four years. The relationship between SLMT and mortality
remained when participants who died early in the study were
omitted and was similar for men and women. NART per-
formance was also significantly associated with mortality,
although the effect was mitigated by controlling for health
behaviors such as smoking status and activity level. Excluding
participants who died in the first four years of the study
diminished the effect of NART to non-significance. In addition,
the effect of NART was stronger for women than men.
A set of six models tested three major proposed mechan-
isms for the relationship between intelligence and mortality.
We tested for the effect of SES, as measured by education and
type of employment. The effect of health behavior was tested
using measures of smoking history and physical, mental and
social activity. We tested for the effect of health status using
measures of self-rated health, disease history, functional
disability, grip strength and mental health status. In response
to the findings of Deary and Der (2005), we controlled for
sensory processing ability using measures of choice reaction
time, visual impairment and hearing impairment. We also
controlled for dementia diagnosis in response to the theory
of Backman and MacDonald (2006) that the intelligence–
mortality relationship is due largely to dementia-related
deficits. The present study did not find strong support for any
of the three explanations. Moreover, evidence for a particular
explanation was contingent on the type of intelligence test
used. For SLMT, although there was slight attenuation of the
effect when controlling for SES, health behaviors or health
status, the effect of SLMT remained significant, providing
limited support for the three major mechanisms. The effect of
intelligence on mortality when measured by the NART was
also slightly attenuated by the effects of SES and health status.
However, after adjusting for smoking status and activity level,
the attenuation was sufficient that NART was no longer
significantly associated with mortality.
The divergence in findings suggests the mediation of the
relationship between intelligence and mortality by SES,
health behaviors and health status is marginally stronger for
fluid intelligence performance than for tests of crystallized
intelligence. Fluid intelligence tasks such as the SLMT may
reflect any initial and early adulthood effects of intelligence
on mortality, combined with the effects of physical health
decline and ageing processes not due to physical health. NART
performance, on the other hand, is likely to reflect initial
intelligence, education across the lifespan and consistent
implementation of health behaviors, but is less susceptible
to effects of independent or systemic disease and biological
ageing processes.
Choice reaction time was associated with mortality, how-
ever, there was no effect of reaction time when models also
included SLMT or NART score. Grip strength was associated
with mortality but accounted for little of the variance in the
intelligence–mortality relationship. Sensory impairments
were not associated with mortality. Manual occupation was
also not associated with mortality after controlling for intelli-
gence. This finding is not due to the collapsing of occupational
categories into a binary measure, as a six-category version of
the measure also had no association with mortality. Smoking
status was not associated with mortality, a finding divergent
from past research (Tessier et al., 2000) which may beexplained by the advanced age and low smoking prevalence
of this sample. In the final model, which includedmeasures of
SES, health behavior and health status, a one standard devia-
tion decrement in SLMT performance was associated with a
25% increase in mortality, while a one standard deviation
decrement in NART performance was associated with an 12%
increase in mortality
In this cohort, the intelligence–mortality relationship
appears to be based on more than lower-level processing
efficiency. There was a strong independent effect of SLMT
even after adjusting for the hypothesized mechanisms of the
relationship together with reaction time and sensory im-
pairment. In addition to mental speed, SLMT measures the
efficiency of visual search and memory for the symbols
presented in the task (Gilmore et al., 2006). Since reaction
time was controlled for, the aspects of SLMT that are asso-
ciated with mortality would appear to be a combination of
processing speed with memory and attention performance.
Further research into which constituents of the SLMT task
best predict mortality could adapt the frameworks used by
Gilmore et al. (2006) and Salthouse and Kersten (1993) to
modify the SLMT task into components that separately mea-
sure the processing speed, memory and attentional aspects of
the task.
While the present findings were often in accordance with
previous research, there were some important differences.
Previous research of the relationship between poor SLMT
performance and mortality risk was supported (Anstey et al.,
2001; Ghisletta et al., 2006; Pavlik et al., 2003; Portin et al.,
2001). Previous investigations have found little evidence for a
relationship between NART performance and mortality (Abas
et al., 2002; Anstey et al., 2001). While NART performance
was significantly associated with mortality risk in the present
study, the effect was tenuous after controlling for measures of
SES, health behavior and health status. However, contrary to
previous findings (Deary & Der, 2005), reaction time did not
explain the effect of either of the intelligence tasks. The
differences in findings may be attributable to the age of the
cohort in the present study. All of the participants were 70 or
older at baseline, averaging over 75 years of age, and were
followed until they were in their late-80s or beyond. Previous
research has shown that the effect of intelligence onmortality
is most pronounced in older age groups (Lyyra et al., 2006;
Shipley et al., 2006).
3.1. Limitations of the findings and directions for future research
The present study examined vital status over 17 years
using baseline measurements as predictors. However, intelli-
gence was assessed at the start of the study, when parti-
cipants were already advanced in age and potentially in poor
health. Participants whowere close to death at the time of the
baseline may have been in a state of terminal decline, leading
to an overestimation of the effect of poor cognitive perfor-
mance on mortality. While the follow-up analysis omitted
participants who died in the early stages of the study, the
baseline intelligence measurement may still have been in-
fluenced by sub-clinical health problems. Additional research
into temporal variations in the intelligence–mortality rela-
tionship would further delineate the influence of time-to-
death on cognitive performance, as would modeling cognitive
559P.J. Batterham et al. / Intelligence 37 (2009) 551–560performance as an outcome, using time-to-death as a pre-
dictor. Another problem for the survival models is that there
may have been cases where death occurred but was not
recorded. Despite a thorough search protocol, the extent of
missing death records could not be assessed in the present
study, so all cases were treated as living if there was no
evidence to the contrary. Having noted this, however, treating
potential decedents as survivors would result in a more
conservative estimate of the association between intelligence
and mortality.
The models that were tested were operationalized using
available measures from the baseline survey. Although it is
difficult to articulate the models sufficiently well to test then
more than in a general way, testing them is important, as it
forces a theoretical articulation and reveals the difficulties of
testing complex relationships among processes over long
periods. Nevertheless, some of the measures that were used
in this study could be further refined for the purposes of
future research. Only a self-reported measure of vision im-
pairment was included in the baseline interview, which may
not accurately reflect visual functioning. Sensory function,
particularly visual acuity, can influence performance on tasks
like SLMT (Gilmore et al., 2006). Self-report measures of
health status (disease history, functional ability) may also
have been inaccurate, although objective health measures
(grip strength, reaction time)were also included as predictors
in themodels. Additional measures of health behaviors would
also have strengthened the analysis — the baseline interview
did not include measures of alcohol and other substance use,
diet, healthcare utilization or medication adherence. Reflect-
ing the constraints of a large in-home epidemiological survey,
the tests available to measure intelligence assessed only
specific domains of cognitive performance. General intelli-
gence tests, such as the WAIS and AH4, cover a broader array
of abilities. However, simply examining the construct of
general intelligence is not sufficient in investigating what
aspects of intelligence are most strongly associated with
mortality. Further research on the intelligence–mortality re-
lationship should continue to examine a broad range of
cognitive abilities, including memory, attention, reasoning,
knowledge and executive function, in a variety of domains,
including episodic, verbal and visuospatial.
Finally, examining all-cause mortality is a starting point for
investigating the relationship between intelligence and mor-
tality. There is strong evidence for a relationship between
intelligence and cardiovascular mortality but less for the
relationship between intelligence and cancer mortality (Hart
et al., 2003; Shipley, Der, Taylor, & Deary, 2007). Examining
modifiable mediators of both mortality and cognitive perfor-
mance has the potential to guide future health interventions.
Continuing to research the associations between various
domains of cognitive performance and mortality will advance
our understanding into the nature of the intelligence–mortality
relationship.
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The Association Between Change in Cognitive Ability and Cause-Specific
Mortality in a Community Sample of Older Adults
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While there is consistent evidence that initial levels of cognitive ability predict mortality, there is mixed
evidence for a relationship between changes in cognition and mortality. There have been few studies that
have examined whether the level and slope of cognitive performance is predictive of subsequent
mortality from all causes or from cardiovascular disease, stroke, heart disease, respiratory disease, or
cancer. This study aimed to assess whether the level and slope of cognitive ability were associated with
all-cause or cause-specific mortality. A cohort of 896 community-based elderly people in Australia was
interviewed four times over 12 years, with vital status followed for up to 17 years. Of these, 592
participants completed two or more interviews and were included in survival models of six mortality
outcomes. Cognitive change in five domains of ability was estimated using latent growth models. Poorer
initial processing speed or verbal fluency was significantly associated with greater all-cause and/or
cardiovascular mortality. In addition, declines in global ability were associated with greater all-cause,
cardiovascular, and heart disease mortality. Vocabulary and episodic memory were not associated with
mortality, and none of the cognitive tests significantly predicted respiratory or cancer mortality. Initial
levels of cognitive ability tend to be better predictors of subsequent mortality than changes in ability are.
The results suggest that vascular events may be largely responsible for the overall relationship between
cognition and mortality.
Keywords: cause-specific mortality, all-cause mortality, cognition, cognitive change, latent growth
models, cardiovascular mortality
While prospective research has consistently shown that cogni-
tive ability predicts mortality, there is mixed evidence for a rela-
tionship between changes in cognition and mortality. Few studies
have definitively examined whether the level and slope of cogni-
tive performance is associated with all-cause mortality and
whether specific causes of mortality might explain the overall
relationship. Furthermore, the use of appropriate methodologies
for assessing change in cognition is critical for providing definitive
evidence about relationships between cognitive change and mor-
tality. The present study used latent growth models to obtain
estimates of level and slope of cognitive ability, with the aim of
assessing whether initial cognitive ability or changes in cognitive
performance were associated with mortality from all causes, car-
diovascular disease, cancer, respiratory disease, heart disease, or
stroke.
A review by Bosworth and Siegler (2002) reported that while
there was consistent evidence that initial levels of cognitive per-
formance were predictive of mortality, there was mixed evidence
for a relationship between cognitive change and mortality. De-
clines in crystallized abilities were more consistently associated
with increased mortality than declines in memory and fluid abili-
ties. Bosworth and Siegler (2002) attributed this differential effect
to the robustness of crystallized abilities to normal aging, suggest-
ing that changes in these abilities may reflect the types of biolog-
ical deterioration associated with mortality. Relationships between
cognitive change and mortality may be partly explained by com-
mon associations of both cognition and mortality with psychomo-
tor or sensory abilities, health behaviors, physical health, or ge-
netic factors (Bosworth and Siegler, 2002; Shipley, Der, Taylor,
and Deary, 2008). However, studies of the cognition-mortality
relationship often report little attenuation of the effect even after
adjusting for such factors (Batterham, Christensen, and Mackin-
non, 2009; Shipley et al., 2008). Bosworth and Siegler (2002)
concluded that further population-based longitudinal research on
the association between cognitive change and cause-specific mor-
tality was necessary to better characterize this relationship.
Latent growth models are a class of structural equation models
that represent individual level data in terms of an initial level of
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performance latent variable or factor (level), a rate of change factor
(slope), and error (residual) parameters (Hofer et al., 2002;
McArdle and Epstein, 1987). These structures are analogous to
random intercept and slope terms in mixed models. Importantly,
these models accommodate missing data, appropriately accommo-
date unequal numbers of individual observations, account for
dependencies among observations within individuals, and account
for individual differences in the rates of cognitive decline (Ba¨ck-
man and MacDonald, 2006). Recent developments in structural
equation modeling allow the incorporation of latent growth models
into a survival model (Asparouhov, Masyn, and Muthe´n, 2006).
One of the key problems in examining the effect of cognitive
change on mortality has been inconsistency in the way that cog-
nitive change is assessed. Previous research has measured cogni-
tive change by (a) comparing mean differences (Bosworth and
Schaie, 1999; Mortensen and Kleven, 1993), (b) categorizing
participants as decliners or nondecliners based on the size of score
changes (Anstey, Luszcz, Giles, and Andrews, 2001), (c) grouping
the sample by time to death and comparing change in cognitive
scores (Johansson and Berg, 1989), or (d) using linear regression
to obtain individual intercept and slope least squares estimates to
predict mortality (Deeg, Hofman, and van Zonneveld, 1990).
While latent growth models have been in use for some time,
very few studies have used these models to examine the relation-
ship between cognitive change and mortality. Johansson et al.
(2004) found that declines in crystallized knowledge and verbal
abilities were associated with increased risk of mortality. How-
ever, the latent growth model used by Johansson et al. (2004) did
not incorporate survival analysis; this warrants the extension of the
latent growth methodology in the present analysis. Ghisletta,
McArdle, and Lindenberger (2006) used a mixed model approach
that is analogous to a latent growth model and reported significant
associations of changes in both speed and fluency on survival.
While there were commonalities among the findings of these two
studies, the types of abilities that were predictive of mortality were
divergent. Fluid and speed-based cognitive tasks decline more
rapidly than crystallized intelligence as a consequence of norma-
tive aging (Horn, 1968), so declines in crystallized abilities may be
more strongly associated with biological deterioration that leads to
mortality, consistent with the findings of Johansson et al. (2004).
However, among cohorts that are cognitively intact (with dementia
excluded at baseline or controlled for) rates of normative aging, as
represented by declines in fluid abilities, may be a more dominant
characteristic in predicting mortality, consistent with the findings
of Ghisletta et al. (2006). Indeed, Ghisletta et al. (2006) concluded
that the relationship between cognitive decline and mortality was
not specific to any domain of functioning.
Nevertheless, these studies reported the common finding that the
initial level of cognitive performance was more strongly and
consistently associated with mortality than change in performance
was. Sliwinski et al. (2006) suggested that cognitive change may
only weakly predict mortality because the change does not accel-
erate continuously. Instead, normative cognitive change begins at
a gradual pace in the preterminal phase; then, when biological
constraints increase in proximity to death, cognitive decline in-
creases more rapidly in the terminal phase (Sliwinski et al., 2006).
Researchers have modeled the time course of terminal decline by
using change point models to distinguish two phases of decline
(Batterham, Mackinnon, and Christensen, in press; Sliwinski et al.,
2006; Thorvaldsson et al., 2008). However, this methodology does
not directly assess whether declines in cognition are associated
with increased risk of death. Since there have been so few studies
of cognition and mortality that have used a latent growth approach,
it is important to further explore this relationship directly.
An additional gap in the research on cognitive change and
mortality is the examination of cause-specific mortality. Small,
Fratiglioni, von Strauss, and Ba¨ckman (2003) separated cardiovas-
cular and noncardiovascular causes of death and found no differ-
ences in the strength of the cognition–mortality associations for the
two groups. However, Shipley, Der, Taylor, and Deary (2007) and
Shipley et al. (2008) reported that associations between cognition
and mortality were strongest for cardiovascular mortality, slightly
less consistent for respiratory mortality, and nonsignificant for
cancer mortality. These associations remained after adjusting for a
range of sociodemographic, health behavior, and health status
measures and after excluding participants who died in the first five
years of follow-up (Shipley et al., 2008). The difference in findings
may be due to the more specific types of mortality defined in the
Shipley et al. (2007, 2008) studies, in contrast to the Small et al.
(2003) study that combined cancer, respiratory causes, and other
causes of death due to small cell sizes. A review of studies
examining the relationship between cognition and mortality in
diseased populations found strong evidence for the association in
patients with stroke and cancer, although the relationship was less
clear for heart disease patients (Anstey, Mack, and von Sanden,
2006). Few of these studies, however, identified the cause of death.
Identification of the circumstances in which mortality is best
predicted by poor cognitive performance may lead to a better
understanding of this association. Likewise, identifying the causes
of death predicted by changes in cognitive abilities may further
pinpoint the mechanisms behind such associations. To date, there
has been no direct examination of the relationship between cog-
nitive change and multiple causes of death.
The present study aimed to assess the relationship between level
and slope of cognitive performance on cause-specific mortality in
a cohort of 896 community-based Australian participants aged 70
and older. They were assessed over a 12-year period with up to
four comprehensive interviews, and vital status information, in-
cluding cause of death, was collected for up to 17 years. Conse-
quently, it was possible to assess change in cognitive performance
using latent growth models to examine associations with cause-
specific mortality. Models were adjusted for measures of physical
and mental health to account for the roles of physical function
(Prince et al., 2010; Rosano et al., 2005; Wang, Larson, Bowen,
and van Belle, 2006), depression (Christensen, Griffiths, Mackin-
non, and Jacomb, 1997) and anxiety (Beaudreau and O’Hara,
2008) on late-life cognitive ability. Such adjustment provided a
stronger test of the hypothesized relationships between cognition
and mortality. Based on previous findings (Ghisletta et al., 2006;
Johansson et al., 2004), it was predicted that changes in cognitive
performance would be less strongly associated with mortality than
initial levels of performance would.
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that performance in all cog-
nitive domains other than vocabulary would be associated with
all-cause mortality. Similarly, changes in the five cognitive abili-
ties were hypothesized to have comparable associations with all-
cause mortality, such that declines in fluid ability were expected to
be equally as predictive of survival as declines in crystallized
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ability. These hypotheses were driven by evidence from the Ghis-
letta et al. (2006) study and others (Batterham et al., in press;
Thorvaldsson et al., 2008). This recent work appears to refute the
White and Cunningham (1988) hypothesis that declines in tasks
that are resistant to the effects of pathology are more strongly
predictive of impending death. In examining cause-specific mor-
tality, stronger relationships were hypothesized between cognitive
performance and cardiovascular mortality than cancer or respira-
tory mortality, as reported by Shipley et al. (2007, 2008). These
hypotheses were driven by the strong links reported between
cardiovascular disease and cognitive function (Laukka, Fratiglioni,
and Ba¨ckman, 2010; Spiro and Brady, 2008) and suggest that
vascular pathology may be a critical predictor of terminal decline.
Method
Participants
The Canberra Longitudinal Study is an epidemiological survey
of mental health and cognitive functioning in older people. The
study design has previously been detailed by Christensen et al.
(2004). Eight hundred and 96 participants (456 men and 440
women) aged 70–97 were recruited for the baseline assessment in
1990. All participants were initially living in the community in the
cities of Canberra or Queanbeyan, Australia. Participants were
sampled from the compulsory electoral roll, with 69% responding,
and the sample was stratified by age and gender. Approval for the
research was obtained from the Ethics in Human Experimentation
Committee of the Australian National University.
Of the original sample of 896 participants, 185 (20.6%) were
deceased by four years, 363 (40.5%) were deceased by eight
years, and 544 (60.7%) were deceased by 12 years. At the end
of vital status collection in June 2007, 687 (76.7%) of the
participants were deceased. Of the surviving participants at
each measurement occasion, 14.1% (100/711) refused or were
unable to complete the first follow-up interview, 21.1% (100/
474) for the second follow-up, and 21.1% (57/270) for the third
follow-up. Only participants who had one or more follow-up
interviews were included in the analyses so that measures of
cognitive change could be obtained. Nineteen participants were
excluded on the basis of missing baseline data, resulting in a
sample size of 592 for the analyses.
Survey Procedure
Participants were interviewed up to four times over 12 years by
trained professional interviewers. Baseline interviews lasted ap-
proximately two hours and included a survey that covered back-
ground characteristics, physical health and disease status, mental
health status, cognitive performance, and social support. Inter-
views also included physical assessments of blood pressure, lung
function, grip strength, vision, and reaction time.
Measures
A range of cognitive tests were administered at each interview.
Speed of processing was measured by the Symbol-Letters Modal-
ities Test (SLMT), a task similar to Smith’s (1973) Symbol-Digit
Modalities Test and Wechsler’s (1981) Digit-Symbol Substitution.
The number of correct symbol-letter pairs made in 90 seconds was
summed. Verbal ability was measured using the National Adult
Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982), a test of vocabulary. The
NART is a list of 50 words that are not phonetically pronounceable.
The number of correct pronunciations made was summed. An
episodic memory task consisted of four brief episodic memory
tasks testing word, face, name, and address recall, as well as figure
reproduction (Jorm, 1992). Verbal fluency was assessed as the
number of animals named in 30 seconds. Global function was
tested using the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein,
Folstein, and McHugh, 1975), scored out of 30. To facilitate
comparisons between tests, all of the tests were standardized to a
common metric across the full sample, with a mean of 100 and
standard deviation of 10 for the full sample at baseline.
Mortality status and date of death were established by contact-
ing relatives, searching the National Death Index (NDI), and
reading death notices in the local newspaper. The NDI is a register
of all deaths in Australia maintained by a government instrumen-
tality, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, and based on
data collected by the registrars of births, deaths, and marriages in
each state and territory in Australia. Consequently, failure to
identify deaths occurring in Australia would be an unusual occur-
rence. The additional methods used for death reporting (i.e., con-
tacting relatives, newspaper searches) provide further confidence
in the mortality status data. Mortality status was followed for up to
17 years, from the start of baseline interviews in September, 1990
until June 30, 2007. For six participants with unknown day of
death, the day was set to the 15th of the month. For two partici-
pants with an unknown month of death, the month was set to June.
Cause of death was based on the primary cause of death provided
by the NDI, which was identified using an ICD-9 or ICD-10 code,
depending on the date of death. The codes for underlying cause of
death were only available for deaths prior to 1996, so only the
underlying cause was used for the present analyses. The ICD codes
were categorized into five binary categories: cardiovascular, can-
cer (all malignant neoplasms), respiratory, ischemic heart disease,
and stroke (cerebrovascular). No cause of death was provided for
30 deceased participants (7.3%), with these participants counted as
having other causes of death.
In addition to the cognitive measures, a number of baseline risk
factors for cognitive decline or mortality were also included in the
models. Age, gender and number of years of education were
included to account for background characteristics. Physical health
measures included smoking status (never, previous, or current),
Activities of Daily Living (ADL, a scale ranging from 0 to 22),
disease count (self-reported history from a list of 14 diseases), and
grip strength (measured in kilograms using a hand dynamometer).
The ADL scale assessed the presence or extent of physical dis-
ability (Christensen et al., 1994). Grip strength is a reliable and
objective indicator of physical functioning in late life (Frederiksen
et al., 2002) that is associated with both cognitive performance
(Christensen et al., 2000) and mortality (Batterham et al., 2009;
Sasaki, Kasagi, Yamada, and Fujita, 2007). Mental health was
controlled for, using the Goldberg Depression and Anxiety Scales
(Goldberg, Bridges, Duncan-Jones, and Grayson, 1988) to assess
the number of depression and anxiety symptoms experienced in
the two weeks prior to the interview.
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Analyses
The analyses were performed using latent growth models, which
incorporated Cox proportional hazards regression models into a
structural equation model to estimate the intercept and slope for
each cognitive measure (see Asparouhov et al., 2006, for further
details of the model specification). Separate models assessed six
mortality outcomes with each of the five cognitive tests, resulting
in 30 models. The mortality outcomes were all-cause mortality and
five categories of cause-specific mortality: cardiovascular, heart
disease (a subset of cardiovascular deaths), stroke (a subset of
cardiovascular deaths), cancer, and respiratory deaths. All partic-
ipants were included in each analysis, with participants who did
not die from the respective cause being treated as censored obser-
vations at the time of death, and surviving participants being
treated as censored observations at the end of the study period
(June 2007). Both the intercept and slope estimates for the cogni-
tive tests (estimated at the first stage) were included as predictors
in each model, along with the potential confounders. Mplus, ver-
sion 6, was used for the analyses.
Results
Sample characteristics for the 592 participants included in the
analyses are shown in Table 1. Participants included in the analysis
tended to be younger, more educated, less disabled, have fewer
diseases, have stronger grip strength, and have fewer depression
symptoms than those who were not included in the analysis. Many
of these differences may be attributable to the necessary exclusion
of participants who died before the second interview. Participants
included in the analysis also had higher initial cognitive perfor-
mance on all tasks, reflecting strong associations between cogni-
tive performance and impending death. There were no significant
differences in anxiety symptoms, gender, or smoking status. Cog-
nitive performance declined significantly across the trial period for
all of the tests. Accounting for both fixed and random effects of
time, the largest decline was in SLMT (0.27 SD per year, p 
.0001), followed by MMSE (0.26 SD/year, p  .0001), verbal
fluency (0.16 SD/year, p  .0001), episodic memory (0.10
SD/year, p  .0001) and NART (0.06 SD/year, p  .0001).
At the end of the follow-up period, 410 (69.3%) of the 592
participants had died from all causes. Of these 410 decedents, 192
(46.8%) died from cardiovascular causes, including 105 (25.6%)
from coronary heart disease and 41 (10.0%) from stroke. A further
64 (15.6%) died from cancer and 43 (10.5%) died from respiratory
disease. The remaining 111 (27.1%) decedents were categorized
for the present analyses as having died from other causes, includ-
ing 12 (2.9%) with dementia listed as the underlying cause of death
and 30 (7.3%) without a listed code. The identified causes of death
were comparable to Australian prevalence estimates for causes of
death in the 85 age group in 2006: 49.4% of women and 42.4%
of men (vs. 46.8% of total in the present study) died from cardio-
vascular causes, 12.3% of women and 20.6% of men (vs. 15.6%)
died from cancer, and 8.5% of women and 11.6% (vs. 10.5%) of
men died from respiratory disease (Australian Institute of Health
and Welfare, 2010). Among deceased participants included in the
analyses, the mean time to death from baseline was 9.6 years
(SD  3.5).
The latent growth models predicting survival time are shown in
Table 2. The models were estimated for each of the five cognitive
tests (SLMT, NART, MMSE, verbal fluency and episodic memory)
across six types of mortality (all-cause, cardiovascular, cancer,
respiratory, heart disease, and stroke). Each model included the
level and slope estimates for the particular cognitive test, along
with the effects of age, gender, years of education, smoking status,
functional disability, disease count, depression and anxiety symp-
toms, and grip strength. An alpha value of p  .01 was used to
account for the six comparisons made for each cognitive test.
Overall, stronger relationships were found for the level of initial
performance than for change in performance. Poorer SLMT per-
formance was associated with higher all-cause, cardiovascular and
heart disease mortality rates, with each unit of decrement in initial
performance being associated with a 5.4–5.7% increase in the
Table 1
Baseline Descriptive Statistics for Participants Included in and Excluded From the Analyses
Included in analyses (n  592);
mean (SD) or freq (%)
Excluded from analyses (n  304);
mean (SD) or freq (%) t or 2 p
Age 76.2 (4.6) 77.3 (5.4) 3.13 0.002
Years of education 11.5 (2.6) 11.0 (2.4) 2.88 0.004
Functional disability score 1.5 (1.9) 2.6 (3.4) 4.98 0.001
Disease count 2.7 (1.6) 3.0 (1.8) 2.09 0.038
Grip strength, kg 25.2 (9.8) 23.5 (9.0) 2.65 0.008
Goldberg Depression score 1.9 (1.8) 2.4 (2.1) 3.66 0.001
Goldberg Anxiety score 2.4 (2.2) 2.6 (2.4) 1.29 0.198
Gender  male (%) 292 (49.3%) 164 (53.9%) 1.72 0.190
Ever smoked (%) 261 (44.1%) 122 (40.1%) 1.28 0.257
Current smoker (%) 65 (11.0%) 38 (12.5%) 0.46 0.499
Died during follow-up period (%) 410 (69.3%) 277 (91.1%) 53.67 0.001
Cognitive outcomes
SLMT score 99.3 (14.9) 89.7 (18.8) 7.47 .0001
NART score 113.3 (9.0) 108.4 (10.3) 6.70 .0001
MMSE score 27.8 (2.0) 26.2 (3.7) 7.17 .0001
Verbal fluency score 11.3 (3.3) 9.7 (3.4) 6.73 .0001
Episodic memory score 13.6 (1.9) 12.7 (3.0) 4.96 .0001
Note. freq  frequency; SLMT  Symbol-Letters Modalities Test; NART  National Adult Reading Test; MMSE  Mini-Mental State Examination.
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hazard of death from each cause. Poorer performance on the verbal
fluency task was not associated with overall mortality; however, it
was associated with higher rates of cardiovascular mortality (5.8%
increased hazard per unit decrement in verbal fluency) and stroke
mortality (11.1% times the hazard per unit decrement). Greater
declines in MMSE performance over the follow-up period were
associated with significantly higher all-cause, cardiovascular, and
heart mortality (7.4%, 10.1%, and 11.7% increase in hazard ratio,
respectively, per unit decrease in MMSE slope). There were also
indications that a poorer level of performance on the MMSE was
associated with higher rates of all-cause, cardiovascular, and
stroke mortality, although these trends were not significant at p 
.01. Likewise, level of SLMT performance had similar hazard
ratios across causes of death although the effects were not signif-
icant for cancer, respiratory, or stroke mortality. None of the other
cognitive tasks were associated with cancer or respiratory mortal-
ity, either in terms of initial performance or changes in perfor-
mance. Neither NART nor episodic memory performance was
associated with mortality.
Discussion
The present study aimed to assess the relationship between level
and slope of cognitive performance on cause-specific mortality in
the Canberra Longitudinal Study. Using latent growth models,
initial levels of cognitive performance were found to be better
predictors of subsequent mortality than the rate of change in
performance. Processing speed (SLMT) and global cognition
(MMSE) were the strongest indicators for mortality, with poorer
performance having associations with increased mortality from all
causes and from cardiovascular disease. Declining performance on
MMSE was associated with greater rates of all-cause, cardiovas-
cular, and heart disease mortality. Furthermore, poorer perfor-
mance on the verbal fluency task was associated with a greater
hazard of cardiovascular and stroke death. As none of the cognitive
tests significantly predicted cancer or respiratory deaths, it appears
that the relationship between cognition and all-cause mortality
may be largely due to late-life changes in the cardiovascular
system that are associated with both cognitive performance and
death.
These results concur with the findings of Shipley et al. (2008),
who found that the relationship between cognitive performance
and mortality was primarily evident for cardiovascular causes of
death. As in the Shipley et al. (2008) study, the present study
excluded participants who died early in the study and adjusted for
potential confounding from background characteristics, health be-
haviors, and physical and mental health status. Many cognition-
mortality effects remained strong after these adjustments. The
findings were somewhat different from the conclusions of the
review by Anstey et al. (2006), who reported stronger associations
between cognition and mortality among cancer and stroke patients
than heart disease patients. However, most of the papers in An-
stey’s review examined all-cause mortality in these patient groups
rather than cause-specific mortality. Disparate causes of death in
cancer and heart disease patients, along with the largely clinical
nature of the samples reviewed by Anstey et al. (2006), may be
responsible for the different findings. The present community-
dwelling sample may have included a broader array of trajectories
of decline in physical and cognitive functioning.
The finding that a range of cognitive abilities were associated
with mortality was consistent with the conclusions of Ghisletta et
al. (2006), who reported that the effect of cognition on mortality
was not specific to any domain of functioning although tasks
robust to aging effects such as vocabulary had no association with
mortality. Speeded tasks such as SLMT tend to decline as a
response to both normative and pathological aging processes, so
the SLMT was expected to show stronger relationships with mor-
tality outcomes. Nevertheless, measures of verbal fluency and
global cognition also showed strong associations with cardiovas-
cular deaths in particular, despite being somewhat more robust to
the effects of aging. These findings are at odds with the White and
Cunningham (1988) hypothesis that terminal decline is limited to
abilities that are robust to aging. Our results suggest that both
normative and pathological aging processes may contribute to the
relationship between cognition and mortality.
Ba¨ckman and MacDonald (2006) have suggested that because
verbal fluency tasks have aspects that reflect both fluid and crys-
tallized intelligence, it may be an important predictor of terminal
decline. They observe, “verbal fluency may be particularly good
Table 2
Latent Growth Model Estimates of the Effects of Level and Slope of Cognitive Performance on All-cause and Cause-specific Mortality
Test Measure All-cause, HR (p) Cardiovascular, HR (p) Cancer, HR (p) Respiratory, HR (p) Heart disease, HR (p) Stroke, HR (p)
SLMT Level 0.949 (<0.001) 0.949 (<0.001) 0.946 (0.030) 0.940 (0.048) 0.946 (0.008) 0.946 (0.091)
Slope 1.028 (0.752) 0.992 (0.929) 1.231 (0.386) 0.998 (0.995) 1.140 (0.323) 0.744 (0.086)
NART Level 0.985 (0.052) 0.985 (0.149) 0.974 (0.138) 1.024 (0.239) 0.999 (0.944) 0.983 (0.494)
Slope 1.091 (0.493) 1.201 (0.248) 1.025 (0.925) 1.284 (0.478) 1.119 (0.605) 1.146 (0.770)
MMSE Level 0.970 (0.011) 0.966 (0.014) 0.964 (0.140) 1.016 (0.645) 0.968 (0.062) 0.924 (0.014)
Slope 0.931 (0.007) 0.908 (0.001) 1.055 (0.430) 0.969 (0.547) 0.895 (0.002) 0.953 (0.463)
Fluency Level 0.973 (0.014) 0.945 (<0.001) 0.997 (0.899) 1.023 (0.478) 0.960 (0.040) 0.900 (0.004)
Slope 0.907 (0.170) 0.868 (0.061) 0.926 (0.633) 0.915 (0.567) 0.871 (0.178) 0.766 (0.298)
Episodic Level 0.975 (0.365) 0.965 (0.181) 0.957 (0.320) 1.008 (0.811) 0.951 (0.177) 0.993 (0.919)
Slope 0.870 (0.429) 0.832 (0.121) 1.090 (0.760) 0.960 (0.828) 0.760 (0.092) 0.751 (0.527)
Note. SLMT  Symbol-Letters Modalities Test; NART  National Adult Reading Test; MMSE  Mini-Mental State Examination; Fluency  verbal
fluency task; Episodic  episodic memory task; HR  hazard ratio. Level and slope estimates were included simultaneously in each model. Separate
models were estimated for each cognitive test and each cause of death. All models are adjusted for the effects of age, gender, education, smoking status,
functional disability, disease count, grip strength, Goldberg depression score and Goldberg anxiety score. Bold cells indicate p  .01.
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for demonstrating terminal decline, because the task is simple
enough for survivors but sufficiently taxing for decedents” (Ba¨ck-
man and MacDonald, 2006, p. 225). It is plausible that this
combination of fluid and crystallized abilities may also explain the
SLMT effects, as the SLMT uses a novel task (transcription of
symbols) to assess processing speed. The MMSE effects are likely
associated with dementia and the psychometric properties of the
instrument. MMSE scores generally remain fairly stable and at a
ceiling in the absence of pathology (Small and Ba¨ckman, 2007).
As the present sample was largely cognitively intact at the begin-
ning of the study, most changes in the MMSE would have occurred
in the follow-up stages as the prevalence of dementia increased.
This may explain why there was less effect for the level of MMSE
than there was for the slope of MMSE, likely reflecting patholog-
ical events that were associated with death in a subset of the
sample. Heart disease deaths were predicted only by changes in
MMSE, whereas stroke deaths were predicted only by level, pos-
sibly because of the more acute effects of stroke on cognitive
performance. Correspondingly, combined cardiovascular deaths
(which include both stroke and heart disease deaths) and all-cause
mortality were predicted by both level and slope of MMSE. In
contrast to the MMSE, vocabulary as measured by the NART is
robust to the effects of both normative aging and preclinical
dementia (McGurn et al., 2004). The lack of association between
episodic memory and mortality may be related to the validity of
the very brief measure used in the present study, as indicated by
the relatively modest declines seen in the episodic memory task
across the study period.
As the effects across all tasks were primarily associated with
cardiovascular deaths, the findings suggest that a range of cogni-
tive deficits in late life may be indicative of cardiovascular prob-
lems, including vascular events in the brain. Such vascular events
may also occur in late life or be precipitated by early- or midlife
disease or injury (Fischer et al., 2006; Herrup, 2010). Furthermore,
given the high comorbidity between dementia and cardiovascular
diseases (Rastas et al., 2010; Skoog, 1998), it is not surprising that
cognitive performance is predictive of cardiovascular mortality,
particularly changes in MMSE that may indicate dementia. As a
range of vascular events are associated with dementia, including
hypertension, coronary heart disease, atrial fibrillation, and stroke
(Skoog, 1998), it is likely that cardiovascular morbidity leads to
reduced cognitive ability and eventual mortality.
The present study expanded the investigation of the cognition–
mortality relationship using estimates of cognitive change that
incorporate all available data under the missing-at-random as-
sumption, rather than analyzing only complete cases. However,
using a measure of change resulted in limited evidence for terminal
decline: There were few significant relationships between the
slope of change and the mortality outcomes, with the exception of
global cognition. The present findings are similar to those of
Johansson et al. (2004) and Ghisletta et al. (2006), who also
reported stronger effects for level rather than slope of cognitive
performance. This finding may reflect the level of cognitive ability
indicative of a lifetime of development through education, health
literacy and healthy behaviors (e.g., medication compliance, help
seeking), along with insult through unhealthy behaviors (particu-
larly substance use), injury, vascular problems, and other physical
health problems (Ba¨ckman and MacDonald, 2006; Deary, 2005).
Other genetic and environmental influences through the life span
may also influence the level of performance (Ba¨ckman and Mac-
Donald, 2006). These lifelong influences on the level of perfor-
mance may be greater contributors to mortality than developmen-
tal cognitive processes that occur in proximity to death, which are
reflected in the change estimates. It appears to be only when
pathological events occur, as reflected by declines in the MMSE,
that changes in cognition may be directly predictive of mortality.
The paucity of effects for slope estimates may also be related to the
reliability of these estimates, which were assessed across up to four
time points. Although these few time points may result in less
reliable estimates of slope, thus reducing the power to find effects,
the large sample size may have somewhat mitigated this issue.
Ghisletta et al. (2006) reported similar findings using up to 11
measurements, and none of the slope effects (other those reported
for MMSE) came close to being significant, so it is unlikely that
the null effects of slope were purely the result of the estimation
process.
Although latent growth models produce defensible estimates of
cognitive change, linear estimates of cognitive change may not
adequately capture the terminal decline phenomenon. Cognitive
decline in proximity to death may be described instead as a
threshold function using a change point model, as it does not
accelerate continuously (Sliwinski et al., 2006). A previous anal-
ysis of the present cohort using a change point model did find
evidence for terminal decline, starting around 6 to 8 years prior to
death for different cognitive measures, with a two- to fourfold
acceleration of decline in the terminal phase (Batterham et al., in
press). Estimating the onset and rate of cognitive decline with
respect to time-to-death assesses whether those in proximity to
death show greater cognitive decline, which is a different research
question from that of the present analysis, which assessed whether
those who exhibit cognitive decline are at greater risk of dying
(Ba¨ckman and MacDonald, 2006). Nevertheless, it is instructive to
identify the differences in findings between these approaches.
Specifically, it appears that while there may be a significant
acceleration of cognitive decline in proximity to death, the overall
rate of decline is generally not a critical predictor of mortality.
There were some limitations of the research that could not be
fully addressed in the present study. Only linear changes in cog-
nition over time were investigated. Thus, further research could
investigate modeling cognitive change using nonlinear functions.
A maximum of four measurements taken over 12 years were
available for estimating change, as more measurements were not
feasible given the large community-based elderly cohort. A sub-
stantial proportion of participants were assessed on fewer occa-
sions. Such a pattern was sufficient only for estimating individual
linear change using the present methods. The analyses also ex-
cluded participants who died or withdrew from the study after the
first interview. This exclusion may have created a degree of bias;
however, it also resulted in a more homogeneous sample, as the
participants closest to death at the first interview were sicker, on
average. Inclusion of these participants would have skewed initial
cognitive test scores. Consequently the effects presented reflect
conservative estimates that may be more reflective of the effects of
normative aging than of pathology. Indeed, Shipley et al. (2008)
recommended examining models that omit individuals who die
early in the study period, as any outcomes may otherwise be
confounded by the disproportionate contribution of sick partici-
pants who were close to death at the first assessment. This rela-
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tionship is reflected by the significantly lower cognitive scores
among participants who were excluded from the analysis due to
death or dropout before the second interview (see Table 1).
The cognitive measures used in the present analysis were se-
lected prior to the beginning of the study in 1990 with the aim of
briefly assessing a range of abilities. Studies using more compre-
hensive measures of episodic memory in particular, along with
other domains of functioning, may find different outcomes. The
relatively small declines observed in episodic memory (0.10
SD/year) may be due to the performance of the scale. The assess-
ment of a range of causes of death also may have limited the power
to find effects. Only 11% of the sample died from respiratory
disease and 10% from stroke. Despite these limited subsamples,
verbal fluency was found to be significantly associated with stroke
mortality, and there were strong trends suggesting a relationship
between global cognition and stroke death. Further analysis of
other cohorts may provide additional insight into these causes of
death. In particular, the nonsignificant hazard ratios for processing
speed in relation cancer, respiratory and stroke mortality were of a
similar magnitude to those that were significant. Further research
should examine whether processing speed has a small, indepen-
dently predictive effect on death from each of the causes exam-
ined. Finally, mortality and attrition across the study period inev-
itably reduced the sample by the fourth wave; however, its size
was large for this type of community study, and most participants
(62%) contributed three or more measures to the estimates of
cognitive change.
In conclusion, poorer cognitive performance in several domains
predicted higher rates of all-cause mortality and cardiovascular
mortality, including heart disease and/or stroke mortality. These
findings suggest the cognition-mortality relationship may be pri-
marily driven by lifelong cardiovascular events which effectively
overshadow subtler effects reflected by change in memory and
cognition. Global ability was the only domain to show a relation-
ship between declines in performance and increased all-cause and
cardiovascular mortality. Other methods that do not rely on esti-
mating linear trends may be more effective for capturing the
terminal decline phenomenon. Nevertheless, the joint latent
growth-survival model presented here is a principled and useful
method for obtaining consistent estimates of linear change, and
this is the first study using this method to predict cause-specific
mortality. While results such as those presented may not be suf-
ficiently consistent to facilitate the prediction of cause-of-death,
the methods used provide greater insight into the relationship
between late-life cognitive performance and mortality.
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The Effect of Education on the Onset and Rate of Terminal Decline
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Differences in the time of onset and magnitude of terminal decline were examined in three cognitive
domains: processing speed, episodic memory, and global function. In addition, cognitive reserve was
investigated by testing whether education affected the onset or rate of decline across these domains. Eight
hundred ninety-six community-dwelling Australian adults aged  70 years were assessed up to four
times over 12 years, with vital status followed for 17 years. For each of the cognitive measures, a series
of change point models were fitted across the 20 years before death to find the optimal point at which
terminal decline was distinguished from preterminal decline. Change points were then assessed sepa-
rately for high- and low-education groups. The change points were 8.5 years for processing speed (95%
CI: 6.0–11.2 years), 7.1 years for global function (6.2–9.3), and 6.6 years for episodic memory (5.3–7.1).
The rate of decline was two to four times greater in the terminal phase relative to the preterminal phase,
depending on the domain. Increased education changed the terminal decline effect differently for each of
the three tests, either by significantly hastening the onset of terminal decline and decreasing the rate of
decline, or by increasing the rate of either preterminal or terminal decline. Analyses were repeated
excluding participants diagnosed with dementia, with no substantive change to the outcomes. In
conclusion, the rate and onset of terminal decline varied somewhat across cognitive domains. Education
affected terminal decline differently across the domains, but this modification was not consistent with the
predictions of cognitive reserve theory.
Keywords: terminal decline, change point models, cognitive reserve, education
The terminal decline phenomenon was first described by Kl-
eemeier (1962), and it was later characterized by Riegel and Riegel
(1972) as a process in which cognitive functioning deteriorates in
proximity to death. It is generally agreed that terminal decline is
related to pathological processes occurring before death, which
may be distinguished from normal, age-related decline (Laukka,
MacDonald, & Backman, 2008; Sliwinski et al., 2006; Small and
Backman, 1999; Wilson, Beck, Bienias, & Bennett, 2007). This
distinction also reflects the concepts of primary aging (matura-
tional processes) and secondary aging (disease processes) (Birren
and Cunningham, 1985; Busse, 1969). However, a review of
studies examining the relationship between changes in cognitive
function and death reported limited evidence for terminal decline
(Bosworth and Siegler, 2002). These studies generally estimated
cognitive change scores to predict survival. An alternative ap-
proach has been used more recently to examine the nature of
terminal decline. The aim of this method is to partition the effects
of normative aging and terminal decline using change point mod-
els, resulting in estimate of both the onset and magnitude of
terminal decline. This method was proposed by Hall, Lipton,
Sliwinski, & Stewart (2000) for the purpose of identifying the
onset of cognitive decline prior to the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s
Disease. Wilson, Beckett, Bienias, Evans, & Bennett (2003), Sli-
winski et al. (2006), Wilson et al. (2007), and Thorvaldsson et al.
(2008) have used the method to distinguish terminal (pathological)
cognitive decline from preterminal (normative, age-related) cog-
nitive decline.
The estimates from the four studies that have used the change
point method are summarized in Table 1. Change points were
identified at 3.5 years for the two studies by Wilson and col-
leagues, while the other studies generally identified a change point
between five and nine years before death. The magnitude of the
ratio between terminal and preterminal decline was generally in
the range of two to five, although there were exceptions to this
finding which may be attributable to near-zero rates of preterminal
decline. Overall, although there is some agreement in these studies
about the timing and magnitude of terminal decline, there is also
variation which warrants explanation. Sliwinski et al. (2006) sug-
gested that the slightly different method used by Wilson et al.
(2003), which included participants who survived the study period
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in the estimates, led to a possible underestimate of the terminal
decline effect. Furthermore, study design, particularly the length of
follow-up, and sample composition may have an impact on the
estimation of the change point (Thorvaldsson et al., 2008).
Perhaps of greater importance, terminal decline appears to com-
mence at different times for different abilities. In healthy older
adults who age normatively, certain cognitive domains such as
perceptual speed and explicit memory have been found consis-
tently to decline earlier and more precipitously than other domains,
such as verbal ability (Carlson, Xue, Zhou, & Fried, 2009; Royall,
Palmer, Chiodo, & Polk, 2005). Ba¨ckman, Jones, Berger, Laukka,
& Small (2005) have reported greater preclinical decline among
participants who progressed to Alzheimer’s Disease than those
who did not on global cognitive ability, perceptual speed, execu-
tive functioning, and episodic memory (d  1.0), while verbal
ability, visuospatial skill, and attention showed more modest levels
of decline. In studies of age-related cognitive decline, Linden-
berger and Ghisletta (2009) reported greater decline in perceptual
speed than in episodic memory, while Scuteri, Palmieri, Lo Noce,
& Giampaoli (2005) reported that decline in perceptual speed
occurs earlier and more precipitously than decline in global func-
tioning. In examining terminal decline, Sliwinski et al. (2006)
studied only an episodic memory task, while the studies of Wilson
et al. (2003 and 2007) used a battery of 19 cognitive tests that were
combined into a single measure. In contrast, Thorvaldsson et al.
(2008) examined verbal ability, spatial ability, and perceptual
speed separately, finding differences in both the onset and mag-
nitude of terminal decline for different cognitive domains. While
Wilson et al. (2003 and 2007) only presented models for a com-
posite cognitive score, many of the constituent tests they examined
were reported to have change points around three to four years,
although visuospatial ability had an earlier change point at six
years. Like Thorvaldsson et al. (2008), Wilson et al. (2003) found
that the magnitude of terminal decline also varied across cognitive
domains, with the slope increased anywhere from threefold to
11-fold in the terminal period compared to the preterminal period.
It may be concluded that the processes involved in terminal
decline – much like those in normative aging – affect different
cognitive domains to varying extents, both in terms of the magni-
tude and time of onset of the decline. Ba¨ckman et al. (2005)
attributed differential decline across cognitive domains to func-
tional impairment and structural changes in multiple brain struc-
tures, including volume reductions in the medial-temporal lobe,
anterior cingulate and temporal sulcus, posterior cingulate and
neocortical temporoparietal regions, and frontal regions, along
with decreased blood flow, reduced glucose metabolism, and am-
yloid deposits in other regions. Other factors including cardiovas-
cular disease, inflammation, lifestyle, and age-related neurobiolog-
ical changes may also have specific impacts on late-life cognitive
performance (Deary et al., 2009). Changes to structure and func-
tion in specific brain regions before death, whether attributable to
dementia or other disease processes, may have differential impacts
on both the onset and magnitude of decline across various cogni-
tive domains. Consequently, examining a range of cognitive do-
mains is necessary to fully capture the nature of the terminal
decline phenomenon (Small and Backman, 1999).
More recently, the change point method has been used to de-
termine whether particular risk factors such as poor education or
the presence of the apolipoprotein E (APOE) ε4 allele modify the
onset and magnitude of terminal decline (Wilson et al., 2007).
Education, childhood cognition, and adult occupation are believed
to protect against faster rates of cognitive decline in normal pop-
ulations (Richards and Sacker, 2003), and it may have specific
effects on rate or onset of terminal decline. Research suggests that
the clinical onset of Alzheimer’s disease appears to be delayed in
those with higher education, but the rate of cognitive decline after
onset is more rapid among more highly educated individuals
(Stern, Albert, Tang, & Tsai, 1999). Such findings are cited as
evidence for cognitive reserve, suggesting that education increases
the brain’s ability to compensate for pathology (Stern, 2002). The
cognitive reserve hypothesis suggests that higher levels of educa-
tion create a buffer against functional decline in the face of brain
insult (Christensen, Anstey, Leach, & Mackinnon, 2008). Educa-
tion may be associated with a greater number of healthy synapses
or neurons, more efficient circuits of synaptic connectivity, or
more efficient use of alternative brain networks (Scarmeas, Albert,
Manly, & Stern, 2006). Evidence for education being an indicator
of reserve comes from functional magnetic resonance imaging
studies of high-functioning older adults, which demonstrate func-
tional compensation for declines in neural activity (Cabeza and
Nyberg, 2000).
Change point models can test whether education protects against
terminal decline by delaying the onset of terminal decline even if
the subsequent rate of decline is accelerated. Wilson et al. (2007)
examined whether education, age, sex, vascular disease, APOE
genotype, or mild cognitive impairment modified terminal decline.
They found that the rate of decline did not accelerate during the
terminal phase for individuals without an APOE ε4 allele or with
a history of vascular disease but found no effect of education on
the rate of decline. However, these effects were examined using
Table 1
Previous Estimates of Terminal Decline From Four Studies Using the Change Point Method
Study n
Follow-up
period (years) Cognitive domain(s)
Change point
(95% CI)†
Magnitude of
decline‡
Wilson et al. (2003) 763 8 Global cognitive functioning 3.5 5.0
Sliwinski et al. (2006) 445 25 Episodic memory 8.4 (7.1, 9.8) 1.8
Wilson et al. (2007) 853 8 Global cognitive functioning 3.5 3.0
Thorvaldsson et al. (2008) 288 15 Verbal ability 6.6 (4.3, 11.7) 13.0
Spatial ability 7.8 (6.3, 10.6) 1.9
Perceptual speed 14.8 (10.8, 16.6) 2.0
† Years before death. ‡ Ratio of terminal to preterminal decline.
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only a global cognition aggregate score (Wilson et al., 2007),
without examining whether cognitive reserve may influence spe-
cific domains of cognitive decline. Hall et al. (2007) also examined
the role of education in memory decline before dementia diagno-
sis. They found that increased education delayed the onset of
dementia-related cognitive decline but the decline was more pre-
cipitous after onset (Hall et al., 2007), in support of the cognitive
reserve theory. However, the study did not examine decline with
respect to death and also examined only a single measure of
cognition.
The present study examined terminal and preterminal decline in
three domains as a function of education using the method pro-
posed by Hall et al. (2000). We explored decline by examining a
series of models that incremented a change point over 20 years.
The definition of the preterminal and terminal phases is dependent
on whether the measurement occurs before or after the change
point, as illustrated in Figure 1. When a measurement occasion is
before the change point (e.g., “Measurement 1” in Figure 1), the
length of the preterminal phase at that measurement is defined as
the individual’s current age, while the length of the terminal phase
is zero. When a measurement occasion is after the change point
(e.g., “Measurement 2” in Figure 1), the length of the preterminal
phase at that measurement is defined as the individual’s age at
death minus the change point, while the length of the terminal
phase is the individual’s current age minus their age at death plus
the change point.
The models included both fixed and random effects (slopes) of
preterminal and terminal decline, in addition to a random intercept.
The change point that optimally differentiated between preterminal
and terminal slopes was determined by varying the change point to
identify the model with the largest likelihood function. A 95%
confidence interval for the identified change point was based on
the difference in 2 log likelihood from the optimal change point,
which has a 2 distribution (Sliwinski et al., 2006). The rates of
preterminal and terminal decline were then assessed using the
model at the optimal change point. Taking this approach further,
the present study examined the effect of education on terminal
decline for each of the cognitive tasks by dividing the cohort based
on educational attainment and repeating the analysis.
The Canberra Longitudinal Study (Christensen et al., 2004)
included seven cognitive domains that were assessed for terminal
decline in the present study: episodic memory, processing speed,
global function, verbal and facial recognition, verbal fluency, and
verbal ability. The three domains found to clearly exhibit terminal
decline in the present study were episodic memory, processing
speed, and global function. Based on the findings of (Thorvaldsson
et al., 2008), it was hypothesized that there would be differences in
both the onset and rate of terminal decline across domains. We
predicted that the onset of terminal decline would be earlier for
processing speed than for other tasks, as reported by Thorvaldsson
et al. (2008), while research on age-related and pathological cog-
nitive decline suggests that the rate of decline for all three domains
may be similar (Ba¨ckman et al., 2005). Based on the predictions of
cognitive reserve theory (Stern, 2002), where higher reserve may
initially slow the rate of decline, and previous findings with respect
to the onset of dementia (Hall et al., 2007; Stern et al., 1999),
where education initially protects but then precipitates decline
after diagnosis, we hypothesized that higher education may shorten
the length of terminal decline but accelerate the rate of decline in
the terminal period. Furthermore, these differences might be more
likely to be observed on tests sensitive to terminal decline such as
processing speed. These observations were undertaken with and
without those with dementia diagnosis to determine the effect of a
dementia diagnosis and to exclude the effect of dementia for the
rest of the population sample.
Method
Participants
The Canberra Longitudinal Study is an epidemiological survey
of mental health and cognitive functioning in older people that
commenced in 1990. The study design has previously been de-
tailed by Christensen et al. (2004). Eight hundred ninety-six par-
ticipants (456 men and 440 women) aged 70 or older at the time of
the baseline assessment were recruited for the baseline assessment.
All participants were initially living in the community in the cities
of Canberra or Queanbeyan, Australia. The sample was stratified
by age and gender. Participants were sampled from the compulsory
electoral roll, with 69% responding. Approval for the research was
obtained from the Ethics in Human Experimentation Committee of
the Australian National University.
Survey Procedure
Participants were interviewed up to four times over 12 years.
Baseline interviews lasted approximately two hours, incorporating
a survey measuring a wide range of risk factors including socio-
demographics, physical health and disease status, mental health
status, cognitive performance, and social support. Interviews also
included physical assessments of blood pressure, lung function,
grip strength, vision, and reaction time. Trained professional in-
terviewers conducted the interviews.
Of the original sample of 896 participants, 185 (20.6%) were
deceased by four years, 363 (40.5%) were deceased by eight years,
and 544 (60.7%) were deceased by 12 years. At the end of vital
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Figure 1. Preterminal and terminal phases of cognitive decline, illustrat-
ing their dependence on the time of measurement.
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status collection in June 2007, 687 (76.7%) of the participants
were deceased. Of the participants who remained in the study,
14.1% (100/711) refused or were unable to complete the first
follow-up interview, 21.1% (100/474) for the second follow-up,
and 21.1% (57/270) for the third follow-up. Participants surviving
at the end of the follow-up period (n  209) were excluded from
the analyses.
Measures
Several tests were administered to assess the cognitive perfor-
mance of study participants. Speed of processing was measured by
the Symbol-Letters Modalities Test (SLMT), a task similar to
Smith’s (1973) Symbol-Digit Modalities Test and Wechsler’s
(1981) Digit-Symbol Substitution. Verbal ability was measured
using the National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1982), a test of
vocabulary. An episodic memory task consisted of brief episodic
memory tasks testing word, face, name and address recall, and
figure reproduction (Jorm, 1992). Verbal fluency was assessed as
the number of animals named in 30 seconds. Face and word
recognition tasks were based on the Rivermead Behavioural Mem-
ory Test (Wilson, Cockburn, Baddeley, & Hiorns, 1989). Global
function was tested using the Mini-Mental State Examination
(Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), scored out of 30. To facil-
itate comparisons between tests, all of the tests were standardized
to a common metric, with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of
10 at the baseline measurement.
Mortality status and date of death were established by contact-
ing relatives, searching the National Death Index, and from death
notices in the local newspaper. Missing death identifications from
the National Death Index would most likely have been a rare
occurrence, as the index is a register of all deaths in Australia. The
additional methods used for death reporting (contacting relatives,
newspaper searches) provide further confidence in the mortality
status data. Mortality status was followed for up to 17 years, from
the start of baseline interviews in September 1990 until June 30,
2007. For six participants with unknown day of death, the day was
set to the 15th of the month. For two participants with an unknown
month of death, the month was set to June. Date of birth (age) was
reported during the initial interview. Educational status was based
on responses to two questions regarding the number of years in
school and the highest qualification obtained. These two questions
were combined into a single measure representing the number of
years it took participants to attain their highest educational quali-
fication. For the analyses based on educational status, a median
split was used to differentiate those with fewer than 11 years of
education (low education) from those with 11 or more years (high
education), which also corresponds to the number of years taken to
complete standard secondary education for this cohort. Additional
analyses controlled for a number of baseline risk factors for
cognitive decline or mortality: gender, heart attack history (self-
report binary measure), hypertension history (self-report binary
measure), grip strength (measured in kilograms using a hand
dynamometer), smoking status (never, previous, or current), Ac-
tivities of Daily Living (a scale of functional disability ranging
from 0 to 24), disease count (self-reported history from a list of 14
diseases), and depression [Goldberg Depression Scale (Goldberg,
Bridges, Duncan-Jones, & Grayson, 1988), range 0–9].
To examine the effect of dementia and to determine any poten-
tial confounding arising from it, analyses were repeated with and
without participants with this disorder. Participants who met cri-
teria for an ICD-10 (World Health Organization, 1993) diagnosis
of dementia or severe dementia during the study (at waves 1–4, up
to 12 years after baseline) were identified. Diagnoses were made
using the Canberra Interview for the Elderly (Social Psychiatry
Research Unit, 1992), which provides information from which a
diagnosis of dementia can be made according to ICD-10 (World
Health Organization, 1993) and DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric
Association, 1987) by means of a computer algorithm (Mackinnon
et al., 2003). The algorithm classifies participants into categories
of non-case, possible dementia, probable dementia, or actual de-
mentia. The “actual dementia” category was chosen for the selec-
tion of participants to exclude, as it is the most robust.
Analyses
Mixed model repeated measures analyses of variance (MMRM)
were used to estimate the change point and magnitude of terminal
decline, following the method described by Hall et al. (2000). This
process segments the participant’s age (in months) at each mea-
surement point using a change point, . The segmentation of age is
shown in the equation (adapted from Sliwinski et al., 2006) below:
cognitionit  0  1 [min (Ageit, DeathAgei – )]  2 [max
(0, Ageit – DeathAgei  )]  εit
where cognitionit represents a cognitive score for participant i at
time t (each cognitive test was modeled separately), 0 is the
intercept, 1 is the coefficient being estimated for the rate of
cognitive decline during the preterminal interval, Ageit is the age of
participant i age at time t (in months), DeathAgei is the age at death
of participant i (in months),  is the change point being evaluated
within a range of 1–20 years (in months), 2 is the coefficient
being estimated for the rate of cognitive decline during the termi-
nal interval, and εit is the error term. Age at study commencement
was centered at 75 (i.e., 75 years were subtracted) to facilitate the
interpretation of intercepts.
The model was repeatedly evaluated using values for the change
point, , incremented from 12 to 120 months before death in steps
of one month. The model with the largest log-likelihood value was
selected, with the  for this model representing the change point at
which terminal decline begins, with the estimates of 1 and 2 at
this value of  representing the rates of preterminal and terminal
decline respectively. Both fixed and random effects for 1 and 2
were included in the model, and maximum likelihood estimation
was used in accordance with the method used by Hall et al. (2000).
An unstructured variance-covariance matrix was used, and degrees
of freedom were calculated using Satterthwaite’s approximation
(Steel and Torrie, 1980). Mixed models use all available measure-
ment points for each participant under the assumption that missing
data are missing at random. Analyses were repeated excluding
participants who had received a dementia diagnosis and also
repeated with the inclusion of multiple risk factors for mortality as
independent fixed effects. SAS v9.1 was used for all statistical
analyses.
Results
Participants who were deceased at June 2007 were included in
the change point analyses (n  687). Of these 687 decedents, 423
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completed the second interview (176 deaths and 88 dropouts), 215
completed the third (183 new deaths, 57 new dropouts, including
31 former dropouts who died and one who returned to the study),
and 81 completed the fourth (176 new deaths and 28 new dropouts,
including 69 former dropouts who died and one who returned to
the study). In all, 81 (11.8%) participants contributed data from all
four time points, 135 (19.7%) from three, 208 (30.3%) from two,
and 263 (38.3%) from only the baseline measurement. There was
no significant difference between the rates of contribution between
those with lower education ( 11 years, n  376) and those with
higher education [ 11 years, n  520; 2 (3)  6.1, p  0.11].
Of the 1406 total observations from the 687 participants, 297
(21.1%) occurred 10 or more years before death, while 791
(56.3%) occurred five or more years before death.
The contribution of observations to the change point models
across the span of the study is shown in Table 2, categorized by the
number of years before death the observations were made, sepa-
rately for the two education groups. Approximately 35% of the
observations fell in the 5–10 years before death where terminal
decline is most commonly found to begin, while 44% were 0–5
years before death and the remaining 21% were more than 10 years
before death. There was no significant difference in the distribu-
tions of observations across the two education groups [2 (16) 
7.3, p  0.96]. The mean age of participants used in the change
point analyses (n  687) was 77.3 years (SD  5.1), with a mean
educational attainment of 11.4 years (SD  2.6). Those who had
died by June 2007 were older at the start of the study than those
who survived. However, there was no significant difference be-
tween decedents and survivors in the amount of education com-
pleted. Performance on all seven cognitive tests was significantly
better for survivors compared to decedents.
To determine whether change point models were justified, de-
cline in each of the tasks was examined using base models testing
linear and quadratic terms for age and, separately, time-to-death.
These models found little decline on several of the tests, possibly
because the participants tended to be relatively well educated, were
community dwelling (non-institutionalized), and had relatively
low rates of dementia. Furthermore, some of the tests were in-
cluded in the study for their robustness to the effects of cognitive
aging. Consequently, change points could not be reliably estimated
for NART, verbal fluency, face recognition, or word recognition.
Three domains of cognitive function were therefore used as out-
comes in the analyses: speed of processing (SLMT), episodic
memory, and global function (MMSE).
To identify the optimal change point and compare change points
across domains, 2 log likelihood values from the 229 models
(12–240 months) were standardized to create “profile likelihood”
values, fitting a range between 0–1. This was calculated by sub-
tracting the 2LL value at each time point from the minimum
2LL value (i.e., the 2LL value at the change point), then
dividing by 2 and taking the exponent (Hall et al., 2000). This was
done separately for each of the three domains investigated. Profile
likelihood values are plotted for the three domains in Figure 2,
with time ranging from 1–15 years before death on the x axis
(death is time zero). The 95% confidence interval for change point
estimate is also indicated, with the cut-off values for this interval
being at approximately 0.15 for the transformed profile likelihood
values on each of the tests. The optimal change point for process-
ing speed was 8.5 years (95% CI: 6.0–11.2 years), the MMSE
change point was 7.1 years (6.2–9.3), while the episodic memory
change point was 6.6 years, (5.3–7.1). Overlap is evident between
the confidence intervals for all three cognitive tests, suggesting
that change points for these tests are not significantly different.
The models showing the effects of preterminal and terminal
decline at the change points are displayed in Table 3. Absolute
rates of decline can be compared across tests, as they were stan-
dardized to mean of 100 and SD of 10 at baseline. The parameter
estimates given in the table represent monthly changes in these
standardized units. Likelihood ratio 2 tests for the null model are
provided in the table, showing the models fit well. The covariance
estimates for the random effects are also provided in the table. In
some cases, the random effect of preterminal decline was close to
zero, as indicated in the table. In these cases, models were reesti-
mated without this random effect (not displayed). The coefficients
for intercept, preterminal, and terminal decline remained virtually
unchanged when these random effects were excluded.
Rates of decline were comparable for processing speed and
global function, decreasing by 0.05 SD per year in the preterminal
phase and around 0.1 SD per year in the terminal phase. There was
slightly less decline in episodic memory: 0.02 SD per year preter-
minal and 0.07 SD per year terminal. However, the magnitude of
terminal decline relative to preterminal decline was greater for
episodic memory, with a 3.7-fold acceleration in decline over the
terminal period, compared to 2.3-fold and 2.8-fold accelerations
for processing speed and global function, respectively. The change
point models were also compared to single slope models of decline
by comparing 2 log likelihood between nested models. The
change point models fit significantly better than single-phase mod-
els [processing speed: 2 (1) 176.4, p 0.0001; global function:
2 (1)  219.6, p  0.0001; episodic memory: 2 (1)  85.3, p 
0.0001].
The analyses were repeated separately for two subgroups cate-
gorized by years of education (11 years or 11 years) to exam-
ine the effect of cognitive reserve. Based on profile likelihood
Table 2
Contribution of Observations to the Mixed Effects Models as a
Function of Time to Death and Education
Time to death
Low education group
(n  376,553 obs)
High education group
(n  520,853 obs)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
0 to  1 year 40 7.2% 68 8.0%
1 to  2 years 50 9.0% 82 9.6%
2 to  3 years 53 9.6% 82 9.6%
3 to  4 years 49 8.9% 80 9.4%
4 to  5 years 42 7.6% 69 8.1%
5 to  6 years 50 9.0% 74 8.7%
6 to  7 years 39 7.1% 65 7.6%
7 to  8 years 36 6.5% 51 6.0%
8 to  9 years 45 8.1% 53 6.2%
9 to  10 years 35 6.3% 46 5.4%
10 to  11 years 24 4.3% 44 5.2%
11 to  11 years 24 4.3% 42 4.9%
12 to  13 years 27 4.9% 36 4.2%
13 to  14 years 15 2.7% 18 2.1%
14 to  15 years 7 1.3% 20 2.3%
15 to  16 years 12 2.2% 18 2.1%
16 to 17 years 5 0.9% 5 0.6%
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plots, the change points and 95% confidence intervals were as-
sessed for each of the cognitive domains, with these estimates
shown in Table 4. The upper limit of the confidence interval for
processing speed could not be assessed, as the profile likelihood
did not asymptote to zero within the follow-up period after reach-
ing the maximum. Regardless, the difference in the change points
for the high- and low-education groups was not significant for
processing speed. The change point for global function was sig-
nificantly later in the low education group than the high education
group, while education did not significantly alter the change point
for episodic memory.
Table 5 shows the parameter estimates and p values for MMRM
models at the change points identified in Table 4. The models
include the likelihood ratio 2 tests, indicating good fit, along with
the fixed effects and random effects. Once again, models where
random effects were close to zero were reestimated without this
effect, with little change to the estimates of the fixed effects. To
illustrate the models fitted, predicted cognitive scores for members
of the high-education group and the low-education group were
plotted for age at baseline of 77.3 years and age at death of 85.3
years (corresponding to the mean values for the sample). These
plots are shown in Figure 3. Steeper terminal decline in processing
speed was evident in the high-education group (0.12 SD per year)
than the low-education group (0.08 SD per year), while pretermi-
nal processing speed decline (0.04 SD per year) was similar in both
groups (Figure 3A). A contrary pattern was seen in global func-
tion, where the rates of both preterminal (0.07 vs. 0.03 SD per
year) and terminal decline (0.27 vs. 0.10 SD per year) were greater
in the low-education group than the high-education group (Figure
3B). A third pattern emerged in the episodic memory measure,
where those with higher education had a greater rate of preterminal
decline (0.02 vs. 0.01 SD per year) but similar rate of terminal
decline (0.08 SD per year for both) compared to those in the
low-education group (Figure 3C).
All analyses were repeated excluding 41 participants with a
dementia diagnosis (n  646). Based on the confidence intervals,
the exclusion did not significantly alter the change point estimates
for processing speed (7.3 years when excluding participants with
dementia versus 8.5 years when including participants with de-
mentia), global function (6.4 years versus 7.1 years), or episodic
memory (6.6 years in both analyses). There was little change in the
rates of preterminal decline (less than 0.004 SD per year difference
on all tasks) and terminal decline (less than 0.024 SD per year)
after excluding participants with dementia. For example, the larg-
est change was in the estimate of terminal decline for MMSE,
which changed from 0.106 to 0.089. The exclusion of partic-
ipants with dementia also had little impact on the findings regard-
ing the effect of education. The estimated change points varied by
fewer than six months in each case. Likewise, the estimates of
preterminal and terminal decline were changed little, in each case
by less than 0.002 SD per year. For example, the largest change
was in the terminal decline estimate for global function among the
low-education group, which changed from0.086 to0.068 after
controlling for covariates.
The models for high- and low-education groups were also
reestimated with the inclusion of other independent risk factors for
cognitive decline or mortality: gender, heart attack and hyperten-
sion history, grip strength, smoking status, functional ability, dis-
ease count, and depression as covariates. Although many of these
variables were significantly associated with cognitive perfor-
mance, their inclusion in the models had very little impact on the
estimated change points, which varied by fewer than 13 months in
most cases. However, for episodic memory among the high-
education group, the change point was shifted from 79 to 27
months because of problems estimating the variance matrix for
these models. Because of this estimation problem, models of
episodic memory for the high-education group were assessed at the
original change point. For all of the cognitive tests, the estimates
of preterminal and terminal decline were changed little by the
inclusion of covariates, in each case by less than 0.002 SD per
year. For example, the largest change was in the terminal decline
estimate for episodic memory among the low-education group,
Figure 2. Profile likelihood plots for processing speed (SLMT), global function (MMSE), and episodic
memory, with confidence limit indicated by dashed line.
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which changed from 0.069 to 0.054 after controlling for co-
variates.
Discussion
In a community sample of 896 adults over the age of 70,
terminal decline effects were found in tasks tapping processing
speed, global function, and episodic memory. The onset of termi-
nal decline was found to be around 81⁄2 years for processing speed,
7 years for global function, and 61⁄2 years for episodic memory.
Although there was less overall decline in episodic memory than in
the other domains, the rate of decline in the terminal phase was
increased almost fourfold compared to the preterminal phase on
the episodic memory task. The ratio was 2.3 for processing speed
and 2.8 for global function, suggesting that episodic memory drops
later but more precipitously than these domains. While the onset of
terminal decline for processing speed was not significantly later
than for other domains as hypothesized, the change points for
processing speed and episodic memory were similar to previous
studies, particularly those of Thorvaldsson et al. (2008) and Sli-
winski et al. (2006). The identified change points were earlier than
those reported by Wilson et al. (2003 and 2007), possibly because
of the inclusion of survivors and shorter follow-up period in those
studies. The rates of terminal decline were in a similar range to
previous studies, while the finding of variability in both the onset
and rate of terminal decline across cognitive domains (Thor-
valdsson et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2003) was also replicated.
Education changed the terminal decline effect for all three of the
cognitive domains, but in different ways. The onset of decline in
global function was delayed significantly for those with lower
levels of education, however the rate of decline was greater in the
terminal phase for the low-education group. For the processing
speed and episodic memory tasks, education did not significantly
modify the onset of terminal decline. Rather, for processing speed,
Table 3
Parameter Estimates From Mixed Effects Models of Cognitive Function Based on Preterminal and Terminal Decline Segmented at
Optimal Change Points
Cognitive domain Effect Estimate SE df t/Z† p
Random effect covariance estimates
Processing speed (SLMT) (change point 8.5 yr)
2(5)  389.5, p  0.0001
Intercept 102.78 0.422 442 243.4 0.0001
Preterminal decline 0.038 0.005 896 7.9 0.0001
Terminal decline 0.086 0.006 304 13.7 0.0001
0, 0 59.246 6.272 9.45 0.0001
1, 0 0.001 0.045 0.02 0.9826
1, 1 0.000‡ — — —
2, 0 0.037 0.071 0.53 0.5991
2, 1 0.000 0.001 0.33 0.7421
2, 2 0.002 0.001 1.49 0.0682
Residual 27.727 2.142 12.94 0.0001
Global function (MMSE) (change point 7.1 yr)
2(6)  260.4, p  0.0001
Intercept 102.33 0.376 322 272.0 0.0001
Preterminal decline 0.038 0.005 360 7.2 0.0001
Terminal decline 0.106 0.010 437 10.3 0.0001
0, 0 29.082 5.604 5.19 0.0001
1, 0 0.151 0.050 3.00 0.0027
1, 1 0.001 0.001 0.85 0.1975
2, 0 0.023 0.122 0.19 0.8513
2, 1 0.004 0.001 2.81 0.0049
2, 2 0.026 0.004 6.25 0.0001
Residual 39.366 3.430 11.48 0.0001
Episodic memory (change point 6.6 yr)
2(5)  79.4, p  0.0001
Intercept 101.49 0.394 341 257.4 0.0001
Preterminal decline 0.016 0.005 774 3.5 0.0005
Terminal decline 0.060 0.011 402 5.3 0.0001
0, 0 21.205 5.989 3.54 0.0002
1, 0 0.051 0.042 1.20 0.2301
1, 1 0.000‡ — — —
2, 0 0.306 0.153 2.00 0.0451
2, 1 0.001 0.002 0.47 0.6405
2, 2 0.028 0.006 4.47 0.0001
Residual 58.153 4.781 12.16 0.0001
† Tests of fixed effect parameters are t tests, tests of random parameter variation are Z tests. ‡ Parameter on boundary of zero, unable to be tested.
Table 4
Estimated Change Points (in Years, With 95% Confidence
Intervals) for Segmenting Preterminal and Terminal Decline
Based on Cognitive Function, Estimated Separately for Each
Education Group
Low education
(11 yr) (n  376)
High education
(11 yr) (n  520)
Processing speed (SLMT) 11.3 (4.8, 17) 7.8 (6.8, 9.3)
Global function (MMSE) 2.6 (2.1, 3.8) 8.6 (7.7, 10.1)
Episodic memory 5.5 (2.8, 8.3) 6.6 (5.5, 6.9)
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the rate of decline in the terminal phase was greater for those with
higher education. For episodic memory, the rate of decline in the
preterminal phase was not significantly different from zero for
those with a lower level of education but higher in those with more
education. The finding that education modifies terminal decline
and that the nature of the modification varies across cognitive
domains has not previously been reported. Wilson et al. (2007)
found no modification by education on terminal decline. Their null
finding may have resulted from using only a cognitive composite
score, which could have obscured any domain-specific effects such
as those identified here. The findings are also contrary to those of
Hall et al. (2007), who reported that memory decline before
dementia diagnosis occurred later but more precipitously in par-
ticipants with higher education levels.
Together, these findings suggest that terminal decline does not
occur uniformly across different cognitive domains. Because the
physiological basis of these forms of cognitive functioning are
different, this may reflect the differential impact of particular brain
or systemic disease, although the situation is likely to vary as a
function of disease and individual vulnerability. For example,
there is a dissociation between explicit and implicit memory per-
formance in those with Alzheimer’s Disease because of the dif-
ferential affects of the disease on specific structures such as the
mesial temporal lobe (Golby et al., 2005). The findings also
suggest that terminal decline may reflect a diversity of physiolog-
ical processes occurring in the years before death, including pre-
clinical dementia (Laukka, MacDonald, & Backman, 2008), or
other forms of cerebral deterioration, including stroke and cardio-
vascular disease (Hassing et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 2007). Such
processes may affect cognitive function in different ways, such
that the onset of decline may be accelerated for some tasks while
the rate of decline may be increased for others.
Analyses excluding participants with a dementia diagnosis did
not substantively change the outcomes. Laukka, MacDonald, &
Backman. (2008) proposed that terminal decline effects are largely
a result of preclinical dementia, although they found selective
terminal decline effects after controlling for this condition. The
present study controlled only for actual dementia cases and found
Table 5
Mixed-Effects Models of Cognitive Function Based on Preterminal and Terminal Decline at the Change Point, Estimated Separately
for Each Education Group
Cognitive domain Effect
Low education High education
Estimate SE df Statistic† p Estimate SE df Statistic† p
Random effect covariance estimates
Processing speed (SLMT) Model fit (LR test) 6 120.52 0.0001 5 238.51 0.0001
Intercept 99.75 0.739 140 134.99 0.0001 105.32 0.486 218 216.83 0.0001
Preterminal decline 0.034 0.008 90 4.12 0.0001 0.034 0.005 254 6.34 0.0001
Terminal decline 0.068 0.009 112 7.63 0.0001 0.103 0.008 180 12.75 0.0001
0, 0 53.492 11.700 4.57 0.0001 47.765 7.643 6.25 0.0001
1, 0 0.050 0.096 0.52 0.6003 0.081 0.058 1.38 0.1661
1, 1 0.001 0.002 0.35 0.3621 0.000‡ — — —
2, 0 0.054 0.109 0.49 0.6222 0.136 0.086 1.58 0.1144
2, 1 0.002 0.002 1.19 0.2338 0.001 0.001 0.74 0.4598
2, 2 0.001 0.002 0.7 0.2420 0.002 0.002 1.21 0.1139
Residual 31.651 4.039 7.84 0.0001 25.012 2.520 9.93 0.0001
Global function (MMSE) Model fit (LR test) 6 101.62 0.0001 5 180.86 0.0001
Intercept 99.56 0.745 162 133.71 0.0001 104.07 0.366 155 284.51 0.0001
Preterminal decline 0.055 0.009 129 6.01 0.0001 0.025 0.006 561 4.41 0.0001
Terminal decline 0.224 0.078 44.9 2.85 0.0065 0.086 0.010 279 8.89 0.0001
0, 0 63.871 13.025 4.9 0.0001 7.761 3.976 1.95 0.0255
1, 0 0.065 0.141 0.46 0.6450 0.133 0.035 3.74 0.0002
1, 1 0.005 0.002 2.13 0.0167 0.000‡ — — —
2, 0 4.265 1.301 3.28 0.0010 0.049 0.081 0.61 0.5430
2, 1 0.031 0.012 2.55 0.0107 0.003 0.001 2.54 0.0111
2, 2 0.394 0.147 2.69 0.0036 0.018 0.003 6.23 0.0001
Residual 47.938 6.684 7.17 0.0001 31.341 3.112 10.07 0.0001
Episodic memory Model fit (LR test) 5 29.02 0.0001 5 56.9 0.0001
Intercept 99.26 0.688 198 144.37 0.0001 102.76 0.443 156 231.93 0.0001
Preterminal decline 0.009 0.007 246 1.22 0.2220 0.020 0.006 546 3.59 0.0004
Terminal decline 0.069 0.025 171 2.81 0.0056 0.063 0.014 181 4.58 0.0001
0, 0 24.235 9.606 2.52 0.0058 17.458 7.483 2.33 0.0098
1, 0 0.048 0.049 0.99 0.3237 0.139 0.054 2.55 0.0106
1, 1 0.000‡ — — — 0.000‡ — — —
2, 0 0.468 0.313 1.5 0.1341 0.247 0.192 1.29 0.1986
2, 1 0.005 0.003 1.8 0.0719 0.001 0.002 0.58 0.5607
2, 2 0.040 0.015 2.73 0.0032 0.031 0.009 3.52 0.0002
Residual 78.693 8.560 9.19 0.0001 42.187 5.983 7.05 0.0001
† Tests for model fit are 2 tests, fixed effect parameters are t tests, tests of random parameter variation are Z tests. ‡ Parameter on boundary of zero, unable
to be tested.
346 BATTERHAM, CHRISTENSEN, AND MACKINNON
Figure 3. Predicted cognitive performance in the 15 years before death for prototypical participants with high
or low education: (A) processing speed, (B) global function, and (C) episodic memory.
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very little evidence that dementia may modify the onset and rate of
terminal decline. In conjunction with similar findings by Thor-
valdsson et al. (2008), it appears that the terminal decline effects
cannot be fully explained by dementia. Consequently, the findings
support a multifaceted model of terminal decline like the one
proposed by Ba¨ckman and MacDonald (2006), who suggest that
the phenomenon is influenced by both normative age-related de-
cline and pathological events (including dementia, cardiovascular
disease, and cancer), along with more distal factors such as health
literacy, childhood intelligence, genes, and environment.
The effect of education was contrary to what would be predicted
by cognitive reserve or compensation theories of cognitive aging
(Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009; Stern, 2002). While increased edu-
cation was associated with higher initial levels of performance, it
was also associated with more rapid declines in performance or
earlier onset of decline. This pattern of change is not consistent
with a straightforward interpretation of cognitive reserve theories,
which would suggest that education protects against cognitive
decline either by recruiting compensatory networks or through
more efficient use of existing networks (Park and Reuter-Lorenz,
2009). Other than improving initial performance, the only sugges-
tion of a protective effect of education was seen in the global
function task, where the rate of decline was lower in the group with
more education. However, there was also a hastening of terminal
decline on this task for those with high education, at odds with
findings suggesting that cognitive reserve may delay the onset but
accelerate declines that are related to pathological processes (Stern
et al., 1999).
These divergent findings may be related to either the diversity of
skills tested by the MMSE or its psychometric properties. The
MMSE includes psychomotor, attention, and recall tasks in addi-
tion to measures of orientation and registration. The earlier onset
of terminal decline in global function for those with higher edu-
cation may also reflect the imperfect psychometric properties of
the MMSE, specifically scaling artifacts, ceiling effects, and un-
reliability of change scores (Hensel, Angermeyer, & Riedel-Heller,
2007). Nevertheless, the results with respect to all three cognitive
domains may suggest that individuals who begin with better
cognitive performance simply have more potential for decline,
whereas those who initially perform poorly may not decline
considerably unless significant pathology develops. There was
no significant change in the onset of terminal decline in pro-
cessing speed or episodic memory, and education did not slow
the rate of decline in either of these domains. It could be the
case that some of the biological processes associated with
terminal decline are different from those associated with
dementia-related cognitive decline, in that terminal decline is
the response to a more diverse range of pathological events.
Cognitive reserve may only buffer against specific types of
brain pathology.
There are some issues in examining terminal decline that the
present analysis was not able to address directly. Firstly, the
present study only obtained four (or fewer) measurements, across
a period of 12 years. This may have been insufficient to detect
terminal decline for some of the cognitive tasks, particularly those
in which there was little decline over the follow-up period. The
four-year retest intervals may also have been insufficient to detect
accelerated terminal decline in some domains, particularly given
previous findings suggesting terminal decline may occur less than
four years before death (Wilson et al., 2003 and 2007). However,
the change point method estimated preterminal and terminal slopes
aggregated across all participants, rather than relying on individual
slope estimates. While this method of estimation may thus be
robust to a paucity of data, a degree of confounding by between-
person effects in the estimating the rates of decline might be
expected as a consequence. However, the potential for between-
person confounding was mitigated in the present study by exclud-
ing survivors (Sliwinski et al., 2006) and by the inclusion of
random effect terms for the preterminal and terminal periods in the
mixed models. Further research comparing alternative methods for
modeling terminal decline may determine the extent to which
between-person effects might influence change point estimates.
Terminal decline effects could not be reliably estimated in this
cohort for tasks of verbal ability, verbal fluency, face recognition,
and word recognition using the change point method. Our inability
to detect terminal decline on these measures may not reflect an
absence of terminal decline but rather a lack of power for this type
of model to detect small rates of decline in this type of sample,
particularly for measures which are more robust to age-related
decline. Future studies studying the terminal decline phenomenon
would benefit from a shorter interval between follow-up inter-
views and more follow-ups, although briefer retest periods or more
interviews may lead to other undesirable outcomes such as in-
creased attrition (Deeg, van Tilburg, Smit, & de Leeuw, 2002) or
larger retest effects (Salthouse, Schroeder, & Ferrer, 2004).
Secondly, the analyses did not include survivors. This was
because the model used was chosen to replicate that used in
previous research (Sliwinski et al., 2006; Thorvaldsson et al.,
2008). However, Sliwinski et al. (2006) noted that the inclusion of
survivors may lead to an underestimate of the terminal decline
effect. Thirdly, education was the only reliable baseline measure of
cognitive reserve able to be included in the present study. Other
factors that may impact reserve, such as brain atrophy and white
matter hyperintensities, may provide clearer insight into the ob-
served effects. APOE ε4 genotype, previously examined by Wil-
son et al. (2007), was only measured at the second wave of the
current study, resulting in an inadequate sample size for the type of
analysis used here. There were also too few cases of head injury
(McMillan and Teasdale, 2007) or cognitive disorders (Wilson et
al., 2007) in the present sample to examine these as separate
indicators. Furthermore, the number of years of education may not
be a good indicator of the quality of education, which may affect
how adequately the measure reflects cognitive reserve. Fourth, the
model estimated a single change point for the whole cohort (or for
each education subgroup), rather than estimating individual change
points. However, Hall, Ying, Kuo, & Lipton (2003) compared the
profile likelihood method used here to a Bayesian method that
estimated individual change points and concluded that individual
change points are not necessary to adequately model heterogeneity
across subjects. Finally, change point models are not the only
method that may be used to characterize terminal decline. Other
methods that could be considered for future research include
retrospective models that account for individual differences (Ger-
storf et al., 2008) and prospective models that link individual rates
of change to the hazard of mortality (Ghisletta, McArdle, &
Lindenberger, 2006).
The present study found that the onset and rate of terminal
decline may be different across cognitive domains and that edu-
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cation can modify the onset and rate of decline. The modification
of terminal decline by education is a new finding that has not
previously been investigated in specific cognitive domains. These
findings were not changed by excluding participants with dementia
or by controlling for other risk factors for cognitive decline and
mortality. As education was the only reliable baseline measure of
cognitive reserve included in the present study, further research is
warranted to investigate modification of terminal decline effects
by other measures of reserve, such as head injury, APOE genotype,
and brain characteristics, including atrophy and white matter hy-
perintensities. Additional research into the nature of terminal de-
cline and how this decline varies according the characteristics of
individuals and their exposures will continue to illuminate the
processes that lead to late-life cognitive decline.
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The article “Age differences in psychosocial predictors of positive and negative affect: A longitu-
dinal investigation of young, midlife, and older adults” by Tim D. Windsor and Kaarin J. Anstey
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Comparison of Age and Time-to-Death in the Dedifferentiation of
Late-Life Cognitive Abilities
Philip J. Batterham and Helen Christensen
Australian National University
Andrew J. Mackinnon
University of Melbourne
The dedifferentiation hypothesis proposes that specific cognitive abilities become more highly associated
with general ability in old age as a result of increasing biological constraints on fluid intelligence. There
is limited evidence for the hypothesis, and research has not tended to clearly distinguish age dediffer-
entiation from ability differentiation and other age-related phenomena. The present study examined age
dedifferentiation using a structural equation model that controlled for ability differentiation, along with
linear and quadratic effects of age. Time-to-death was examined as an alternative time metric to
chronological age, as it may better represent biological constraints. The Canberra Longitudinal Study
community-based cohort, consisting of 896 Australian adults aged 70 and over, provided data from 687
decedents who were followed for up to 17 years. Results indicated little support for the age dedifferen-
tiation hypothesis, with only two of seven cognitive tests showing significant age dedifferentiation. The
time-to-death metric showed more evidence of dedifferentiation, with four of the seven tests exhibiting
dedifferentiation. However, after excluding participants with possible cognitive impairment, all of the
dedifferentiation effects were attenuated to nonsignificance. Age dedifferentiation effects may therefore
reflect dementia and other mortality-related pathology rather than being an inevitable outcome of
advanced age. Alternative developmental theories for cognitive function must better account for the
diversity of late-life abilities and pathology.
Keywords: dedifferentiation hypothesis, time-to-death, mortality, dementia, intelligence, aging
The concept of a general factor of intelligence had its origins
more than one hundred years ago (Spearman, 1904). Subsequent
research suggested a range of specific factors of intelligence and
led to the development of the theory of fluid and crystallized
intelligence by Horn and Cattell (Cattell, 1941; Horn, 1968; Horn
& Cattell, 1966). The fluid-crystallized theory suggests that there
are two higher order factors of intelligence that form distinct
dimensions: fluid intelligence, general ability derived from basic
neural and sensory structures, and crystallized intelligence,
knowledge-based ability derived from experience, education, and
acculturation (Horn & Cattell, 1966). Cattell’s investment theory
(Cattell, 1971, 1987) extended the fluid-crystallized theory into a
developmental framework. According to the investment theory,
the fluid component of intelligence develops rapidly through child-
hood and adolescence, peaking in the early twenties, then decreas-
ing through adulthood, more rapidly in old age. The crystallized
component grows incrementally, driven by fluid ability, peaks in
mid-life, and declines very little and only in late old age (Cattell,
1987). However, there has been little evidence to support the
theory that fluid intelligence drives the development of crystallized
intelligence, with more recent longitudinal research reporting that
higher levels of fluid intelligence are not associated with subse-
quent increased growth in crystallized intelligence (Ferrer &
McArdle, 2004). Nevertheless, research examining performance
on fluid and crystallized tasks across the lifespan (Li et al., 2004;
McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & Woodcock, 2002; Tucker-
Drob, 2009) has replicated the patterns of development and decline
for fluid and crystallized ability reported by Cattell (1987). So
while the investment theory may not accurately explain the pro-
cesses behind the development of intelligence, the patterns of
development and decline reported by Cattell (1987) have been
supported.
Alternative explanations have been provided for individual dif-
ferences in developmental patterns of cognitive performance. The
observation that a general factor of intelligence accounts for a
greater amount of variability in children and the elderly compared
to adults (Balinsky, 1941; Garrett, 1946) led to the development of
the differentiation-dedifferentiation hypothesis (Baltes, Cornelius,
Spiro, Nesselroade, & Willis, 1980; Reinert, 1970), which suggests
that intellectual abilities are unspecialized in childhood, differen-
tiate during maturation, and become undifferentiated in late life (Li
et al., 2004). Contributions from the environment and noncognitive
influences, such as motivation and interest, are postulated to en-
gender differentiation (Tucker-Drob, 2009). Late-life dedifferenti-
ation is hypothesized to occur when, as a result of increasing
biological constraints on information processing mechanisms, de-
clines in fluid abilities limit subsequent development in crystal-
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lized abilities (Li et al., 2004). The cognitive processes involved
with fluid and crystallized abilities consequently become more
strongly coupled together (Li et al., 2004), such that general ability
accounts for a greater proportion of performance across domains.
These constraints on information processing have been linked to
decreased neurobiological efficiency (Li, Lindenberger, & Sik-
strom, 2001; Li & Sikstrom, 2002; Park et al., 2002). Changes in
neuromodulation and neuroanatomy result in decreasing differen-
tiation between the patterns of neuronal representations elicited by
different stimuli as people age (Li & Sikstrom, 2002). This neu-
rocomputational model of cognitive aging posits that deficits in
neuromodulation lead to increased neural noise, resulting in less
distinctive cortical representations in the aging brain and, finally,
to cognitive aging deficits, which manifest as decreases in perfor-
mance, increases in variability, and increased relationships among
cognitive abilities (Li et al., 2001). The relationship between
neuronal dedifferentiation and cognitive dedifferentiation is pur-
ported to be based on the need for some form of compensatory
neural recruitment in older adults (Park et al., 2002) as the cortical
representations become less distinctive. On a neuroanatomical
level, this compensation could come from contralateral recruitment
of a homologous brain area, from unique recruitment of nonho-
mologous sites, or from substitution of brain areas (Park et al.,
2002). In cognitive terms, abilities may be seen as hierarchical
(Vernon, 1971), with an overall general factor of ability that
comprises several broad ability factors, which can themselves be
further deconstructed into specific abilities. When neuronal com-
pensation is required in response to neuronal deficits, greater
reliance may be given to broader abilities, such as processing
speed, retrieval, and fluid and crystallized intelligence, rather than
to specific abilities. Recruitment of these higher order abilities to
perform lower order tasks leads to declines in performance, in-
creases in variability, and, in particular, dedifferentiation of cog-
nitive abilities.
There has, however, been mixed evidence for the late-life ded-
ifferentiation of cognitive abilities. Several studies have reported
late-life increases in the correlation between cognitive abilities
(Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997; Ghisletta & Lindenberger, 2003; Li
et al., 2004), while other studies have found no systematic rela-
tionship (Anstey, Hofer, & Luszcz, 2003; Juan-Espinosa et al.,
2002; Sims, Allaire, Gamaldo, Edwards, & Whitfield, 2009;
Tucker-Drob & Salthouse, 2008; Zelinski & Lewis, 2003). De
Frias, Lovden, Lindenberger, and Nilsson (2007) found evidence
for dynamic dedifferentiation beginning in old age, suggesting that
common sources increasingly account for the development of
abilities. Likewise, Ghisletta and colleagues (Ghisletta & de
Ribaupierre, 2005; Ghisletta & Lindenberger, 2003) found longi-
tudinal age-associated dedifferentiation, reporting that the dedif-
ferentiation was a consequence of the constraints of mechanic
ability, a notion similar to fluid intelligence.
Recently, Tucker-Drob (2009) used a statistical model able to
distinguish the effects of ability differentiation from age dediffer-
entiation, and found no support for age dedifferentiation in a
lifespan cohort. In examining the age dedifferentiation hypothesis,
it is important to rule out confounding by ability differentiation,
which is defined as differences in the correlations between cogni-
tive abilities at different ability levels, with stronger correlations
often observed among groups with lower ability levels (Deary et
al., 1996; Tucker-Drob, 2009). Specifically, unless ability differ-
entiation is accounted for, any age-based dedifferentiation effect
may simply reflect the poorer performance among older individ-
uals. Other sources of individual differences should also be
accounted for in examining the dedifferentiation hypothesis, to
exclude more parsimonious explanations for the phenomenon and
determining whether dedifferentiation is an independent phenom-
enon of aging. Nonnormative sources of heterogeneity, particu-
larly the influences of preclinical dementia (Sliwinski, Hofer, &
Hall, 2003), should be examined to determine whether dediffer-
entiation is an inevitable consequence of normative aging or sim-
ply a reflection of pathological decline.
To date, research on dedifferentiation has used chronological
age as the metric of time. However, ability differentiation may
vary widely across individuals of the same age, depending on their
lifetime accumulation of biological damage and resulting cognitive
health (Lovden, Bergman, Adolfsson, Lindenberger, & Nilsson,
2005; Sliwinski, Hofer, & Hall, 2003). To observe the effects of
dedifferentiation in a heterogeneous cohort, time-to-death may be
a better metric for age, as it is a strong indicator of declines in both
physical health and cognitive performance (Batterham, Chris-
tensen, & Mackinnon, 2009; Hassing et al., 2002; Small & Back-
man, 1999). For example, while two 80-year-olds may differ
markedly in their health and cognitive performance, less average
variation may be expected in two individuals that are one year
from death. Dedifferentiation occurring as a function of proximity
to death would provide evidence that dedifferentiation occurs in
response to late-life pathology, particularly if the amount of ded-
ifferentiation is greater than when modeling as a function of age.
If there was more evidence for dedifferentiation as a function of
age than time-to-death, it may be concluded that dedifferentiation
was not directly indicative of pathology.
The present study aimed to compare the two time metrics—
chronological age and time-to-death—in modeling the degree to
which dedifferentiation may be observed in late life. It was hy-
pothesized that time-to-death would be a more sensitive metric for
observing dedifferentiation than age. This hypothesis was tested
with the statistical model used by Tucker-Drob (2009) that can
account for nonlinear relationships between cognitive measures
and factors while controlling for any effects of ability differenti-
ation. It is important that nonlinear relationships can be accounted
for, as the predictions of the hypothesis are inherently nonlinear
across the life span. Tucker-Drob’s (2009) model simultaneously
estimates the effects of age dedifferentiation and ability differen-
tiation, in addition to age, age2, the general ability factor (G), and
the interaction between age dedifferentiation and ability differen-
tiation. Age dedifferentiation is operationalized as the interaction
between age and the general ability factor, that is, how the amount
of variability accounted for by the general factor changes as a
function of age. Ability dedifferentiation is defined in the model as
G2, which reflects how the amount of variability accounted for by
the general factor changes as a function of the level of performance
on that factor. As previous research has shown some evidence that
age may modify ability differentiation (Facon, 2006; Tucker-Drob,
2009), the interaction between age dedifferentiation and ability
differentiation was also included in the model. This is defined as
the interaction between age and G2, that is, how the amount of
variability explained by the general factor as a function of overall
performance changes in response to age.
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Reestimation of the model using time-to-death in place of age
enabled a comparison of the two time metrics. It was hypothesized
that a greater degree of dedifferentiation would be observed when
using time-to-death as the time metric rather than age. Such an
outcome would suggest that dedifferentiation is due to increasing
pathology in proximity to death rather than being due to age-
related developmental changes. Likewise, exclusion of participants
with possible cognitive impairment was hypothesized to attenuate
any observed dedifferentiation due to age or proximity to death.
Method
Sample
The Canberra Longitudinal Study is an epidemiological survey
of mental health and cognitive functioning in older people that
commenced in 1990. The study design has previously been de-
tailed by Christensen et al. (2004). Eight hundred and ninety-six
community-dwelling adults, aged 70–97, living in the cities of
Canberra and Queanbeyan, Australia, participated in the baseline
assessment. The sample was stratified by age and gender. Partic-
ipants were sampled from the compulsory electoral roll, with 69%
responding. For the present study, only participants who had died
at the end of the vital status collection period (June, 2007) were
included in the analysis (n  687, 76.7%), as time-to-death cannot
be assessed for survivors.
Procedure
Participants were interviewed up to four times over 12 years,
although only the baseline assessment was used in the present
analysis. Baseline interviews lasted approximately two hours, in-
corporating a survey with a wide range of measures, including
sociodemographics, physical health and disease status, mental
health status, and cognitive performance. Interviews also included
physical assessments of blood pressure, lung function, grip
strength, vision, and reaction time. Trained professional interview-
ers conducted the assessments. Approval for the research was
obtained from the Ethics in Human Experimentation Committee of
The Australian National University.
Measures
Tests assessing a variety of cognitive domains were adminis-
tered to assess the cognitive functioning of study participants.
Speed of processing was measured by the Symbol-Letters Modal-
ities Test (SLMT), a task similar to Smith’s (1973) Symbol-Digit
Modalities Test and Wechsler’s (1981) Digit-Symbol Substitution.
Verbal ability was measured using the National Adult Reading
Test, a test of vocabulary (Nelson, 1982). An episodic memory task
consisted of brief episodic memory tasks testing word, face, name,
and address recall and figure reproduction (Jorm, 1992). Verbal
fluency was assessed as the number of animals named in 30
seconds. Face and word recognition tasks were based on the
Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (Wilson, Cockburn, Badde-
ley, & Hiorns, 1989). Global function was tested using the Mini-
Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh,
1975), scored out of 30. For the factor analysis and to facilitate
comparisons across tests, all of the tests were standardized to a
common metric, with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 10
at the baseline measurement.
Mortality status and date of death were established by searching
the National Death Index, contacting relatives, and from death
notices in the local newspaper. The National Death Index is a
register of all deaths in Australia. The additional methods used for
death reporting were included to provide added confidence in the
mortality status data. Mortality status was followed for up to 17
years, from the start of baseline interviews in September 1990 until
June 30, 2007. For six participants with unknown day of death, the
day was set to the 15th of the month. For two participants with an
unknown month of death, the month was set to June. Date of birth
(age) was reported during the initial interview.
Analysis
The model detailed by Tucker-Drob (2009) was adopted for the
analyses. The model is a structural equation model that combines
a nonlinear factor analysis to estimate the general ability factor
with a regression that tests the effects of age dedifferentiation and
ability differentiation. The regression component uses each of the
cognitive tests as dependent variables, estimating the effects of
general ability (G, a latent variable based on the seven cognitive
test scores), age (or time-to-death; TTD), age2 (or TTD2), ability
differentiation, age/TTD dedifferentiation, and the interaction be-
tween ability differentiation and age/TTD dedifferentiation. The
age-based model may be written as
g xn   x  1x  agen  2x  agen2  1x
 Gn  2x  Gn2  3x  agen  Gn  4x
 agen  Gn2  uxn
where g [x] represents the matrix of n specific cognitive abilities
that were assessed; the n subscript indicates terms that vary;  [x]
represents the intercepts for each ability; 1[x] and 2[x] are the
coefficients for age and age2; G is general ability; 1[x] are the
loadings of each specific ability on G; 2[x] is the coefficient
representing ability differentiation (G2); 3[x] is the coefficient for
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for the Analysis Sample at Baseline
(n  687)
M or frequency SD or percent
Gender, Male 373 54.3%
Marital status
Married 366 53.3%
Widowed 261 38.0%
Age 77.30 5.09
Years of education 11.41 2.66
Processing speed (SLMT) 93.91 16.97
Vocabulary (NART) 111.32 10.08
Global cognition (MMSE) 27.07 2.98
Verbal fluency 10.52 3.43
Word recognition 0.94 0.09
Face recognition 0.78 0.11
Episodic memory task 13.16 2.48
Note. SLMT  Symbol-Letters Modalities Test; NART  National
Adult Reading Test; MMSE  Mini-Mental State Examination.
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age differentiation (G  age); 4[x] represents the degree to which
age modifies ability differentiation (G2  age); and u[x] is the
error term that represents the component of each broad ability not
accounted for by the other terms in the model (Tucker-Drob,
2009). The time-to-death model simply replaced age with TTD.
Age was centered by subtracting 70 years from chronological age
(range: 0–27.5 years), while time-to-death was measured in years
(range: 0–16.75 years), and both measures were converted to
decades to enable interpretation of small estimates of the squared
components. The model was estimated using seven cognitive tests
to examine a range of cognitive domains. A criterion for signifi-
cance of p  .01 was used for all analyses to adjust for the multiple
comparisons across the seven cognitive tests. Finally, to examine
whether dedifferentiation effects were attributable to dementia,
models were reestimated excluding participants with MMSE
scores  24, as this criterion is a conservative indicator for
cognitive impairment reflecting dementia (Folstein et al., 1975).
All analyses were conducted in Mplus version 6.
Results
Sample characteristics for the analysis sample (n  687) are
shown in Table 1. Compared to participants who were excluded on
the bases of survival or missing baseline data, the participants
included in the analysis were significantly older (t894  	8.58,
p  .0001), were more likely to be male [
2(1)  13.6, p  .0002],
and performed more poorly on all of the cognitive tasks, including
processing speed (t851  7.52, p  .0001), vocabulary (t833 
2.32, p  .0204), global cognition (t877  4.54, p  .0001), verbal
fluency (t881  3.75, p  .0002), word recognition (t865  3.79,
Table 2
Parameter Estimates (99% Confidence Intervals) From the Models of Performance on the Seven Cognitive Tasks Based on Age and
Time-To-Death (n  687)
Intercept Age/TTD Age2/TTD2
Age model
Processing speed 104.80 (102.29, 107.30) 1.017 (1.558, 0.476) 0.022 (	0.004, 0.048)
Vocabulary 101.11 (98.12, 104.10) 	0.432 (	1.035, 0.171) 0.020 (	0.008, 0.048)
Global cognition 103.80 (101.79, 105.81) 	0.093 (	0.539, 0.353) 	0.004 (	0.030, 0.022)
Verbal fluency 104.58 (102.54, 106.61) 	0.555 (	1.142, 0.032) 0.013 (	0.015, 0.041)
Word recognition 103.04 (100.30, 105.77) 	0.189 (	0.738, 0.360) 	0.011 (	0.042, 0.020)
Face recognition 102.35 (99.50, 105.20) 	0.198 (	0.801, 0.405) 	0.008 (	0.039, 0.023)
Episodic memory 103.99 (101.73, 106.26) 	0.485 (	1.003, 0.033) 0.011 (	0.017, 0.039)
TTD model
Processing speed 94.79 (91.48, 98.10) 0.339 (	0.449, 1.127) 0.016 (	0.028, 0.060)
Vocabulary 97.32 (94.01, 100.63) 0.141 (	0.683, 0.965) 0.015 (	0.031, 0.061)
Global cognition 99.49 (96.62, 102.35) 0.412 (	0.224, 1.048) 0.001 (	0.030, 0.032)
Verbal fluency 100.56 (97.81, 103.31) 	0.087 (	0.999, 0.825) 0.032 (	0.020, 0.084)
Word recognition 99.50 (95.60, 103.41) 	0.157 (	0.829, 0.515) 0.031 (	0.008, 0.070)
Face recognition 97.25 (94.01, 100.48) 	0.096 (	1.016, 0.824) 0.024 (	0.028, 0.076)
Episodic memory 98.57 (95.05, 102.09) 0.222 (	0.512, 0.956) 0.007 (	0.032, 0.046)
Note. Bold values indicate p  .01; TTD  time-to-death; G  general ability factor.
Table 3
Parameter Estimates (99% Confidence Intervals) From the Models of Performance on the Seven Cognitive Tasks Based on Age and
Time-To-Death, Excluding Participants With MMSE  24 (n  606)
Intercept Age/TTD Age2/TTD2
Age model
Processing speed 105.72 (102.23, 109.21) 0.951 (1.577, 0.325) 0.011 (	0.025, 0.047)
Vocabulary 101.72 (96.16, 107.28) 	0.266 (	0.918, 0.386) 0.010 (	0.023, 0.043)
Global cognition 103.26 (101.07, 105.44) 	0.004 (	0.375, 0.367) 	0.012 (	0.033, 0.009)
Verbal fluency 104.66 (98.59, 110.74) 	0.509 (	1.130, 0.112) 0.015 (	0.013, 0.043)
Word recognition 102.83 (99.56, 106.10) 	0.112 (	0.877, 0.653) 	0.006 (	0.042, 0.030)
Face recognition 102.14 (98.99, 105.28) 	0.293 (	1.022, 0.436) 	0.003 (	0.039, 0.033)
Episodic memory 103.87 (100.80, 106.94) 	0.157 (	0.628, 0.314) 	0.007 (	0.035, 0.021)
TTD model
Processing speed 96.68 (92.74, 100.62) 0.065 (	0.757, 0.887) 0.032 (	0.017, 0.081)
Vocabulary 99.27 (95.16, 103.38) 	0.065 (	0.892, 0.762) 0.026 (	0.026, 0.078)
Global cognition 100.94 (98.41, 103.47) 	0.025 (	0.486, 0.436) 0.020 (	0.008, 0.048)
Verbal fluency 102.53 (99.68, 105.38) 	0.265 (	1.092, 0.562) 0.036 (	0.016, 0.088)
Word recognition 99.57 (94.81, 104.33) 	0.005 (	0.639, 0.629) 0.008 (	0.028, 0.044)
Face recognition 98.71 (95.36, 102.06) 	0.204 (	1.165, 0.757) 0.031 (	0.023, 0.085)
Episodic memory 101.44 (96.94, 105.94) 	0.041 (	0.662, 0.580) 0.014 (	0.022, 0.050)
Note. Bold values indicate p  .01; TTD  time-to-death; G  general ability factor.
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p  .0002), face recognition (t871  3.15, p  .0017), and episodic
memory (t894  3.15, p  .0017) at baseline. There were, how-
ever, no significant differences in years of education (t892 
	1.18, p  .24) or marital status [
2(3)  5.3, p  .15]. The
participants in the analysis sample were, on average, fairly well
educated and cognitively intact.
The two models testing age and time-to-death dedifferentia-
tion are shown in Table 2. The first column of values is the
estimate of the intercept for each of the cognitive tests at age 70
(or at death for the TTD model) for a participant with general
ability score of zero (i.e., mean level of general ability), with
each cognitive test score standardized to M  100 and SD  10.
The second column is the effect per decade of age (or per
decade closer to death), while the third column is the quadratic
effect per decade of age (or per decade closer to death). The
fourth column is the effect of general ability, which would be
expected to reflect ability on each of the tests. The fifth column
is the effect of ability differentiation, where negative values
indicate that G accounts for less of the variability in perfor-
mance at higher levels of performance. The sixth column is the
effect of age/TTD differentiation, where positive values in the
age model indicate that G accounts for more of the variability
across cognitive domains as age increases (i.e., age dedifferen-
tiation), whereas negative values in the TTD model indicate that
G accounts for more of the variability across cognitive domains
as time-to-death decreases (i.e., TTD dedifferentiation). The
final column is the interaction between age/TTD differentiation
and ability differentiation, where negative values in the age
model or positive values in the TTD model indicate that age/
TTD dedifferentiation decreases at higher ability levels.
G Ability differentiation Age/TTD differentiation Ability  Age/TTD differentiation
6.903 (5.151, 8.655) 	0.762 (	1.836, 0.312) 0.009 (	0.197, 0.215) 0.067 (	0.044, 0.178)
7.505 (5.885, 9.125) 	0.224 (	1.844, 1.396) 	0.012 (	0.192, 0.168) 	0.001 (	0.163, 0.161)
4.063 (2.505, 5.621) 1.647 (3.041, 0.253) 0.348 (0.137, 0.559) 0.240 (0.425, 0.055)
6.202 (3.814, 8.590) 0.760 (	0.919, 2.439) 	0.058 (	0.300, 0.184) 	0.074 (	0.239, 0.091)
3.979 (2.045, 5.913) 3.320 (5.115, 1.525) 0.204 (	0.015, 0.423) 0.029 (	0.190, 0.248)
1.567 (	0.532, 3.666) 	1.386 (	3.645, 0.873) 0.136 (	0.137, 0.409) 	0.006 (	0.258, 0.246)
4.094 (2.559, 5.629) 1.710 (3.204, 0.216) 0.287 (0.084, 0.490) 0.003 (	0.262, 0.268)
8.202 (6.487, 9.917) 0.572 (	0.567, 1.711) 	0.149 (	0.347, 0.049) 	0.091 (	0.248, 0.066)
6.985 (5.166, 8.804) 0.655 (	0.764, 2.074) 0.030 (	0.179, 0.239) 	0.135 (	0.313, 0.043)
10.316 (7.843, 12.789) 3.840 (5.244, 2.436) 0.470 (0.728, 0.212) 0.040 (	0.171, 0.251)
6.025 (3.689, 8.361) 	0.203 (	1.700, 1.294) 	0.046 (	0.381, 0.289) 0.069 (	0.199, 0.337)
8.040 (5.657, 10.423) 3.143 (4.943, 1.343) 0.324 (0.569, 0.079) 0.059 (	0.183, 0.301)
4.955 (2.521, 7.389) 	1.409 (	3.194, 0.376) 0.293 (0.553, 0.033) 0.023 (	0.180, 0.226)
9.335 (7.176, 11.494) 1.697 (3.338, 0.056) 0.397 (0.616, 0.178) 0.035 (	0.145, 0.215)
G Ability differentiation Age/TTD differentiation Ability  Age/TTD differentiation
6.320 (4.020, 8.620) 	1.451 (	5.495, 2.593) 	0.063 (	0.277, 0.151) 0.240 (	0.054, 0.534)
6.946 (3.433, 10.459) 	0.664 (	6.990, 5.662) 	0.128 (	0.331, 0.075) 0.095 (	0.281, 0.471)
2.971 (1.505, 4.437) 	0.817 (	2.996, 1.362) 0.037 (	0.066, 0.140) 0.059 (	0.083, 0.201)
6.018 (3.651, 8.385) 1.528 (	0.319, 3.375) 	0.135 (	0.372, 0.102) 	0.102 (	0.249, 0.045)
3.040 (1.443, 4.637) 	2.175 (	6.966, 2.616) 0.132 (	0.136, 0.400) 	0.032 (	0.279, 0.215)
0.702 (	1.194, 2.598) 	0.385 (	2.654, 1.884) 0.113 (	0.165, 0.391) 0.043 (	0.284, 0.370)
4.002 (0.643, 7.361) 	2.184 (	5.847, 1.479) 0.046 (	0.178, 0.270) 0.125 (	0.117, 0.367)
6.201 (4.279, 8.123) 1.743 (	1.629, 5.115) 	0.043 (	0.280, 0.194) 	0.198 (	0.414, 0.018)
5.197 (3.160, 7.234) 1.222 (	2.572, 5.016) 0.092 (	0.184, 0.368) 	0.191 (	0.361, 	0.021)
4.434 (3.362, 5.506) 0.112 (	1.598, 1.822) 	0.147 (	0.294, 0.000) 	0.074 (	0.182, 0.034)
4.198 (1.906, 6.490) 0.225 (	2.619, 3.069) 0.104 (	0.156, 0.364) 0.069 (	0.209, 0.347)
6.588 (1.854, 11.322) 	3.760 (	9.434, 1.914) 	0.320 (	0.642, 0.002) 0.189 (	0.099, 0.477)
2.836 (0.332, 5.340) 0.576 (	3.095, 4.247) 	0.154 (	0.430, 0.122) 	0.090 (	0.505, 0.325)
5.863 (3.638, 8.088) 	1.582 (	5.147, 1.983) 	0.188 (	0.389, 0.013) 0.032 (	0.133, 0.197)
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The effect of primary interest was that of age/TTD dedifferen-
tiation. In the age-based model, significant age dedifferentiation
was observed only for global cognition and episodic memory,
suggesting G accounted for larger amounts of variance on these
two tasks at older age, independent of ability. In the time-to-death
model, significant TTD dedifferentiation was observed in four of
the seven domains, with G accounting for more of the variance in
global cognition, word recognition, face recognition, and episodic
memory performance as death approached. In addition, significant
ability differentiation was observed for global cognition, word
recognition, and episodic memory in both models, suggesting that
G accounted for more of the variance on these tasks in those with
poorer general ability. There was also a significant interaction
between age dedifferentiation and ability differentiation on global
cognition, suggesting that the effect of age dedifferentiation is
decreased at higher levels of performance. There was no signifi-
cant effect of TTD or TTD2 on any of the tests, while processing
speed performance decreased significantly by 0.1 standard devia-
tion per decade of age. Not surprisingly, general ability (G) had
strong positive associations with all of the cognitive tests, although
the effect did not reach significance ( p  .055) for face recogni-
tion in the age-based model.
The fit of the models presented in Table 1 was tested by
repeatedly excluding single cognitive tests from the models. For
example, the 	2 log likelihood of the age-based model increased
from 44920.2 to 45029.0 [
2(6)  108.8, p  .0001] after exclud-
ing face recognition, indicating that the model fit was significantly
better when face recognition was included. Exclusion of each of
the cognitive tests significantly decreased the fit of both the age
model [
2(6) range 108.8 to 759.1, p  .0001] and the time-to-
death model [
2(6) range 105.4 to 767.3, p  .0001]. Conse-
quently, all of the cognitive tests were retained in the models.
In a further analysis to examine whether the observed dediffer-
entiation effects were attributable to dementia, the models in Table
2 were estimated with the exclusion of participants who scored 
24 on the MMSE [n  606, 81 (11.8%) excluded]. These models
are shown in Table 3. All of the age dedifferentiation, TTD
dedifferentiation, and ability differentiation effects became non-
significant after this exclusion.
Discussion
Significant age dedifferentiation was observed on two of the
seven cognitive tests, global cognition, and episodic memory,
while significant time-to-death (TTD) dedifferentiation was ob-
served on four of the tests: global cognition, word recognition, face
recognition, and episodic memory. This is the first study to exam-
ine dedifferentiation as a function of time-to-death. As the effects
of TTD dedifferentiation were more consistent than the effects of
age dedifferentiation, any strengthening in the relationship be-
tween general and specific abilities as a function of advancing age
appears to be attributable to increasing pathology in proximity to
death. This finding was as predicted and likely reflects the closer
relationship of pathology with time-to-death than chronological
age (Johansson et al., 2004; Kerber, Whitman, Brown, & Baloh,
2006; Sliwinski, Hofer, & Hall, 2003). However, after excluding
participants with possible cognitive impairment, nearly all of the
age/TTD dedifferentiation effects were markedly attenuated and
all became nonsignificant. Consequently, the effects were not
sufficiently robust to support the theory of age dedifferentiation.
The findings suggest that brain pathology, both as a result of
dementia and mortality-related biological events, is likely to play
a significant role in any late-life dedifferentiation of cognitive
abilities. Dedifferentiation was not found to be an inevitable con-
sequence of aging.
Memory was found to be the primary domain of functioning,
where some evidence of dedifferentiation was observed, with
episodic memory, face recognition, and word recognition all show-
ing dedifferentiation in proximity to death. As dementia results in
a broad range of memory declines (Spaan, Raaijmakers, & Jonker,
2003), it is perhaps not surprising that the observed effects disap-
peared after accounting for cognitive impairment. Likewise, the
global cognition measure, the MMSE, is sensitive to dementia
(Mitchell, 2009) and showed dedifferentiation as a function of both
age and time-to-death. The MMSE includes a memory component,
with the recall items being the most difficult for people with
dementia (Teng, Chui, Schneider, & Metzger, 1987). Processing
speed also declines as a result of aging; however, decrements in
processing speed are observed in the absence of pathological aging
processes. The lack of dedifferentiation in processing speed is
therefore further evidence that dedifferentiation is a product of
pathological rather than normative aging. Verbal performance
(verbal fluency, vocabulary) is generally robust to the normative
and pathological effects of aging, so it is not surprising that no
dedifferentiation was observed on the verbal tasks.
The absence of robust age dedifferentiation effects was in line
with a growing body of research in this area (for example, Anstey
et al., 2003; Tucker-Drob, 2009; Tucker-Drob & Salthouse, 2008;
Zelinski & Lewis, 2003). Age-related dedifferentiation is proposed
to be the result of common or normative constraints on functioning
in late adulthood (Li & Lindenberger, 1999). It may be that in
community-based cohorts that vary widely in both ability and
pathology, age-related effects are so diverse that they cannot be
classified as “common.” While age dedifferentiation may be ob-
served in certain cohorts and on specific measures, alternative
developmental models for late-life cognition should be explored.
Such models need to better account for multiple trajectories that
occur in response to both normative aging and the range of
pathologies that occur in late life. Furthermore, the lack of evi-
dence for age dedifferentiation suggests that the decline of abilities
in old age is not as analogous to the development of abilities in
childhood as suggested by the differentiation-dedifferentiation hy-
pothesis.
The results also provide little evidence for a relationship be-
tween neurobiological dedifferentiation and cognitive dedifferen-
tiation. Park et al. (2002) suggest that while there are few changes
in the structure of working memory across the lifespan, changes in
processing speed may be broadly implicated in a range of cogni-
tive abilities. This explanation for how neuronal compensation
may lead to changes in the relationship between cognitive abilities
is based on the common cause theory of aging (Salthouse, 1996).
However, processing speed would appear to have less association
with the tasks that showed any evidence of age dedifferentiation in
the present study—particularly face recognition, word recognition,
and global function—than on tasks that showed no evidence of
dedifferentiation, particularly speeded tasks such as verbal flu-
ency. Thus, it would seem that the patterns of relationships ob-
served show little evidence of the recruitment of higher order
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abilities, such as processing speed, to perform lower order tasks. It
could be argued that higher order retrieval processes may be
implicated in the observed dedifferentiation effects, which tended
to be related to memory. However, these effects do not appear to
be the result of normative aging processes in the present cohort.
Rather, such higher order recruitment may only be occurring in
response to pathological processes, most likely the effects of
preclinical dementia. The critical link between less distinctive
cortical representations in the aging brain and increased relation-
ships among cognitive abilities proposed by Li et al. (2001) could
not be supported by the present study.
There were some limitations to the present study. The cognitive
measures used were selected at the beginning of the study 20 years
ago. Alternative measures covering a wider range of cognitive
domains might provide further insight into the phenomena of
interest. The use of single cognitive tests to measure each domain
of ability also precludes assessing the common variance across
multiple tests of the same ability, which may make it harder to
detect dedifferentiation effects. However, it is generally not feasi-
ble to repeatedly administer a large battery of cognitive tests to a
large community-based sample that is retested every 4 years. There
are few community-based studies that have the breadth of data of
the Canberra Longitudinal Study. Nevertheless, other study de-
signs may be better able to account for a wider range of abilities
and assess each ability using multiple tests. Secondly, only cross-
sectional cognitive information was used in the present analysis.
The complexity of the structural equation model used for this
analysis precluded adaptation to a longitudinal analysis. Other
methods for longitudinal examination of dedifferentiation may
reveal more about the phenomenon by examining within-
individual patterns of change in the relationship between abilities
(Anstey et al., 2003; Sliwinski, Hofer, Hall, Buschke, & Lipton,
2003; Zelinski & Lewis, 2003). Other types of analyses that
account for intraindividual change may also provide greater insight
into relationships between terminal decline and dedifferentiation.
However, the current cross-sectional analysis was sufficient to
show that the dedifferentiation effects were not robust when de-
mentia was excluded. Finally, while the role of background factors
such as gender, education, social support, and mental health may
be investigated in relation to dedifferentiation, the lack of evidence
for age dedifferentiation in the present study rendered any such
investigation largely unnecessary.
In conclusion, little support was found for the age dedifferenti-
ation hypothesis in the present study, and dedifferentiation was
found to result from dementia and terminal pathology rather than
being an inevitable outcome of advanced age. The lack of robust
age dedifferentiation effects is in line with the findings of Tucker-
Drob (2009), who accounted for ability differentiation using a
similar method. The necessity to use models that account for
confounding by ability dedifferentiation remains clear. Further
research should examine the conditions that are associated with the
emergence of age-associated dedifferentiation effects, particularly
examining whether such effects are associated with subsequent
conversion to dementia. Examining the range of individual late-life
cognitive trajectories (Lovden et al., 2005) or explicitly decom-
posing cognitive performance as a function of preclinical demen-
tia, study attrition, terminal decline, and chronological age (Sli-
winski, Hofer, Hall, et al., 2003) may enable further exploration of
the role of pathology in dedifferentiation. The present findings
with respect to dedifferentiation as a function of time-to-death are
novel and suggest that dedifferentiation is not a phenomenon that
results from normative aging.
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Abstract
Purpose Six previous reviews have found a relationship
between depression and mortality. However, many past
studies have failed to adequately control for the role of
physical health. A proposed mechanism of the depression–
mortality relationship suggests that physical health may
mediate the relationship. The present study used new
methods to examine relationships between mental health
symptoms and mortality in an elderly community cohort
while accounting for potential mediation of these rela-
tionships by physical health.
Method 896 community-dwelling participants aged 70–97
were assessed four times over 12 years and vital status was
tracked for up to 17 years. Relationships of depression and
anxiety with survival time, controlling for physical health,
age and gender, were tested using Cox proportional hazards
regressions embedded in structural equation models.
Results A significant unadjusted relationship between
depression symptoms and mortality (HR = 1.09, p \ .001)
was attenuated to non-significance after controlling for
measures of physical health (HR = 1.03, p = .18). No
significant relationship was found between anxiety symp-
toms and mortality.
Conclusions The relationship between depression and
mortality was accounted for by physical health status in
this cohort. This finding casts doubt on studies that report a
relationship between depression and mortality without
adequately considering the effect of physical health.
Keywords Mortality  Depression  Anxiety 
Physical health
Introduction
There is a large body of literature examining whether
depression is a risk factor for death. Evidence for the rela-
tionship has been summarized in six reviews, each of which
has concluded that depression is associated with an increased
all-cause mortality rate [1–6]. The earliest of these, a review
of 57 studies published between 1966 and 1996 [6] found 29
(51%) reported a positive relationship between depression
and mortality. A follow-up review of 61 articles published
between 1996 and 2001 [5] reported that 72% had positive
findings. A meta-analysis [4] reported a combined odds ratio
for mortality with depression of 1.73 (95% CI 1.53-1.95).
The most recent review [2] reported a relative risk for mor-
tality in depressed subjects of 1.81 (95% CI 1.58–2.07)
compared to non-depressed subjects. However, Wulsin et al.
[6] cautioned against drawing strong conclusions about the
nature of the relationship due to (a) a lack of adequate con-
trolling for confounders, (b) the potential of publication bias
in favor of positive studies and (c) the heterogeneity of
samples and methods used in the studies.
With respect to the first of these limitations, 44% of the
57 studies reported by Wulsin et al. [6], 33% of the 61
studies reported by Schulz et al. [5], and 79% of the 21
studies reported by Saz and Dewey [4] did not control for
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physical health status. Moreover, very few of the studies
used objective measures of health status, with most using
less reliable measures such as presence/absence of chronic
disease or disease counts. Only one of the 57 studies
reviewed by Wulsin et al. [6] controlled for both the effect
of physical health and other potential confounders of the
relationship such as smoking, alcohol use and suicide. The
strength of evidence for an association between depression
and mortality is further diminished by the inconsistency of
the effect over extended follow-up periods, in heteroge-
neous populations or using a variety of methods. Saz and
Dewey [4] found that the odds ratio of depression on
mortality appears to be significantly attenuated over time,
in that studies with longer follow-up periods predicted
smaller effect sizes. Studies examining community samples
rather than clinical populations have tended to report mixed
or null effects, with only 4 of the 12 (33%) high-quality
community studies reviewed by Wulsin et al. [6] reporting
positive findings. Furthermore, the majority of the studies
reviewed used a clinical diagnosis or a cut-off on a scale as
the depression measure, rather than investigating the con-
tinuum of depressive symptomatology. Using diagnostic
instruments to create binary categorizations of participants
precludes drawing conclusions on the incremental impact
of depression severity on mortality.
Many mechanisms for the association between depression
and mortality have been proposed [2]. Schulz et al. [5] pre-
sented a general theoretical model proposing that depressive
symptoms either lead directly to mortality or are mediated by
a cascade of risk factors ranging from behavioral and bio-
logical factors to subclinical and clinical disease. Cuijpers
and Schoevers [2] describe a model of the relationship that
suggests physical health status might play a mediating role.
Specifically, depression may directly increase vulnerability
to physical illness by compromising physiological systems,
particularly through changes in immune response. There is
evidence that depression promotes increased production of
inflammatory cytokines and reduced cellular immune
response [7]. Such changes in immunological processes have
been implicated in a range of conditions including cardio-
vascular disease, arthritis, type 2 diabetes, certain cancers,
frailty and functional decline [7]. Other physiological
responses associated with depression include increased
platelet aggregation and heart rate variability brought about
by dysregulation of the autonomic nervous system [8], both
of which increase the risk of cardiovascular disease. In
addition, there is evidence that depression is associated with
hazardous health behaviors, including smoking, alcohol use
and poor diet, that lead to further declines in physical health
[2]. As people with poorer physical health are more likely to
die, the interactions between physical health and depression
may account for much of the association between depression
and mortality. Given the methodological inadequacies of
some previous studies, the relationship between depression
on mortality may have been overstated and requires more
thorough testing.
There have been fewer studies on the relationship
between anxiety and mortality. One review has examined
the effects of an array of mental disorders on mortality
among patient cohorts [3]. Harris and Barraclough [3]
found increased risks of premature death for all disorders.
Their review examined four studies of ‘‘neurosis’’, one of
‘‘anxiety neurosis’’ and one of panic disorder. Harris and
Barraclough [3] reported that the risk of death from all
causes was significantly greater for those with neurosis or
panic disorder but not for anxiety neurosis. A more recent
meta-analytic review of seven studies of the impact of
anxiety on mortality in elderly cohorts [9] concluded that
although anxiety diagnoses tended to be associated with
mortality, the effect was not significant. The review also
reported that there was no association found between levels
of anxiety symptoms and mortality.
The present study sought to determine whether depression
and anxiety symptoms were associated with long-term all-
cause mortality in an elderly community sample and to
explore the impact of controlling for physical health status.
To better account for the complex pattern of relationships
between mental health, physical health and mortality, a
recently developed statistical method was used for the anal-
ysis. The majority of studies investigating the effect of
depression on mortality have used Cox proportional hazards
regression, with time to death as the outcome. However, Cox
proportional hazards regression cannot directly test whether
one independent variable mediates the effect of another on
the survival outcome. Structural equation modeling (SEM)
allows theories of mediation to be assessed, and has been
applied widely to conventional regression analyses [10].
However, until recently SEM software has not accommo-
dated survival data. By employing a Cox proportional haz-
ards regression model within a SEM context using the Mplus
application [11], it is possible to test for mediation when
modeling survival data. We hypothesized a significant direct
relationship between depression and mortality. After
accounting for physical health, the indirect effect of
depression on mortality was hypothesized to be non-signifi-
cant, particularly given the advanced age of the cohort and
the extended follow-up period. Any relationship between
anxiety and mortality was hypothesized to be non-significant.
Method
Participants
The Canberra Longitudinal Study was an epidemiological
survey of mental health and cognitive functioning in older
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people that commenced in 1990. The study design has been
detailed by Christensen et al. [12]. Eight hundred and
ninety-six participants (456 men and 440 women) aged 70
or older at the time of the baseline assessment were
recruited for the baseline assessment. All participants were
initially living in the community in the cities of Canberra
or Queanbeyan, Australia. The sample selection was
stratified by age and gender. Participants were sampled
from the compulsory electoral roll, with 69% responding.
Approval for the research was obtained from the Ethics in
Human Experimentation Committee of The Australian
National University.
Survey procedure
Participants were interviewed up to four times over 12
years. Baseline interviews lasted approximately 2 h,
incorporating a survey measuring a wide range of risk
factors including socio-demographics, physical health and
disease status, mental health status, cognitive performance
and social support. Interviews also included physical
assessments of blood pressure, lung function, grip strength,
vision and reaction time. Trained professional interviewers
conducted the interviews.
Of the original sample of 896 participants, 185 (20.6%)
were deceased by 4 years, 363 (40.5%) were deceased by 8
years and 544 (60.7%) were deceased by 12 years. At the
end of vital status collection in June 2007, 687 (76.7%) of
the participants were deceased. Of the participants who
remained in the study, 14.1% (100/711) refused or were
unable to complete the first follow-up interview, 21.1%
(100/474) for the second follow-up and 21.1% (57/270) for
the third follow-up.
Measures
Mortality status and date of death were established by
contacting relatives, searching the National Death Index
and from death notices in the local newspaper. Mortality
status was followed for up to 17 years, from the start of
baseline interviews in September 1990 until 30 June 2007.
Survival was calculated as the time from the baseline
interview to death for deceased participants, or from
baseline until 30 June 2007 for surviving (right-censored)
participants. For six participants with unknown day of
death, the day was set to the 15th of the month. For two
participants with an unknown month of death, the month
was set to June.
Depression and anxiety symptoms were measured using
the Goldberg Depression and Anxiety Scales [13], which
each comprise nine items that measure symptoms of
affective disorders in the 4 weeks prior to reporting. The
number of ‘‘yes’’ responses were summed for these scales
to derive two scores (range 0–9), with higher scores
reflecting a greater level of depression/anxiety. Age and
gender were reported during the initial interview. Several
indices of physical health were measured in the study. Four
of these measures were chosen as being objective health
measures that cover different aspects of physical wellbeing.
Heart attack history and hypertension history were inclu-
ded as dichotomous variables, based on self-report at the
initial interview. Grip strength was taken using a Smedley
hand dynamometer which measures the force exerted in
kilograms [14]. A scale of functional ability was based on
difficulty ratings for eight Activities of Daily Living
(ADLs), including transportation, walking, getting out of
bed, getting out of a chair, dressing and bathing. Using a
four-point response scale (no difficulty, some difficulty but
no help needed, need help, bedridden) for the eight items,
functional ability scores ranged from 0 to 24, with higher
scores indicating greater functional disability.
Analyses
Survival time was graphed using Kaplan–Meier curves and
modeled using Cox proportional hazards regression anal-
yses within a SEM framework. A series of three Cox
regression analyses were completed using structural mod-
eling [11], for both depression and anxiety: (i) a univariate
model (depression or anxiety only), (ii) a model with age
and gender included and (iii) a model with age, gender and
physical health measures included and accounting for the
relationship between depression and physical health in the
structural model. Mediation by physical health of the
relationship between depression/anxiety and mortality was
tested by comparing model (iii) with an identical model
(iv) that omitted the relationship between depression/anx-
iety and mortality, using the difference in -2 log likeli-
hood values that are distributed as v2 for nested models. No
significant change between the fit of model (iv) and model
(iii) would indicate full mediation of the depression/mor-
tality relationship by physical health. To comprehensively
measure multiple aspects of physical health, four measures
were included in the model: heart attack history, hyper-
tension history, grip strength and functional disability.
These measures were chosen to be somewhat independent
measures of past and present physical health, with absolute
correlation coefficients less than 0.1 for every pairing
except functional disability and grip strength (r = -.41).
Consequently, a robust latent variable could not be con-
structed, so the physical health measures remained separate
in the structural equation models. The four models are
shown in Fig. 1. Among the variables used in the analysis,
3% of the sample had one missing value and a further 3%
of the sample had two or more missing values, resulting in
a sample size of 865 for the depression analyses and 870
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for the anxiety analyses. Stata version 10 was used to
construct Kaplan–Meier survival curves, while Mplus
version 5.1 was used for the modeling.
Results
Among the cohort of 896 participants, the mean initial age
was 77 (range 70–97), with males representing 51% of the
stratified sample. Participants had a mean of 2.0 depression
symptoms and 2.5 anxiety symptoms. Thirteen percent of
the sample had four or more depression symptoms, while
19% had four or more anxiety symptoms. Participants had
a mean of 11 years of education. Considering the age of the
cohort, participants were reasonably healthy at baseline,
with 18% reporting heart attack history and 42% with
hypertension history. Most of the participants had high
functional ability, with 36% requiring no assistance for any
of the eight listed activities and a further 46% requiring
assistance for just one or two of the activities.
Kaplan–Meier curves show the univariate relationships
between depression (Fig. 2) and anxiety (Fig. 3) with
mortality. For these figures, the Goldberg scales were split
at a value of four, which represented the approximate 80th
percentile of depression or anxiety levels in this sample.
Figure 2 shows that participants with elevated depression
tended to have a higher mortality rate than those lower or
no depression, as there was evident separation between
these groups. The overlap of the two curves in Fig. 3
suggests that there was no effect of elevated anxiety,
although more anxious participants appeared to have a
lower mortality rate after the eighth year.
Table 1 shows the Cox regression models for mortality
using (a) only depression symptoms, (b) adjusting for age
and gender and (c) adding the effect of physical health and
adjusting for the effect of depression on physical health.
Table 2 shows parameters for the same models using anx-
iety symptoms. The coefficients in the tables are hazard
ratios for the effects of depression/anxiety, age and gender
on mortality and standardized path coefficients for the
effects of physical health on mortality and depression/
anxiety on physical health. The univariate hazard ratio (HR)
for depression on mortality was 1.09 (p \ .001), suggesting
mortality risk increased by 9% for each depression
Fig. 1 Structural equation/Cox regression models used to examine relationships between depression/anxiety and mortality: (i) univariate model,
(ii) adjusted for age and gender, (iii) adjusted for age, gender and physical health latent variable, and (iv) testing mediation by physical health
Fig. 2 Kaplan–Meier curve of mortality over 17 years based on
presence/absence of elevated depression symptoms
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symptom. This changed little after adjusting for age and
gender (HR = 1.10, p \ .001). However, after adjusting for
age, gender, the physical health measures and the rela-
tionship between depression and physical health, the HR
was 1.03 (p = .18). To examine whether the depression–
mortality relationship provided a significant contribution to
the adjusted model, the likelihood functions for models (iii)
and (iv) were compared (see Fig. 1). The difference in
-2 log likelihood, which is distributed as v2 (1), was 1.18
(p = .28), suggesting that the direct path from depression to
mortality could be omitted from the model.
Anxiety symptoms had a univariate HR for mortality of
1.004 (p = 0.82) and 1.03 (p = .08) after adjusting for age
and gender (Table 2). After adjusting for age, gender and
physical health status, the HR was 0.99 (p = .49). The
difference in -2 log likelihood between models (iii) and
(iv) was 0.24 (p = .62), suggesting that the direct path
from anxiety to mortality did not contribute significantly
to the model. In both the depression and anxiety models,
older age and male gender were, predictably, significantly
associated with higher rates of death. Weaker grip strength,
increased physical disability and history of heart attack or
hypertension were also associated with increased mortality.
Depression and anxiety were both associated with weaker
grip strength and increased physical disability, however,
only anxiety was associated with an increased likelihood of
reporting a history of heart attack or hypertension.
Discussion
In this cohort of community-dwelling elderly participants,
the relationship between more depression symptoms and
greater mortality was accounted for by physical health
status. Structural models demonstrated a strong association
between depression symptoms and poorer physical health.
These findings provide further evidence that the observed
univariate relationship between depression and mortality
may be due to the strong associations of physical health
with both depression and mortality. There was no rela-
tionship between anxiety symptoms and mortality, a pro-
tective effect of anxiety on mortality was found after
controlling for physical health. The present study tested the
proposed mechanism that the association between depres-
sion and mortality was mediated by physical health. There
was strong evidence for a relationship between depression
and physical health, supporting the hypothesis that the
depression–mortality relationship is a result of physical
health. This finding may be reflective of the physiological
effects of depression, specifically, immunological and
cardiac processes which are strongly associated with
mortality risk [7, 8]. While there is a strong association
between depression and morbidity, there appears to be no
direct link between depression and mortality.
The results for depression are somewhat inconsistent
with previous research. However, reviews of the depression
Fig. 3 Kaplan–Meier curve of mortality over 17 years based on
presence/absence of elevated anxiety symptoms
Table 1 Cox proportional
hazards regression models
predicting time to death over 17
years of follow-up using
depression symptoms
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01;
*** p \ .001
a Path coefficients presented
instead of hazard ratios
Model (i)
Univariate hazard
ratio (95% CI)
Model (ii)
?Age and gender
Model (iii)
?Health status
Goldberg depression score 1.09 (1.04, 1.13)*** 1.10 (1.05, 1.14)*** 1.03 (0.99, 1.08)
Age 1.10 (1.08, 1.12)*** 1.08 (1.06, 1.09)***
Male gender 1.71 (1.46, 2.00)*** 2.69 (2.07, 3.51)***
Grip strength 0.97 (0.96, 0.99)***
Physical disability (ADL) 1.11 (1.07, 1.15)***
Heart attack history 1.40 (1.16, 1.70)***
Hypertension history 1.28 (1.09, 1.50)**
Depression ? grip strengtha -1.19 (-1.50, -0.88)***
Depression ? ADLa 0.40 (0.31, 0.49)***
Depression ? heart attacka 0.03 (-0.06, 0.11)
Depression ? hypertensiona 0.06 (-0.01, 0.13)
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research have noted that many of the studies examined
insufficiently controlled for physical health [4, 6], with
control variables often limited to binary measures of disease
presence. Despite this methodological inadequacy, only
62% of the combined articles reviewed by Wulsin et al. [6]
and Schulz et al. [5] reported positive findings, suggesting
that the relationship may only be observed in specific
populations, particularly clinical populations. Other differ-
ences from previous studies may also contribute to the
divergence in findings. The majority of reviewed studies
have examined depression or anxiety as a binary diagnostic
measure. The continuous measures used in the present study
allowed for the continuum of symptomatology, rather than
examining the upper tail of the distribution. The reviews
also included studies of clinical and medical cohorts and
studies primarily consisted of middle-aged and early-old
aged cohorts. The present study used a community sample
that was comparatively older. It is possible that using a
more highly symptomatic clinical population may result in
different relationships and that the impact of depressive
illness on mortality may occur earlier in the lifespan. Fur-
thermore, as Wulsin et al. [6] reported, the relationship
between depression and mortality becomes weaker over
extended follow-up periods. The 17-year follow-up of the
present study is longer than that of any of the reviewed
community-based studies of elderly cohorts [4–6].
There are limitations to this study that should be noted.
The depression and anxiety measures involved a symptom
count rather than a diagnostic instrument. As previously
observed, there are advantages to using a measure that
assesses a range of severities, including non-clinical states.
However, this conceptualization of depression or anxiety
may not always be in accordance with diagnosis based on
DSM or ICD criteria. Symptom scales do not reveal the
prevalence in the sample of chronic disorders (e.g., dys-
thymia), acute disorders (e.g., major depressive episode) or
subclinical states. The administration of a more compre-
hensive clinical measure that could reliably assess mood
and anxiety disorders was not feasible in this large epide-
miological study. Secondly, depression tends to be an
episodic illness, whereas the depression measure captured
only those individuals who experienced symptoms in the 4
weeks prior to the baseline survey. Examining lifetime
history of depressive episodes may result in a different
outcome. Thirdly, while the model provided a formal test
of mediation, it was not possible to fully account for
temporal effects using the present dataset. Specifically, the
onset of depression may have preceded physical health
problems in some cases. Nevertheless, the strong attenua-
tion of the direct effect of depression on mortality is a clear
evidence of confounding by physical health status and
indicates possible mediation of the effect. Finally, the
analyses did not account for other measures related to
mortality, including cognitive performance, education,
socioeconomic status, subjective health, health behaviors,
additional physical diseases and additional markers of
physical health, including objective markers for cancer and
other diseases. Measures that are closely related to
depression, such as subjective health ratings, were omitted
to ensure that the attenuation of the effect was not entirely
due to multicollinearity. However, the small number of
health indices used in the Cox regression model fully
accounted for the direct effect of depression, despite no
direct adjustment for the presence of cancer, respiratory
disease or many other diseases. Further adjustments were
consequently deemed unnecessary. While mediation of the
depression–mortality effect is primarily through physical
health, indirect mediation through health behaviors such as
inactivity, sleep problems or substance use [5] and the
direct effect of suicide were not tested.
Future research should aim to clarify how the type of
sample and methods of measurement affect relationships
Table 2 Cox proportional
hazards regression models
predicting time to death over 17
years of follow-up using anxiety
symptoms
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01;
*** p \ .001
a Path coefficients presented
instead of hazard ratios
Model (i)
Univariate hazard
ratio (95% CI)
Model (ii)
?Age and gender
Model (iii)
?Health status
Goldberg anxiety score 1.00 (0.97, 1.04) 1.03 (1.00, 1.07) 0.99 (0.95, 1.02)
Age 1.10 (1.08, 1.12)*** 1.07 (1.05, 1.09)***
Gender 1.65 (1.41, 1.93)*** 0.37 (0.29, 0.48)**
Grip strength 0.97 (0.96, 0.98)***
Physical disability (ADL) 1.12 (1.08, 1.16)***
Heart attack history 1.42 (1.17, 1.72)***
Hypertension history 1.29 (1.10, 1.51)**
Anxiety ? grip strengtha -0.88 (-1.15, -0.61)***
Anxiety ? ADLa 0.22 (0.15, 0.29)***
Anxiety ? heart attacka 0.09 (0.02, 0.16)*
Anxiety ? hypertensiona 0.09 (0.03, 0.15)**
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between mental health and mortality. In addition, a range of
specificities in the association between depression and
mortality should be examined. In particular, younger cohorts
may exhibit stronger relationships between depression and
mortality than older cohorts, there may be decay of the
relationship over long follow-up periods and the presence of
certain depressive symptoms may be more strongly predic-
tive of death than others. Regardless of the nature of the
relationship, future studies must be rigorous in accounting
for the confounding effects of physical health. While the
present study found no evidence of a relationship between
anxiety and mortality, there is a possibility for future
research to investigate whether specific types of anxiety
disorders have differential impacts on physical health and
mortality. Given the attenuation to non-significance of the
relationship between depression and mortality after ade-
quately controlling for physical health in the present study, a
degree of uncertainty may be placed upon studies that report
a strong relationship between depression and mortality
without adequately controlling for physical health.
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